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One of the most striking developments at the turn of the 21st century has been the 
increasing prominence of caring—or meeting needs—in international relations.  A wide 
and ever expanding system of international governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations exist to enhance the welfare of people around the world.  Every year 
thousands join Doctors without Borders, Islamic Relief, Partners in Health, the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement, Save the Children, World Vision, as well as local religious 
groups and service organizations to convey aid to populations struggling to meet basic 
needs.1 
 The rise of humanitarianism seems to signal a transformational moment in which 
international relations reflect greater compassion and wider agreement on the value of 
care.  Humanitarian organizations and individuals occupy a privileged position in world 
politics that allows them to negotiate with states and local leaders for access to suffering 
populations, and to call on the worldwide media to back them.  Due in part to the 
visibility of their actions, and to the risks they are seen to take, the international 
community honors humanitarians for their compassion, professionalism, and sacrifice.  
Even while international peace appears out of reach, charity and justice seem close at 
                                                
1 For a general introduction to these trends, see Peter Walker and Daniel G. Maxwell, Shaping the 
Humanitarian World, Routledge Global Institutions (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2009); Michael N. Barnett and Thomas George Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where 
Angels Fear to Tread, Routledge Global Institutions (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 
2011). 
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hand.  As one International Relations scholar put it, “If there is a symbol of 
cosmopolitanism and the possibility of moral progress, it is humanitarianism.”2 
Sadly, there is in fact no worldwide consensus on the value of care.  Every year 
hundreds of thousands of men and women leave their own countries to work as nurses, 
doctors, nannies, teachers, and domestic workers elsewhere.  In contrast to humanitarian 
groups, migrant caregivers and the advocacy organizations that support them rarely have 
power to negotiate terms of entry.  The care they provide in homes, retirement 
communities, hospitals, and other settings garner little public interest and no public 
appreciation.  At the same time humanitarianism has won worldwide respect, the 
activities of migrant doctors, nurses, nannies, and domestic workers are trivialized as 
merely different forms of labor, recognized perhaps for the remittances they contribute to 
the Gross National Product of the societies that send them, but also as a problem to be 
managed by the states that receive them, and as irrelevant to the advancement of human 
rights, human security, national security, and international ethics.  Consider that in the 
United States migrants are often called “illegal” and “undocumented” and are frequently 
subjected to policing, abuse, and public ambivalence, if not belittlement and outright 
hostility.  If we imagine referring to an American nurse in Port-au-Prince as an “illegal 
alien” or to a Haitian nurse in Minneapolis as a “humanitarian”—and we reflect on how 
unnatural these descriptions would seem—we begin to appreciate how thoroughly 
humanitarians and migrants are separated in thought and practice. 
                                                
2 Michael N. Barnett, "Humanitarian Governance," Annual Review of Political Science 16 (2013): 412.  
Michael Barnett goes on to develop a nuanced analysis of how humanitarianism represents both progress 
and politics as usual.  See also: The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
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This separation has limited our ability to think well about care in international 
relations.  This dissertation pursues a fuller accounting of the place and significance of 
care, building on the premise that any such project must attend to care in the context of 
both migration and humanitarianism.  More than a quirky juxtaposition, this wide lens 
frames new lines of inquiry, and yields significant insights. 
 
A New Approach to the Politics of Care 
Why are some forms of care valued more highly than others, and with what 
consequences?  Does the prevalence of care suggest progress in international relations?  
And how should a better understanding of the politics of care inform the ethics of care?  
These questions drive this dissertation, in each case pressing toward a new kind of 
working knowledge about care—and not only that the forms of care in the international 
system are multiple and diverse, or that the geography of care extends beyond previous 
estimates.  The principal argument in this dissertation is that hierarchy in international 
relations shapes care, producing divisions among caregivers; intensifying politics among 
states; frustrating moral progress; and presenting, more generally, a complex political 
groundwork for international ethics. 
This dissertation develops a two-part account of how a hierarchical order of 
power in international relations has produced stratification among caregivers.  My 
explanation begins with the imperial relations that predominated in the international 
history of care.  I argue, first, that from a position of relative privilege forerunners of 
North Atlantic humanitarianism dismissed and diminished the caregivers and care 
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practices they encountered in other regions of the world, in a pattern important as a 
precedent and a determinant of things to come.  Over time, distinctions between 
caregivers hardened and inequality between caregivers increased, suggesting the 
expanding presence of care in international relations has a regressive aspect. 
Turning to the present, I argue contemporary international institutions preserve 
hierarchical social relations in a way analogous to how institutions within states maintain 
divisions and asymmetries between a public sphere of politics and a private sphere of 
labor.  I use this analogy, provisionally, to try to account for why humanitarians seem to 
be special caregivers in world politics.  I suggest privileges in the global public sphere 
include representation and participation in global governance, while disadvantages of the 
global private sphere include rule by market imperatives and the denial of a share in 
power in major international organizations.  Humanitarians are generally able to access 
public sphere privileges while migrants are generally relegated to conditions akin to the 
private sphere.  International institutions not only allocate differential privileges and 
disadvantages but also naturalize and normalize this order of things.  The upshot is that 
care in humanitarianism appears to be exemplary and incomparable, not because of its 
intrinsic worth, but because of this past and present system of power and advantage.  And 
care in the context of migration appears ordinary and unremarkable, not because the care 
provided is somehow less good, but because the same privileges are unavailable. 
My analysis then assesses how the divided status of care aggravates politics 
among states.  Relations of dominance and subordination preserved in international 
institutions condition the interests of states in care, and their capacity to get and give care, 
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with consequences for their security.  In the absence of a world state to ameliorate these 
conditions and ensure the equitable distribution of care across the international system, 
states seize on the differential valuation of care to serve their own interests.  States like to 
give care to populations in other countries in part because it enhances their own image of 
independence and morality, but states do not like to be given care, because it evokes 
incapacity, dependence, and vulnerability.  Thus, states that send humanitarians and 
attract migrant caregivers reap the most benefits from the high profile of humanitarian 
care and the low profile of migrant care.  The consequences of these conditions are not 
trivial, because being able to get care easily can improve health and welfare while not 
being able to get care can mean loss of life.  I call these dynamics “power politics in slow 
motion,” since the effects appear most clearly over long periods of time. 
Thus, the prevalence of care in international relations does not indicate progress 
from an older imperial order of power toward a more just and peaceful future.  I argue the 
persistence of poorly paid, poorly appreciated care in migration and its exclusion from 
the humanitarian world suggest a hard limit on what might otherwise seem to be a 
revolution in international ethics, and progress in world politics more generally.  It is 
common in segregated communities for privileged groups to define what progress means 
for everyone and to take their own advances to be a measure of the advancement of the 
whole society.  In the context of stratification in the international community, 
humanitarian groups often fall into similar error.  Yet, the success of humanitarianism is a 
poor guide to progress.  Many people who wish to do good are hindered by conditions 
not of their making.  And many more do good in ways humanitarians do not recognize. 
  6 
A better understanding of the place of care in international relations might 
contribute to the ethics of care.  Rethinking care as a public good has been a central aim 
of scholarship on the ethics of care.  This has meant envisioning democratic citizenship 
as caring, and championing care as a public responsibility.3  Now humanitarianism 
presents in an extraordinary way a form of care in the public sphere, in this case on a 
world scale.  Yet, the history of humanitarianism gives further evidence that making care 
public is fraught with problems.  It is all too common for care to be divided as it is 
translated into the procedures of bureaucracies, shaped for professional definitions, and 
fractured through race, gender, and class hierarchies.  Making care public is a 
transformation that involves creating categories that introduce divisions between 
caregivers, and institutionalizes the exclusion of some people who would care if given the 
opportunity. 4  Humanitarianism demonstrates care need not always be marginal, but it 
also shows making care public can mean instituting or reinstituting relations of 
dominance and subordination. 
I focus my ethical analysis on the question of whether some communities should 
host caregivers from other communities.  In the abstract, caregivers would seem to be 
superlative visitors, deserving of a hospitable welcome because of their ability to do 
good.  I argue, however, unconditional hospitality does not prove to be a good or just 
standard across contexts, even to caregivers, precisely because they can embody and 
perpetuate imperial relations of power.  Global public and private spheres tend to 
                                                
3 Joan C. Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice (New York: New York University 
Press, 2013). 
4 Mignon Duffy, Making Care Count: A Century of Gender, Race, and Paid Care Work (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2011). 
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naturalize and normalize patterns of care, and in practice, contribute to granting 
hospitality to humanitarians and denying that same expectation of a welcome to other 
caregivers.  Therefore, unsettling these conditions can expand the policy space for 
making a decision on caregivers. 
In short, in this dissertation, I theorize about the politics and ethics of care, and I 
theorize about international relations through this focus on care.  In proceeding, I seek to 
make several more specific contributions. 
First, I work against realist and liberal perspectives to come to a better 
understanding of the politics of intransigent hierarchy in the international system.  In 
Chapter 4, I discuss how these perspectives take up care (or refuse to), but throughout the 
dissertation I engage their understanding of international relations more generally.  Most 
scholars of International Relations conceive of the international system in terms of 
anarchy.  Anarchy refers to the absence of a world government that can guarantee the 
welfare of states.  Realist scholars believe that in the absence of a world government 
states will fear for their security, propelling them to constantly seek to acquire military 
power in order to survive.5  Tragically, in threatening other states, these measures only 
perpetuate insecurity, competition, and conflict.  Because realists are concerned with the 
state pursuit of hegemony—or dominance in the international system—it can sometimes 
seem like realists are interested in hierarchy.  But they do little if anything to investigate 
dominance as a relation that transforms subordinate states, or to think through the 
problematic character of these relations.  Realists also fail to consider the possibility that 
                                                
5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2001). 
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the absence of a world government might lead states interested in their own security to 
undertake not only acts of war, but also efforts to give and get care. 
Liberal theorists also view the world in terms of anarchy.  As Thomas Friedman 
explains, “nobody is quite in charge.”6  But unlike realists, liberals do not view anarchy 
as a zero-sum game, where states and other actors are inevitably pitted against each other.  
To the contrary, they understand the absence of a world government to mean freedom for 
individual entrepreneurism, economic development, cultural expression, political 
innovation, interstate cooperation, and progress toward a better world.  According to 
liberals political problems from war to climate change can be overcome through the 
combined force of good people, good ideas, and good institutions.  Some liberals—
known as neoliberal institutionalists or cooperation theorists—believe international 
organizations improve the possibility of interstate cooperation, even if there are no 
guarantees that cooperation will be long-lasting or effective.  Like realists, liberals 
misperceive the existence and operation of a hierarchal order of power in world politics.  
The upshot is that they presume projects to care demonstrate moral evolution or 
enlightened cooperation, not the reproduction of hierarchy or the intensification of 
conflict. 
Scholars of humanitarianism tend to sidestep direct engagement with these 
theoretical perspectives.  However, most likewise conceive of the international system in 
terms of anarchy.  In fact the assumption of anarchy generates a key puzzle in the 
scholarly literature on humanitarianism:  Why would people go great distances to care for 
                                                
6 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000), 
8. 
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others?  In a world where there are no “ties that bind” such action is puzzling.7  Moving 
from an assumption of anarchy to an exploration of hierarchy this puzzle disappears.  It is 
not surprising powerful societies would undertake showy acts of benevolence, nor is it 
surprising these same societies would quietly enlist people from other countries to 
perform care.  When, how, and to whom care is given reflect the hierarchical ordering of 
world politics. 
Second, this analysis of hierarchy is a contribution, too, to care theory, in thinking 
through what it means for the project to make care public.  Joan Tronto has suggested 
hierarchies in care might be overcome through democratization.8  Yet hierarchies in 
international politics appear extremely resistant to democratization.  The continual 
reinstitution of power hierarchies through projects intended to serve the greater good—
including projects to care—exemplifies this.  Making care public in the context of 
hierarchy entails substantial risk and uncertainty, since it is not clear in advance if or to 
what extent the goodness of care can survive conditions of domination and subordination.  
In general, if care is visible primarily as a practice of domination it might be more likely 
to create aversion than to attract new proponents, particularly if the promised returns on 
care are constantly deferred to a more democratic future. 
Third, in addition to engaging theories of international relations and care on the 
significance of hierarchy, I seek to offer a structural account of gender in international 
relations.  While there is quite a bit of work on gender in development, there is little 
                                                
7 For example, Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell wonder, “Why should people on one side of the planet go 
out of their way to alleviate the suffering of others in places where there is no obvious gain to be made—no 
market for one’s trade to be developed, no useful alliances to be forged, no indispensible natural resources 
to be tapped?” Walker and Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World, 10. 
8 Tronto, Caring Democracy : Markets, Equality, and Justice. 
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specifically on humanitarianism.9  What research exists does little to locate 
humanitarianism in the broader context of world politics, for instance, in what V. Spike 
Peterson has called a “gendered global hierarchy,” a metaphor she uses to capture global 
relations of domination.10  To put this differently, it is conventional to locate 
humanitarians in “humanitarian space,” the “humanitarian field,” the “humanitarian 
sector,” the “humanitarian system,” the “humanitarian sphere,” and the “humanitarian 
international.”  Only by zooming out is it possible to see how humanitarianism is made 
possible by distinctions with care that is paid and with care that addresses routine 
problems in normal times.  The demarcations that separate the humanitarian world from 
the rest of the world contribute to the marginalization of care and caregivers in the field 
of migration.  While humanitarianism is understood as constituting a central current in 
international politics, and as contributing to the global good, migration is understood as 
“low politics,” as occurring “below” the level of states, and thus as being peripheral or 
marginal to the constitution of international life.11  Expanding on the domestic analogy I 
introduced above, I find there is differentiation in the profile and status of these groups 
similar to that which in at least some countries distinguished the citizen in the public 
                                                
9 For some important exceptions, see: R. Charli Carpenter, "Women and Children First: Gender, Norms, 
and Humanitarian Evacuation in the Balkans 1991-95," International Organization 57, no. 4 (2003); Joan 
C. Tronto, "Is Peacekeeping Care Work? A Feminist Reflection on the 'Responsibility to Protect'," in 
Global Feminist Ethics, ed. Peggy DesAutels and Rebecca Whisnant (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2008); Jennifer Hyndman and Malathi De Alwis, "Beyond Gender: Towards a Feminist Analysis of 
Humanitarianism and Development in Sri Lanka," Women's Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2003); Miriam 
Ticktin, "The Gendered Human of Humanitarianism: Medicalising and Politicising Sexual Violence," 
Gender & History 23, no. 2 (2011); Jonneke Koomen, "‘Without These Women, the Tribunal Cannot Do 
Anything’: The Politics of Witness Testimony on Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda," Signs 38, no. 2 (2013). 
10 V. Spike Peterson, "A ‘Gendered Global Hierarchy’?," in Contending Images of World Politics, ed. Greg 
Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan (Basingstoke, Hampshire [England], New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, 
2000). 
11 See below for a discussion of related tendencies in the literature on care migration. 
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sphere from workers, servants, slaves, and wives in the home and fields, or what has been 
termed the private sphere.  Citizens depended materially on the labor in the private sphere 
but also ideologically on the system of distinctions that differentiated these spheres of 
life.  Similarly, on the world scale, a global public sphere has granted humanitarians 
power and privilege, which is enforced through the distinctions they claim, which 
differentiate them from other caregivers who are subordinated in part through those 
distinctions, and relegated to what I conceptualize as a global private sphere.  These 
socially and politically constructed differences exemplify the workings of a gendered 
logic of domination in the international system. 
In addition to contributing to these scholarly literatures, this lens also offers a 
critique of popular common sense about care in the United States.  Americans, especially 
young people, often see international humanitarianism as a morally pure avenue for faith 
and action, what Amy Finnegan called “a noncontentious form of contemporary 
activism.”12  Higher education increasingly caters to this desire for noncontentious 
service by providing programming in global health and humanitarianism.  In 2011, the 
New York Times reported, “More than 70 universities in the United States and 
Canada…offer formal academic programs in global health, most of them developed in 
just the past five years.”13  These programs will likely only reinforce the belief among 
many students that humanitarians are uniquely praiseworthy, laudable for their 
compassion and tirelessness in setting up national and international institutions, and for 
                                                
12 Amy C Finnegan, "Beneath Kony 2012: Americans Aligning with Arms and Aiding Others," Africa 
Today 59, no. 3 (2013): 146. 
13 New York Times, April 2, 2011, A6.  The article attributes this figure to the Consortium of Universities 
for Global Health. 
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their commitment to saving and improving human lives in communities and nations 
where they are strangers.  Yet, migrant nurses and doctors have crossed borders and 
provided care in more places, in greater numbers, and for longer periods of time than the 
nurses, doctors, and others identified as humanitarians. 
Even the most rudimentary comparisons are revealing.  In 2006, the combined 
international field staff for humanitarian relief in all INGOs and United Nations 
humanitarian organizations was just shy of 15,000. 14  While this figure underrepresents 
the size of the humanitarian sector—the vast majority of workers in these organizations 
are national staff—this number is telling.  Around the same time, well over 370,000 
migrant doctors and 600,000 international migrant nurses were working in countries 
around the world to much less fanfare.15  In light of these figures, popular preconceptions 
about humanitarian care seem unfounded.  Still, they have real consequences for 
caregivers and for the societies who receive their care.  Conventional wisdom translates 
                                                
14 ALNAP, The State of the Humanitarian System, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012), 
http://www.alnap.org/. 30, 32.  I calculated this figure based on the ALNAP study, which found in 2006 
that the combined humanitarian field staff of all international NGOs was around 140,200 workers—and an 
estimated 5% of these workers were international humanitarians—and that the United Nations 
humanitarian organizations had a total field staff of 71,483 workers, of which around 11% were 
international staff.  While these figures do not include corporate humanitarian agencies, other Red Cross 
institutions, or small and more informal humanitarian efforts, they give a sense of the scale of the 
international humanitarian sector. 
15 In the most recent count, the sum of all expatriate nurses working in OECD countries is 613, 309 nurses 
and 373,184 doctors.  For each OECD country, this count uses figures from one year between 1995 and 
2004, depending on when information was available.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, "International Migration Outlook: Annual Report," (Paris: OECD, 2007).  These should be 
taken as conservative estimates given that these figures do not include nurses and doctors in countries that 
are not members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, an international 
governmental organization composed primarily of North-Atlantic industrialized nations plus Australia, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Chile.  This means workers in South Africa, Singapore, and Middle Eastern 
countries are not counted, even though all of these countries are important destinations for careworkers and 
other migrants.  These data also miss the many undocumented, temporary, and other unconventional 
workers, who are not counted by state agencies.  The point is the numbers of migrant caregivers would be 
even greater if they were included in these estimates. 
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into citizenship, visas, pay, status, representation, and other rewards.  Reassessing what 
we believe about care, what we value, and why are important tasks. 
In sum, new possibilities for interpretation, explanation, and ethical reflection 
open up when we use a broad definition of who in our world counts as a “caregiver.”  
The remainder of this introduction prepares the conceptual and analytical ground for the 
rest of this dissertation by introducing in more detail the concept of care, summarizing 
current approaches to care in world politics, sharpening my analytical lens, and outlining 
a methodology for the dissertation. 
 
Care as a Moral and Political Practice 
In the United States, care has traditionally been understood to occur in the home 
and a handful of related sites like the laundromat, the daycare center, the park, and the 
school.  And caring has traditionally been understood to be the work of women, 
particularly in the role of mothers.  Like other activities and actors in the private sphere, 
this labor has typically been unseen and it has certainly been undervalued.  Care has long 
been associated with low skill, low status jobs, and with menial labor.  And because 
caring has been interpreted as a private activity, political philosophers and political 
scientists have often treated it as irrelevant to morality and politics.16 
Feminist scholars in the last several decades have objected to this characterization 
and have argued care should instead be thought of as an exemplary moral and political 
                                                
16 Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 
1993), 165-66. 
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practice.17  Olena Hankivsky has called this group the “first generation” of care theorists, 
placing them together because of their shared interest in using maternal experience as a 
basis for theorizing care.18  For instance, Nel Noddings attended to how mothers and 
teachers care for children and students.  She found their caring involves a “commitment 
to act in behalf of the cared-for, a continued interest in his reality throughout the 
appropriate time span, and the continual renewal of commitment over this span of 
time.”19  Sara Ruddick similarly conceived of caring as a maternal practice.  She 
suggested “three demands—for preservation, growth, and social acceptability—constitute 
maternal work; to be a mother is to be committed to meeting these demands by works of 
preservative love, nurturance, and training.” 20  While Ruddick closely associated caring 
with the activity of mothers, she clarified caring might not only be done by women or by 
women with children, and argued it could also inform broader political activity, 
particularly the practice of peace-making. 
Nonetheless, this largely maternal conception of caring drew criticism for 
essentializing women and for narrowly interpreting the scope and potential of women’s 
political activity and men’s caring activity.21  Mary Dietz, for one, criticized “the 
conviction of the maternalists that feminists must choose between two worlds—the 
                                                
17 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Nel Noddings, Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking : 
Toward a Politics of Peace; with a New Preface (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 
18 Olena Hankivsky, Social Policy and the Ethic of Care (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
19 Noddings, Caring, a Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, 16. 
20 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace; with a New Preface, 17. 
21 Mary G. Dietz, "Citizenship with a Feminist Face:  The Problem with Maternal Thinking," Political 
Theory 13, no. 1 (1985); "Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship," Daedalus 116, no. 4 
(1987); Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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masculinist, competitive, statist public and the maternal, loving, virtuous private.”22  
Along these lines, Hankivsky reflected, "While most of the first generation of care 
theorists state that their ethic is not exclusively feminine, they nevertheless assume that 
women are more likely and more suited for the maternal role than men."23  In this view, 
first generation care theorists not only gave short shrift to women, men, and to their 
potentialities, but also to the political promise of care. 
In the last twenty years, political theorists along with feminist and gender 
theorists from other disciplines have reformulated the concept of care in order to 
emphasize its wider relevance and political character.  This “second generation” of care 
theorists clarified that care is basic to all human life, not just to some women’s capacity 
for maternal experience.24  Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto suggested caring includes 
“everything we do to continue, repair, and maintain ourselves so that we can live in the 
world as well as possible.”25  They described four integral phases of care:  caring about, 
taking caring of, care-giving, and care-receiving.  Tronto later identified these phases of 
caring with four moral aspects of good caring:  attentiveness, responsibility, competence, 
and responsiveness, and added another phase, caring with, which she linked to the 
principle of solidarity.26  Caring about means attending to the specific needs of others.  
Taking care of involves allocating and accepting responsibility for meeting needs.  Care-
                                                
22 Dietz, "Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship," 13. 
23 Hankivsky, Social Policy and the Ethic of Care, 12. 
24 Ibid., 11, 27. 
25 Berenice Fisher and Joan Tronto, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring," in Circles of Care: Work and 
Identity in Women's Lives, ed. Emily K. Abel and Margaret K. Nelson, Suny Series on Women and Work 
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1990), 41. 
26 For the original statement on attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness, see Tronto, 
Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, 127-36.  Tronto later added solidarity and 
trust.  See Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. 
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giving requires competence using skills and resources to meet needs.  Care-receiving 
corresponds to understanding how caring is received and making appropriate 
adjustments.  Finally, caring with entails nurturing trust and communication with others 
in caring.  Tronto introduced this last phase of caring in her most recent account of caring 
democracy. 27 
I find this political conception of care to be useful.  It is a political perspective in 
several respects.  First, care is not imagined to exist only in dyadic and domestic 
relationships; it also figures into wider relations and concerns.  Although it is common to 
represent care as a dyad between a caregiver and a care recipient, and I sometimes cast it 
in this way, care is not a practice always performed between just two individuals.  
Second, care is conceived broadly enough to inform and evaluate public policy.  Tronto 
shows how care ethics can bear on domestic policy decisions—and not only on issues of 
clear relevance like healthcare, but also over less obvious issues like immigration policy.  
Third, this view is political in that it suggests care is inseparable from power.  Studying 
caring at any level—local, federal, international, or global—means looking at who meets 
needs, whose needs are met, and how this expresses power.28  Finally, Tronto emphasizes 
caring should be organized collectively, ideally reflecting and contributing to democratic 
life.29  Thus, with this political understanding of care, feminists no longer need to choose 
between “two worlds.” 
                                                
27 Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice, 35-37. 
28 Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care; Olena Hankivsky, "Rethinking Care 
Ethics: On the Promise and Potential of an Intersectional Analysis," American Political Science Review 
108, no. 2 (2014). 
29 Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice. 
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This conception of care is also useful in that it is underpinned by an assumption of 
mutuality between caregivers and carereceivers, that normally both parties to care are in 
some sense beneficiaries.  Not all perpsectives on care share this assumption.  Daniel 
Engster proposed a narrower definition of care than Fisher and Tronto.  He emphasizes 
the role of care in the survival and development of individuals.  He considers care to be 
“everything we do directly to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, 
develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or 
unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in 
society.”30  Notice Engster further limits the meaning of care by focusing on basic needs 
and capacities, a point I will return to in a moment.  Kari Wærness conceptualizes care in 
a way still narrower than either Fisher and Tronto or Engster.  Wærness describes one 
type of caring devoted to people who are capable of meeting their needs but do not, in the 
way wives have long cared for husbands, though husbands could share in caring 
responsibilities.  When the capacity to care is symmetrical but performance of care is 
asymmetrical, it is less like care-giving and more like “personal service.”31  Wærness 
distinguishes this type of service from care, which she argues involves meeting needs that 
could not otherwise be met.  Specifically, she restricts “care-giving work to services, help 
and support, given on a consistent and reliable basis to persons who according to 
                                                
30 Daniel Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 29. Original emphasis removed. 
31 Kari Wærness, "Caring as Women's Work in the Welfare State," in Patriarchy in a Welfare Society, ed. 
Harriet Holter (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1984), 70. 
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generally accepted social norms, are dependent, i.e. persons who cannot take care of 
themselves.”32 
Thus, Engster and Wærness argue caring is best understood to be for others—
whether others are “developing individuals” or “dependents”—while Fisher and Tronto 
insist caring is also “for ourselves.”  Theirs is a more inclusive formulation, because it 
covers “others” and “us” and refuses to identify recipients of care with the former and 
providers of care with the latter.  They in effect reject a narrow specification of care that 
would enforce a strong distinction between the self and the other.  Tronto has recently 
underscored receiving care as a fundamental human commonality, inviting us to 
acknowledge, “We are care receivers, all.”33  The point is we all care and we all benefit 
from care.  There is no group of “developed individuals” or “independents” that does not 
need it.  And when we care, we are contributing to our own individual wellbeing as well 
as to our common welfare. 
The primary advantage of recognizing care as being at once for the self and for 
the other is that it decenters the difficult question of whether care is egoistic and self-
interested, or altruistic and selfless.  That line of inquiry relies on a number of 
unwarranted assumptions as well as some giant logical leaps—for instance, that altruistic 
care can distinguish the self in contrast with the other; that only selfless, unrewarded 
                                                
32 Ibid., 71.  Abel and Nelson make a similar point, though they do not develop it.  They write, “When 
higher-status workers provide care to working-class and minority clients, caregiving shades easily into 
social control.  When marginal workers deliver care to white, middle-class clients, caregiving tends to 
embody significant elements of personal service.”  Emily K. Abel and Margaret K. Nelson, "Circles of 
Care:  an Introductory Essay," in Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women's Lives, ed. Emily K. Abel 
and Margaret K. Nelson, Suny Series on Women and Work (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York 
Press, 1990), 15-16. 
33 Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice, 146. 
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caregiving is really virtuous; and, finally, that virtuous caregiving is rare, strange, and 
puzzling, and therefore must be identified and explained. 
This conceptual turn is friendly to mounting evidence of both interestedness and 
disinterestedness in care.34  For example, in working as care professionals, migrant nurses 
earn a living.  But many if not most nurses are motivated at least partly by compassion 
and the personal rewards in pursuing a calling to care.  In their own activity, 
humanitarians provide aid and relief for others.  But many if not most humanitarians are 
motivated by an opportunity to pursue a respected vocation, embody dearly held 
principles, and to receive a stipend, however minimal. 35  As one volunteer for Doctors 
without Borders explained, “there are a lot of people who do this because they can't get a 
job at home, or at least they can't get an interesting job at home."36 
By clarifying care need not be for the self or the other, the exhaustive dissection 
of individual motives becomes a less pressing task.  To set aside the quest for a subtler 
portrayal of human motivation is not, however, to underrate the pervasiveness of 
ideologies surrounding care that advertise it as being only for the other, to the exclusion 
of the self.  Claims about compassionate service figure into the self-understanding and 
self-presentation of humanitarian organizations.  For example, one key principle of the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is voluntary service 
                                                
34 Barnett, The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. 
35 Ibid., 224-28; Anthony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War (Sterling, VA: 
Earthscan, 2001) ; Anne-Meike Fechter, "‘Living Well’ while ‘Doing Good’? (Missing) Debates on 
Altruism and Professionalism in Aid Work," Third World Quarterly 33, no. 8 (2012). 
36 Quoted in:  D. Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Crafting of Community 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 75. 
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defined as “not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.”37  This precept is an 
organizational mandate, not an essential motivation in every individual aid worker.  
Societies and politics—rather than pre-social and pre-political motivations—organize 
relations and practices of care. 
Indeed, this definition can thoroughly trouble many taken for granted beliefs 
about care in world politics.  Most definitions of care register distinctions between “us” 
and “them” that care creates or perpetuates.  This is crucial, for it makes it possible to 
recognize how popular common sense represents caregivers in relation to care recipients, 
for instance, construing the former as responsible and the latter as infantile.  Some 
theorists of care problematize and overturn these received categories, as Wærness does in 
the contribution discussed earlier.  But in presuming receiving care is ubiquitous, Fisher 
and Tronto encourage us to take the further step of critically scrutinizing powerful 
individuals and states that identify exclusively as care providers.  We might inquire into 
why and how these actors conceal their dependence on care.  What do they have to hide?  
How do they manage this concealment?  And is this process of image-making even in 
their control? 
Think how humanitarian care is represented as by the West for the non-West.  In 
addition to obscuring humanitarianisms from other parts of this world, this portrayal sets 
up a rigid dichotomy and obscures the way the same Western countries that send 
humanitarians are more often than not dependent on the care provided by migrants from 
                                                
37 http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles.  Accessed 
November 24, 2012.  
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around the world.38  As one illustration, consider that at the same time the U.S. 
government and U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations send food aid abroad, 
Americans depend utterly on migrant labor to harvest agricultural crops and process meat 
products.39  Or consider that U.K.-based Oxfam sells used clothes to fund its aid projects 
overseas—and, in fact, still sometimes sends clothes overseas—at the same time the 
United Kingdom receives new clothes manufactured at factories around the world.  An 
alarm should sound when the “we” who receive care is hidden from view, and this 
understanding of care is a good tripwire. 
Still, there is one respect in which I do not follow Fisher and Tronto’s 
understanding of care.  For pragmatic reasons, this dissertation focuses on a relatively 
narrow set of practices closer to the range of activities identified by Engster and 
Wærness.  I am concerned most with the tending to survival needs, primarily needs for 
nursing and medical care, and less with the broader range of practices Fisher and Tronto 
have in mind.  Their view of care as maintining and improving the world encompasses all 
manner of activities, including building roads and bridges, undertaking reforestation 
projects, sewing clothes, and producing food.  So while according to Fisher and Tronto 
many labors and laborers fall under the rubric of care—labor in the agricultural sector, as 
an important example—for the purpose of limiting the scope of this dissertation, I do not 
take into account that wider range of activities. 
 
                                                
38 For a related point about care and regimes of visibility, see: Susan Craddock, "Aid for Whom? Distance 
Caring and Corporate Practices," International Political Sociology 7, no. 1 (2013).  Also see:  Fiona 
Robinson, "After Liberalism in World Politics? Towards an International Political Theory of Care," Ethics 
and Social Welfare 4, no. 2 (2010). 
39 I thank Eli Meyerhoff for suggesting this example. 
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Two Stories about Care in World Politics 
In comparison to work in other fields, political scientists have done relatively 
little to address care as an issue or dimension of world politics.40  This inattention may 
reflect the fact that scholars primarily view care as a matter for normative theory, and 
therefore as related to the articulation of values, rather than to a wider range of scholarly 
pursuits.  Another possibility is that scholars continue to think care is an intimate or, at 
most, a local matter.  To the extent care figures into international relations scholars 
usually consider only one side of the world politics of care, either care in migration or 
care in humanitarianism.41  I call this the dual stories approach to care.  Scholars study 
one form of care in isolation from the other. 
Here is one story about care.  Those who write about migrant care workers see a 
wave of women moving from the Third World to work in other countries as nannies, 
housecleaners, and nurses.42  Concepts like gender, race, care, family, domesticity, 
                                                
40 There are important exceptions.  See Fiona Robinson, Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and 
International Relations, Feminist Theory and Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999); The Ethics 
of Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security, Global Ethics and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2011); Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Barnett, The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism; 
Michael N. Barnett, The International Humanitarian Order (London; New York: Routledge, 2010); 
Tronto, "Is Peacekeeping Care Work? A Feminist Reflection on the 'Responsibility to Protect'."; Himadeep 
Muppidi with Bud Duvall, "Humanitarianism and Its Violences," in The Colonial Signs of International 
Relations, by Himadeep Muppidi (London: Hurst & Company, 2012); Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: 
Toward a Politics of Peace; with a New Preface. 
41 Exceptions are Robinson, The Ethics of Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security; Nicola Yeates, 
Globalizing Care Economies and Migrant Workers: Explorations in Global Care Chains (Basingstoke 
[England]: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
42 For some examples, see:  Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds., Global Woman:  
Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002); Rhacel 
Salazar Parreñas, Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2001); Bridget Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work?: The Global Politics of 
Domestic Labour (London; New York: Zed Books, 2000); Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Doméstica: 
Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001); Sondra Cuban, Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
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migration, globalization, and capital orient this literature.  Researchers typically 
concentrate on the experience of migrants from a particular country and use material 
from in-depth interviews and ethnographies to tell their stories.  Scholarly commentary 
tends to focus on the hardships created through separation from family, rather than on 
professional challenges.  These scholars have had relatively little to say about the efficacy 
of care or about the principled rationale that motivates caregivers.  And the effectiveness 
of care is seldom quantified.  Instead of counting children raised, homes cleaned, lives 
saved, and dollars spent on care, feminist and gender theorists are more likely to call 
attention to how the global expansion of capital has extended and deepened the 
subordination of women, subjugating them by means of material deprivation and 
ideologies of femininity, domesticity, and maternalism, which in combination draft large 
numbers of women around the world into nursing, childcare, and domestic work, among 
other labors. 
If the literature on migration presents one story about care in world politics, 
scholarship on international humanitarianism offers a quite different account. 43  Those 
who write on this subject tend to see an ensemble of international institutions, ideas, and 
actors that arrange aid and relief for populations confronting severe hardships and often 
emergency conditions.  The humanitarian field is diverse, containing international 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, religious groups and even corporations.  
                                                
43 For some examples, see:  Michael N. Barnett and Thomas George Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question: 
Politics, Power, Ethics, Cornell Paperbacks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); DeChaine, Global 
Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Crafting of Community; Barnett, The International Humanitarian Order; 
Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 2002); Peter Redfield, Life in Crisis: The Ethical Journey of Doctors without Borders 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Barnett, The Empire of Humanity: A History of 
Humanitarianism.  David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, 1st Simon & Schuster 
trade pbk. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
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What unites this group of humanitarians is an ambition to save lives.44  Ordinary health 
professionals save lives, too, and the lives of strangers no less, but what seems to 
distinguish humanitarians is the effort to save lives en masse, voluntarily, at great risk, 
and to cross the world to that end. 
Scholars describe humanitarian involvement in meeting basic needs for medical 
care, shelter, food, and in many cases, protection.  If travel is mentioned at all, it is as 
“intervention” while the language of “migration” is almost completely absent.  In 
addition, scholars speak of humanitarians as professionals motivated by deep ethical 
commitments, as “global citizens,” and as “cosmopolitans.”  Humanitarians are identified 
at least as much by their principles as by their practices.  They serve humanity, and they 
do so impartially—that is, with an orientation to the most pressing needs, without regard 
to race, ethnicity, or religion.  To gain access to populations in distress, they also often 
seek independence from states and other donors, and neutrality with respect to warring 
parties.  Scholars and practitioners see humanitarians bringing their capacity for moral 
reasoning to bear on these complex political situations where the proper course of action 
is not obvious and standard operating procedures are of little use.45  Complex 
emergencies call on them to exercise their faculty to reason even while they wrestle with 
unusual problems that are “emotionally wrenching” yet nonetheless “intellectually 
doable.”46  While I do not emphasize it here, there is a large body of scholarship that 
deals with military interventions to halt internal conflict, maintain peace, or provide 
                                                
44 Barnett, "Humanitarian Governance." 
45 Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," Ethics & International Affairs 13, no. 
1 (1999): 9. 
46 Ibid.: 9-10. 
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shelter, food, and medical care for bystanders and refugees, particularly under the rubric 
of “the Responsibility to Protect.”47  Concepts like sovereignty, power, politics, law, 
compassion, and morality—and almost never gender and migration—orient this work.  
Scholars and practitioners employ narrative methods less often, instead preferring 
techniques like process-tracing, comparative case studies, single case studies, and legal 
interpretation.  Similarly, humanitarian organizations research and report measurable, 
quantifiable outcomes, including persons vaccinated and medicines distributed.  The 
preference for such different terms, concepts, theories, and methods may help to explain 
why so little scholarship has addressed the full range of care in international relations.48 
The clarity and persuasiveness of this scholarly division of labor is undermined by 
the fact that migrant caregivers and humanitarians engage in such similar activities.  Both 
groups are involved in meeting fundamental needs for food, shelter, protection, 
healthcare, and nurturance.  Both groups assist individuals, communities, and societies at 
significant personal risk and sacrifice.  Both groups express professional identities as 
doctors and nurses, for example, and possess professional knowledge, responsibilities, 
ethical codes, and practical experience.  What seems on the surface to distinguish these 
groups is the voluntary nature of humanitarian care.  But as I noted above motivations are 
difficult to pin down in practice.  And migrants who care for children by sending 
remittances home do so in a voluntary capacity.  Furthermore, the practices of these 
                                                
47 Gareth J. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All 
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American History, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); 
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groups are identical with regard to discrete healthcare procedures.  Inoculation campaigns 
carried out by nurses in both regular public health services and in humanitarian projects 
are indistinguishable.  It is revealing that the same person can be a migrant and a 
humanitarian, but not necessarily at the same time.  When a Haitian nurse takes 
employment in the United States, she is identified as a migrant, but when she joins the 
relief effort in Haiti she is counted as a humanitarian.49 
More than an academic division of labor, the dual stories approach carries with it 
a series of unexamined assumptions.  First, the dual stories approach implies separate 
accounts of care can adequately establish the meaning of care in world politics.  The 
assumption is that discrete research areas correspond to discrete domains of international 
relations.  By examining just one form of care different scholars, journals, books, and 
chapters can uncover the total meaning of care.  I have already made it clear I think dual 
stories misconstrue the place and significance of care in international relations.  Take the 
claim that humanitarianism is a politically unparalleled and morally progressive 
movement in world politics.  Such arguments can only be sustained by examining 
humanitarianism in isolation.  I will suggest throughout the dissertation that care in the 
context of migration presents a parallel to humanitarianism, and the continued separation 
of these fields suggests a hard limit to progress in international relations. 
Second, the dual stories approach implies different histories can explain the 
emergence of different forms of care.  I show in Chapter 3, however, that this is not the 
                                                
49 Hundreds of Haitian doctors and nurses who were working in the United States volunteered in the relief 
effort.  See New York Times, April 5, 2010, A13.  A recent overview of the humanitarian system listed 
“diaspora groups” as part of a group of “non-core humanitarian actors.”  See:  ALNAP, The State of the 
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case.  The emergence of humanitarianism has involved constant differentiation from 
others deemed unsuitable or unqualified to be caregivers.  Among those excluded were 
many people from societies that now send migrants.  A complete history of care would 
trace these exclusions and investigate their ramifications. 
Third, the dual stories approach is premised on the assumption that a viable 
ethical account of care is attainable by studying either sector of care.  However, crafting 
one ethics for one group and another ethics for another group produces inconsistencies 
and contradictions.  It is hazardous to issue categorical prescriptions that do not attend to 
caregivers and care-receivers in both sectors.  Moreover, the ethical achievements of a 
single group are inevitably projected onto a world map, thereby misrepresenting not only 
the latitude and longitude of care but also the geography of moral possibility.  Again, 
when humanitarianism is represented as the exclusive fount of international care and 
humanitarianism is constantly identified with the West, the West comes to seem like the 
exclusive source of international ethics.  Recognizing humanitarian movements from 
other parts of the world begins to trouble this view.  Recognizing care in migration 
presents perhaps an even more powerful challenge. 
Look at the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a nation that is continually 
identified with crisis, humanitarian need, and humanitarian action.  It is undeniable that 
the humanitarian mobilization in the DRC over the last fifteen years has been massive, 
including the largest UN peacekeeping force in history and a phalanx of other 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors.  Humanitarian aid agencies including the 
United Nations, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Rescue Committee, and the 
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International Committee of the Red Cross have sent hundreds of humanitarian workers.  
For instance, in 2002, Médecins Sans Frontières deployed an international field staff of 
84 to the DRC. 50  At the same time hundreds of people from the DRC were providing 
care in other countries.  Around the year 2000, 552 men and women from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo were working as doctors in other countries, and 2,288 men and 
women from the DRC were working as nurses in other countries. 51  While not all 
Congolese doctors and nurses were educated in medicine and nursing in that country, 
these numbers nonetheless disrupt the conventional wisdom.  It is not a necessary fact of 
world politics that a country either sends care to other countries or receives care from 
other countries.  More to the point, it is not necessarily the case that countries like the 
DRC that receive humanitarians are incapable of providing care, whether to their own 
nationals or to foreigners in other countries.  Such oversights can be avoided with a wider 
view on care. 
 
A Wide Lens on Care 
To review, I seek to answer three questions:  First, why are some forms of care 
valued more highly than others, and with what consequences?  Second, what does care 
reveal about the possibility of progress in international relations?  Third, how should the 
world politics of care inform the ethics of care? 
                                                
50 Médecins Sans Frontière, Activity Report 2002, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=1142&cat=activity-report. 
51 Michael A Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson, "New Data on African Health Professionals Abroad," 
Human Resources for Health 6, no. 1 (2008).  These figures are based on census information from nine 
major receiving countries—the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Portugal, 
Spain, Belgium, and South Africa—rather than a more comprehensive worldwide survey, and therefore 
represent a conservative estimate. 
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A view on these issues is not easy to obtain.  Rendering care internationally with 
exclusive reference to humanitarianism is much like mapping the security arena 
exclusively in relation to states:  it can be done, but the omission comes at a cost.  In the 
security issue area, we miss not only a range of actors that seek to acquire and manipulate 
the means of violence, but also, ultimately, an important set of state preoccupations.  
With respect to care, there are many actors that engage in activities oriented to meeting 
needs.  Without attention to a wider range, we misconstrue what care is and 
underestimate how much care matters in world politics. 
Even as I seek a broader understanding of care in international relations, however, 
I do not aim to gather or summarize the infinitely various meanings of care across 
cultures and contexts.  Care obviously carries different meanings in different societies, 
referring to self-care, parenting, and welfare programs, among many other possibilities.  
The duty to care might be asserted in religious doctrine, political ideology, moral 
philosophy, and economic theory.  Instead, in my analysis of the meaning of care I look 
to international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which idealize and 
institutionalize care and restrict its meaning.  I also give special attention to the United 
States, a country that has exercised substantial influence in shaping international 
organizations and ideologies around care.  As I discuss below, I take care in nursing to 
exemplify broader trends in care work. 
With a wide lens on care I not only seek to describe how different kinds of care 
are produced and organized.  I also seek to explain patterns and reveal problems in the 
organization of care.  To do so, I place care in critical, comparative, and historical 
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perspective.  In the first subsection below, I provide a brief introduction to critical 
international relations. 
 
CARE IN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
“Theory,” to cite Robert Cox, “is always for someone and for some purpose.”52  
In contrast to other theoretical perspectives that claim to analyze politics at a distance, 
critical theory is explicitly political and draws out the implicitly political claims and aims 
of conventional international relations theory. 
Substantively, critical investigation of international relations is geared to 
“questioning the conditions of existence of world order(s).”53  In his seminal overview of 
critical theory, Robert Cox refers to world order as the “configurations of forces which 
successively define the problematic of war or peace for the ensemble of states.”54  Cox 
identifies ideas, institutions, and material forces that shape conditions for states. 
Questioning the existence of world orders is important for several reasons.  First, 
this questioning points up errors and limitations in realist and liberal analyses of 
international relations, and contributes to better knowledge and understanding of world 
politics.  For instance, realists believe world order is static, assuming anarchy is a 
perpetual condition on state behavior, and therefore they mistakenly presume, “with 
respect to essentials, the future will always be like the past.”55  Liberals think the agency 
                                                
52 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in 
Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Kenneth N. Waltz and Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), 207. 
53 Raymond Duvall and Latha Varadarajan, "Traveling in Paradox: Edward Said and Critical International 
Relations," Millennium-Journal of International Studies 36, no. 1 (2007): 84. 
54 Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," 220. 
55 Ibid., 212. 
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of individual political entrepreneurs is powerful enough to override or harness other 
social forces and change the shape of world order.  Critical theorists find realists 
inadvertently make the world order they study seem normal, natural, timeless, and 
inevitable.  And critical theorists show that liberals miss a lot about power when they 
start from and focus narrowly on resourceful individuals.  It is necessary to give greater 
attention to a wider constellation of social forces to understand whether and how world 
order is subject to change, and it is important to be alert to preservative forces, too—that, 
again, naturalize and normalize the existing order of things. 
Part of the work of critical theory, then, is to engage in grappling with the nature 
and place of power in the constitution of world orders.  As Raymond Duvall and Latha 
Varadarajan explain, critical theorists tend to share "a suspicion—a disdain—for relations 
of dominance in power."56  More generally, critical theorists attend to the accumulation 
of power, “in that any inordinate concentration of power is seen as not desirable.”57  The 
aim, then, is "to 'see' the operation of various modes of power—the ways in which they 
are intrinsically involved in the production of world order."58  In critical international 
relations definitions of power vary, but most definitions construe power not simply as a 
possession, but also or instead as a relation.59 
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57 Ibid. 
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various conceptualizations.”  Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance, 
Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 4. 
  32 
At any rate, because politics changes, critical international relations changes, too.  
It is difficult to sustain an elaborate political vision or substantive program across time, a 
seeming lack of commitment that some can find frustrating.  At one point, for instance, 
international human rights were a political novelty and a subversive force, cutting the 
edges of a movement to check state sovereignty, end state violence, and foil the inhuman 
logic of neoliberalism.  Now, the human rights idea governs an immense system of norms 
and institutions, with the capacity to leverage extraordinary power.  That transition from 
movement to power called for critical analysis and critical distance.  Such a turnabout can 
seem to treat politics and political alliances lightly.  Yet a critical perspective is 
compatible with respect for both political mobilization—see above—and also more 
mundane human connection, as exemplified in the writing of Judith Butler and Edward 
Said.60 
Relationality is also important to critical theory in a more general sense.61  Critical 
theorists seek to grasp the whole of a social domain—the totality—which cannot be 
understood with reference only to its parts in isolation.  This means critical analysis 
involves revealing relations, for instance, studying actors in relation to each other; 
interactions with reference to relationships; events with reference to processes; and 
processes as they reflect and constitute world orders.  Take for instance, the analysis of 
the democratic peace.  According to the international relations mainstream the absence of 
war between democracies is due to factors internal to democracies, or, at most, features 
                                                
60 On Said, see, again: Duvall and Varadarajan, "Traveling in Paradox: Edward Said and Critical 
International Relations." 
61 Still, I recognize most critical theorists would object to the strong, normative claims about relationality 
that appear in some care theories. 
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of the relationship between pairs of democratic countries.  Against this view, Tarak 
Barkawi and Mark Laffey contend wider processes of global social change account for 
peace between democracies; indeed, imperial expansion and the attendant 
internationalization of capital explain both “zones of war and peace.”62  To give another 
example, most scholars account for “failed states” with reference to internal factors like 
corruption and animosity between religious groups.  Arjun Chowdhury argued instead 
that the world system produces weak states.63 
A critical lens can contribute significantly to the study of care in international 
politics, first of all in pressing the analysis of power.64  It is not that the topic of power 
and care has been entirely neglected.  Scholars of care frequently (and rightly) worry care 
has been, is, or will be a technology of power.  This is an old concern.  For Emily Abel 
and Margaret Nelson, by 1990 it was already “almost a truism to note that human 
services advance the goal of social control.”65  Two decades later, the subordination of 
care to coercion remains an issue, and Evelyn Nakano Glenn among others has reminded 
us that in the United States caregiving has often been secured by means of the forceful 
recruitment of women, especially women of color, into service with gender and race 
ideologies.66  Without doubt, this line of critique was and is an important rejoinder to too 
                                                
62 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, "The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization," European 
Journal of International Relations 5, no. 4 (1999): 404. 
63 Arjun Chowdhury, "Expectations of Order:  State Failure in Historical Context" (University of 
Minnesota, 2011). 
64 I am not the first to present a critical perspective on these issues.  See, also:  Robinson, The Ethics of 
Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security; Barnett, "Humanitarian Governance."; Parreñas, Servants 
of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work. 
65 Abel and Nelson, "Circles of Care:  an Introductory Essay," 13. 
66 Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Forced to Care: Coercion and Caregiving in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Abigail B. Bakan and Daiva K. Stasiulis, "Making the Match:  Domestic 
Placement Agencies and the Racialization of Women's Household Work," Signs 20, no. 21 (1995).   
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naïve portrayals of social and political life and the care purveyed by means of formal 
organizations and informal institutions. 
One hindrance to the analysis of care and power may be lazy presumptions about 
gender.  While scholars constantly reiterate that gender is a social construct, Olena 
Hankivsky rightly observes that “a type of residual naturalized essentialism exists.” 67  
Hankivsky detects pervasive presumptions that gender is more serious than all other 
factors of domination, and is somehow separable from the rest.  Against this view, 
Hankivsky advances an intersectional approach to incorporate contingency and 
complexity, for instance in rejecting “a simplified binary of power versus powerlessness” 
and “dichotomizing care givers and care receivers as either privileged or oppressed.” 68  
But Hankivsky goes too far, I think, in implying contemporary accounts of care treat 
gender as ontological—in her words, “ontologically separate”—when, at least in my 
reading of the scholarship, current approaches to care and domination are mostly social 
and historical.69  And it is possible to have a too contingent view of hierarchy.  If scholars 
give up the serious pursuit of generalizations to concentrate on singularities, contrary to 
her purposes, introducing more contingency could lead to a poorer analysis of power.70  
Still, the important lesson to be drawn from this work is that we should try to understand 
the subtle relationships between power and care, and how institutionalized care is likely 
to privilege some and disadvantage others. 
                                                
67 Hankivsky, "Rethinking Care Ethics: On the Promise and Potential of an Intersectional Analysis," 259. 
68 Ibid.: 261. 
69 Ibid.: 257. 
70 Ibid. 
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With critical scholars, I also emphasize the relationship between power and 
meaning in world politics.  Meaning shapes how we relate to each other and become who 
we are.  Care is a meaningful practice.  While who is a caregiver is subject to change and 
what it means to be a caregiver is subject to change, categories that identify caregivers 
acquire stability over time through incorporation into social and political institutions.  
Because dominant discourses naturalize meanings, a key task for interpretation is to call 
into question what has come to seem natural and who gains and who loses as a 
consequence.  What does it signify, for example, that scholars from the European-
American academy observe domestic workers from the Philippines associate with 
“coethnics” in their free time in London, while scholars from the same milieu never refer 
to associations among humanitarian “coethnics”?71  What does it mean when scholars 
refer to humanitarians helping “strangers,” forgetting humanitarians are themselves 
“strangers”?72 
It is worth noting critical scholars view meaning in social relations differently 
than liberals, including liberal constructivists.  Liberals focus on individual actors as 
creators of the world they inhabit; individuals generate meaning, institutions, and politics.  
This assumption leads them to particular research methods; they favor individual 
interviews over discourse analysis, for example.  In my view, the explanation for why 
hundreds of thousands of individuals cross borders to deliver care is unlikely to be found 
in variations at the individual level.  Hence, the analysis in this dissertation does not rest 
on the investigation of individual characteristics, motivations, or actions.  The upshot is 
                                                
71 Cuban, Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry, 173-78. 
72 Barnett, The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, passim. 
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that I have not undertaken extensive interviews to ascertain the motives of people who 
became international caregivers.  Proceeding in that way might have interfered with 
addressing my core research questions since meaning-making patterns continually escape 
the consciousness of individuals. 
 
CARE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Again, my claim is that the politics and ethics of care are best understood with 
reference to care in migration and care in humanitarianism.  This lens has a comparative 
angle involving a critical comparison of two forms of care that share similarities and 
differences. 
To render this type of comparison is obviously not like using the comparative 
method to draw nomothetic inferences.  According to that methodology, comparison and 
explanation are made possible by the independence of the terms under study.  All else 
being equal, a variation in circumstances can explain variation in outcomes.  In contrast, I 
seek something closer to what Himadeep Muppidi describes as the “possibility of an 
ethically charged comparison, a knowledge of international relations that bridges the 
relationship between the here and the there in a responsible and responsive way.’”73  I 
aim at a type of comparison that has this quality of bridging and exposing relationships, 
rather than comparisons that reproduce what might appear at first to be a separation, a 
system of binaries, or a catalog of values privileging some terms over others.  The critical 
                                                
73 Himadeep Muppidi, The Colonial Signs of International Relations (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), 
65; for an interesting discussion of the relevance of comparisons for ethics, see:  Kathryn Sikkink, "The 
Role of Consequences, Comparison and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought," in Moral Limit 
and Possibility in World Politics, ed. Richard M. Price (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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comparison between two groups of caregivers—and the neglected asymmetries these 
comparisons display—help cast the political edge of this dissertation.  While sometimes 
implicit, this “edge” gives shape to the entire project. 
 
CARE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
My lens is wide, as well, in the chronological sense.  While change is in evidence 
in the short-term and in narrow parameters, a long-view and a wide lens reveal 
conservative forces and enduring tendencies.  However, rather than trying to encompass 
the whole history of medicine and nursing, going back centuries, I focus in depth on the 
late modern period, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century.  As Andrew 
Bennett and Colin Elman advise, “an account that runs from a suitably chosen beginning 
to the end of the story is likely to be more persuasive than one that starts or ends at an 
odd or unconvincing moment.”74  I choose as my starting point the middle of the 19th 
century, a time when the care professions were being standardized, and translated into the 
curricula taught at new medical and nursing schools in the United States and elsewhere.  
This was also an important moment in the history of emergency humanitarianism.  The 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, perhaps the most important 
international humanitarian organization, traces its roots to this period. 
I also restrict the range of this historical research by grounding it in the study of 
migrants and humanitarians who have moved between North America and Asia, 
especially between the United States and the Philippines.  By all accounts, more nurses 
                                                
74 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research:  Recent Developments in Case Study 
Methods," Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 459. 
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have left the Philippines than any other country.  The Philippines has also received 
humanitarians across the twentieth century, beginning with the American colonial state 
and nongovernmental actors, and continuing with the humanitarian activities of the 
World Health Organization and the World Bank and with the action of nongovernmental 
organizations.  Paying attention to the entirety of this history is important in probing the 
relationship between care migration and humanitarianism, and also in showing how 
relationships and practices of care are at once embedded in, constituted by, and 
constitutive of wider political contexts. 
In prioritizing historical methods over ethnographic and interview methods, I am 
seeking to capture broader historical dynamics rather than personal stories.  This may 
seem strange, since care tends to be imagined in relation to caregivers themselves in a 
way that is powerful and unique.  Again, a contrast with the security research area is 
instructive.  Notice how war has become disassociated with the soldiers who fight it.  
Scholars of war generally do not study the motivations of individual soldiers to 
understand the causes of conflict, because it is clear that broader processes and 
institutions enlist soldiers into fighting.  A similar logic holds here.  Still, I recognize and 
appreciate the variety of ways interview methods might inform research of all kinds—
liberal, constructivist, critical, and beyond.  I conducted a small set of informational 
interviews that greatly increased my knowledge of the nature of nursing, the 
consequences of large out-migrations of nurses, and of the continuity between nursing in 
different fields of practice, and I am grateful to the nursing leaders who gave their time 
and agreed to be interviewed. 
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VARIETIES OF CARE 
A few more specific methodological notes are in order.  While I seek a wide lens, 
this project does not encompass all humanitarianisms nor all migrations.  That would be 
too large a task for several dissertations.  As a dissertation about world politics, I attend 
primarily to those forms of care that cross national borders—that is, to international 
humanitarianism and international migration.75  I focus further on humanitarian efforts 
related to health, including organizations and projects dedicated to routine healthcare 
services as well as emergency relief. 
I concentrate on migration in the caring professions, with a special focus on 
nursing.  I focus on nurses partly because nursing is easily identifiable in 
humanitarianism as well as in migration.  That is, many practices associated with nursing 
are roughly similar, whoever performs them, wherever they are performed.76  Studying 
nurses in migration and in humanitarianism provides a clear common reference, and in 
both fields nurses exemplify wider trends.  In the context of migration, this makes sense 
because in many countries the social and economic status of nurses falls between 
domestic workers, on the one hand, and doctors, on the other hand, so the experiences 
and conditions of nurses are representative of at least some of the experiences and 
                                                
75 I recognize variation within these groups.  Most humanitarian organizations include some international 
workers and often far larger national staffs.  And Parreñas found in many cases caregivers who migrate can 
do so because they themselves can hire caregivers for their children.  See Parreñas, Servants of 
Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work, 77. 
76 I do not wish to underrate large and small differences within the profession of nursing.  I also do not want 
to lose sight of the fact that oftentimes those who migrate for employment as nurses have a wide range of 
educational and professional backgrounds. 
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conditions of other care workers.  In humanitarianism, nurses play a central role in 
emergency activities as well as in more ordinary assistance projects. 
While many other types of labor commonly performed by migrant workers and 
humanitarians might be understood as caring, it would be impossible to give adequate 
coverage here to that multiplicity.  This means, for example, that I will not devote much 
space to military actors engaged in humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping in the 
humanitarian sector.  I will not focus as much on doctors, teachers, or domestic workers 
in the migrant sector.  I also recognize there is movement between occupations as women 
and men are put in a position where there is pressure to take whatever work is available.  
For example, many men and women who are educated as nurses are “deskilled” through 
the process of migration and accept work as health assistants, homecare assistants, or 
nannies.77  It is also increasingly common for doctors from countries like the Philippines 
to retrain as nurses or “nurse-medics” to take advantage of greater opportunities for 
employment as nurses abroad.78 
Finally, while I focus on caregivers, I recognize there are significant cross-border 
movements of patients.  Some countries now do an active business in health services.  
For example, “medical tourism” has become an increasingly common reason for 
Americans to visit Mexico.79  Americans, especially senior citizens living close to the 
southern border, travel to Mexico to purchase less expensive medical care and medicines.  
                                                
77 Cuban, Deskilling Migrant Women in the Global Care Industry, 149-152. 
78 Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra et al., "Human Resources for Health in Southeast Asia: Shortages, 
Distributional Challenges, and International Trade in Health Services," The Lancet 377, no. 9767 (2011): 
776. 
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The Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota receives foreign heads-of-state who seek 
premium care and are willing to pay for it.  It is not only the most privileged who cross 
borders and receive medical services.  Even if not “touring” the world for the purpose of 
medical treatment, regular migrants also often seek medical care in host countries.  Staff 
in major North American hospitals know to be prepared to receive patients who do not 




The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in four chapters and a conclusion.  
Chapter 2 begins by bringing to the fore the private sphere and the public sphere, two 
concepts used to describe, idealize, analyze, and criticize a social order that historically 
kept women in the home to provide service while compelling men into the common 
world for work, wages, and citizenship.  Feminists argue these categories are now 
defunct, if they ever described social reality.  Against this position, I argue both the 
concepts of public and private spheres remain applicable to world politics in clarifying 
the meaning and significance of the privatization of caring labor performed by migrants 
in contrast to the public caring performed by humanitarians.  I find this turn useful as an 
analytical and evaluative move that makes it possible to argue, further, that the conditions 
of humanitarianism, as much as the principles and practices internal to the movement 
make it seem like an unparalleled movement in world politics.  More generally, this 
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framework facilitates identifying and reflecting on the unequal conditions faced by 
humanitarians and migrants, and the ethical stakes in that differentiation of care. 
Chapter 3 steps back and offers a historical survey that traces the roots of 
humanitarianism and care migration.  I develop the argument that if humanitarianism 
appears to be a special movement in world politics, it is in large part because of a history 
of excluding other groups from the humanitarian world.  I revisit the origins of the 
profession of nursing in the late nineteenth century, and discuss how, often under the 
aegis of colonial rule, early humanitarian actors propagated a particular vision of nursing 
through the establishment of hospitals and nursing schools around the world and, at the 
same time, delegitimized existing models of care.  This led to significant worldwide 
standardization in the nursing profession, which in subsequent decades, contributed to the 
ease with which nurses could obtain employment in foreign countries.  These early 
humanitarian projects also established authority relations that would endure in the 
twentieth century. 
Chapter 4 investigates the international politics of care after World War II.  This 
chapter argues the security of states is at stake not only in conflict but also in care-
receiving and caregiving.  Global public and private spheres condition the capacity of 
states to fulfill security imperatives with respect to care.  The public sphere highlights 
humanitarian action, staging it in a kind of moral show and presenting states that send 
humanitarians as capable and developed.  The global private sphere regularizes care in 
the context of migration which means great power states are able to quietly secure care 
for themselves at the same time they conspicuously project care to other states.  I term 
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this brand of politics “power politics in slow motion” to signal that the effects are no less 
serious than those forms of power politics that are more widely known and well 
understood, with the difference that political effects become visible most clearly over 
generations. 
Chapter 5 takes up the international travel of caregivers in relation to the politics 
and ethics of the societies receiving them.  This chapter engages the ethics of hospitality, 
or openness to guests.  Scholars of humanitarianism usually argue that access must be 
provided for the sake of care recipients, while scholars of migration argue that hospitality 
is imperative for the sake of caregivers themselves, to provide them with opportunities 
for living well, practicing their vocation, and supporting their families.  I argue 
hospitality is not universally a good or just standard, even when visitors are caregivers.  
Because caring is generally assumed to be good, few justifications on moral or ethical 
grounds are available to societies that would prefer to refuse it.  To think more fully 
about the ethics of receiving visitors in the care sector requires scrutiny of the power 
relations between visitor and visited and how they are reinforced by wider dynamics in 
world politics.  Global public and private spheres condition power relations between 
visitors and hosts and thus the kinds of reception humanitarians and migrants receive.  
Norms supporting humanitarianism facilitate their cross-border travel.  Yet, these norms 
have not been generalized to migrant caregivers whose care is trivialized as labor rather 
than celebrated as compassionate foreign aid.  I therefore adjust the ethics of hospitality 
accordingly. 
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The conclusion summarizes my arguments and draws out final implications of the 
politics of care for the study of international politics.  I engage with the major theoretical 
perspectives in the discipline of International Relations to highlight the unique 
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Chapter 2 
 
SPHERES OF CARE IN WORLD POLITICS 
 
In 2004, the United Nations designated August 19th World Humanitarian Day to 
remember “those who have lost their lives in humanitarian service and those who 
continue to bring assistance and relief to millions.”80  Eight years later, in August 2012, 
the United Nations organized a special performance to mark the occasion.  Standing in a 
white floor-length dress on stage at the UN General Assembly hall, Beyoncé Knowles 
belted out this lyric:  “The hearts I have touched will be the proof that I leave that I made 
a difference, and this world will see I was here.”81  The screen behind Beyoncé displayed 
images of the globe interspersed with video of humanitarians coming to the aid of men, 
women, and children.  An elaborate production complete with costume, script, spotlight, 
and screaming audience, Beyoncé’s performance was a particularly literal expression of 
what James Scott has called the “dramaturgy of power” in his description of the staged 
and presentational aspects of domination.82  The ritual of the day, the display of vast 
resources, the suggestion of unanimous universal consent for humanitarian action, and 
the use of the song title “I Was Here” to brand the event are all indications of the 
privileged status of the actors and ideas that populate this sphere of world politics. 
 Feminist theorists should take note.  For contrary to all expectations that care has 
been and is likely to remain marginal, care in world politics is now socially recognized – 
                                                
80 See http://www.un.org/en/events/humanitarianday/background.shtml, accessed September 4, 2012.  
Some punctuation has been removed. 
81 See http://whd-iwashere.org/, accessed September 4, 2012. 
82 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 50. 
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and the audience and stakes are vast.83  Care as humanitarianism is acclaimed, with an A-
list celebrity as its spokesperson and representation, at least temporarily, in two important 
international venues:  the United Nations General Assembly and YouTube.  The video of 
Beyoncé’s performance was viewed widely, receiving millions of hits.  For feminist 
theorists and activists who believed caring needed to be remunerated to be valorized, this 
recognition should be all the more surprising given humanitarian action is voluntary, at 
least in principle.  And it is worthy of note that in contrast to feminists who wanted 
caregiving in the home to be understood as a political practice in a political site, 
international humanitarian organizations have shunned politics, striving instead to be 
perceived as neutral and independent.  It is surprising and ironic, then, that this 
international celebration of care followed from the move toward voluntarism, the retreat 
from politics, and the promotion of terms and activities once stigmatized as “women’s 
work.” 
Nevertheless, skepticism is warranted.  Although Beyoncé stood on stage at the 
United Nations extolling the value of care and caregivers to a world audience, it is clear 
she did not stand for all care providers.84  It is noteworthy that text accompanying the 
video of her performance explained its purpose was to honor humanitarians killed in the 
previous year as well as ordinary caregivers everywhere.  And the web site for the 
campaign asked people to do something good for someone else, to report their acts of 
                                                
83 This conventional wisdom has circulated widely.  See citations below in my discussion of the private 
sphere.  
84 See http://whd-iwashere.org/, accessed September 4, 2012. 
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care, and to follow links to the sites of humanitarian organizations for suggestions.85  Yet, 
the succession of images projected on screen behind Beyoncé did not portray many of the 
most routine forms of care, like childcare or elder care, or, with the exception of one 
school scene, any care performed indoors, whether in homes, day care centers, hospitals, 
or retirement communities.  These are the workplaces of another field of caregivers, 
including some 39 million doctors, nurses, and other health service providers, and around 
53 million domestic workers.86  What assumptions informed the selection and reception 
of these images?  Why can’t care in homes be humanitarian?  If the answer to these 
questions is in part that being humanitarian requires “going the distance,” literally and 
metaphorically, then why exclude international migrants who have crossed borders and 
traveled hundreds if not thousands of miles for employment as doctors, domestic 
workers, nannies, and nurses, often to work long days under difficult conditions?  Why 
not honor these caregivers, who, far from being shielded from difficulties and risks 
indoors, face a range of hazards, including needlesticks and bloodborne pathogens, 
cholera, tuberculosis, influenza, toxic chemicals, assault, and murder? 
In addition to a class of caregivers that is celebrated, another class of caregivers is 
excluded from the prevailing understanding of care in world politics and marginalized by 
it.  Scholars have yet to notice this or to interpret it as a problem, due largely to their own 
tendency to concentrate on only one field of care, either international humanitarianism or 
                                                
85 The World Food Programme, for example, invited site visitors to “Take the Hunger Quiz,” “Add a 
Banner to Your Site,” “Play Freerice,” “Meet Molly,” and “Donate.”  See https://www.wfp.org/get-
involved, accessed May 25, 2013. 
86 International Labour Organization, "Domestic Workers across the World: Global and Regional Statistics 
and the Extent of Legal Protection," (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2013), 2; World Health 
Organization, "The World Health Report 2010," (http://www.who.int/whr/2006/06_chap1_en.pdf). 
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international care migration.  This is what Chapter 1 referred to as the dual stories 
approach to care.  In precluding a wide view of care in world politics, this scholarly 
division of labor has foreclosed an investigation into why and with what consequences 
humanitarianism has come to define the meaning of care in the international arena.  In 
conceiving of humanitarianism as a domain encompassing all comers willing to abide 
common principles and practices, scholars cannot see to what extent humanitarianism is 
divided and differentiated from other systems of ideas and institutions for care.  In 
focusing exclusively on migrant caregivers, feminist researchers cannot comprehend how 
these and other caregivers are subject to and marginalized by the institutions and ideas 
about care that organize the humanitarian sector.  In giving short shrift to care in all 
forms, mainstream scholars in International Relations cannot appreciate to what extent 
and how significantly struggles to define, provide, and obtain care enter into foreign 
policy, institutionalized interstate cooperation, and international power politics.  As a 
consequence, scholars have been unable to see crucial dynamics in world politics. 
A rethinking is needed.  The primary goals of this chapter are to propose concepts 
for a fuller analysis of care in world politics, to provide an account of why 
humanitarianism appears to be a special moral practice in international relations, and to 
outline several problems with this order of things. 
I will make the case there is a partial analogy—as well as a measure of 
continuity—between public and private spheres within nations and across nations.  These 
contexts are similar in that a sphere of public activity is defined, distinguished, and 
privileged in relation to a sphere of productive and reproductive activity that is excluded 
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from the purview of the public.  The explicit terms marking one domain of activity as 
public refer to its universal accessibility (everyone can participate in public life), its 
universal applicability (everyone is implicated in public issues), and its authoritative 
system of governance (everyone is subject to public power).87  While purportedly 
existing for all people, actual public institutions categorize and exclude groups—
historically on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality—in many cases, 
ensuring a pool of laborers in the private sphere.  In contrast, sites and activities 
associated with the private sphere appear inaccessible to the public at large and 
inapplicable to the public.  Some version of this institutional matrix has been documented 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Brazil, and numerous other country 
contexts.88  I argue it also exists in the international system.  A global public sphere 
includes authoritative organizations like the United Nations Security Council that 
exercise governance, that are premised on a claim to serve an international community, 
and that are animated by global issues like peace and climate change.  Families, 
corporations, workers, and consumers comprise, in contrast, a global private sphere, 
where actors seem to provide for only their own particular needs rather than common 
interests.89 
With this conceptual work in place, then, it is possible to see how different forms 
of care in international relations are produced.  I argue if humanitarianism seems to be the 
                                                
87 I borrow this understanding of the meaning of public from Pitkin, as I discuss below.  Hanna Fenichel 
Pitkin, "Justice: On Relating Private and Public," Political Theory 9, no. 3 (1981). 
88 On the global scope of a sexual divisions of labor, see:  Alice Kessler-Harris, "Gender and Work: 
 Possibilities for a Global, Historical Overview," in Women's History in Global Perspective, ed. Bonnie G. 
Smith (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).  On imperialism and its effects on family restructuring 
see:  Ann B. Waltner and Mary Jo Maynes, "Family History as World History," in Women's History in 
Global Perspective, ed. Bonnie G. Smith (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004). 
89 As will become clear later I include individual and state actors in the category of consumers. 
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acme of moral progress in international history, and care in the context of migration 
seems to be no more than a sidebar, it is not because of the intrinsic worthiness or 
worthlessness of these practices but because of the different conditions that produce 
them.  The capacity to access the international community through publicity and 
governance privileges humanitarians, while limited access contributes to disadvantaging 
other international caregivers.  International institutions naturalize and normalize these 
forms of care, as well as the distinctions between them. 
Below, I elaborate and problematize two aspects of this configuration of care.  
One issue is the hierarchical ordering of care in a paradigmatic gender hierarchy.  In 
national settings, actors in the public sphere tend to narrowly specify public principles 
(like democracy) and practices (like citizenship) in a way that maintains others in a 
subordinate position.  At the global level there is a similar system of relations.  When 
humanitarians produce knowledge for worldwide consumption and represent their care in 
exclusive terms, their bid for status negatively affects caregivers in regular healthcare 
institutions, including migrants, by making it more difficult for them to make parallel 
claims.  The injustice of exclusion from and subordination to the public sphere is 
exacerbated by the way the global private sphere and the practice of care continue to be 
gendered and racialized.  This system of international dominance and subordination is 
difficult to see and understand precisely because of the way that publicity—including 
visible displays of humanitarian service—contributes to the indirection of international 
hierarchy. 
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A related but more specific concern is the problem of partial publicity.  
International humanitarianism presents the most spectacular case yet of care reconstituted 
as a public good (in this case a global public good), and is therefore of prime importance 
in grasping the promise as well as the complications in the transformation of care from a 
private to a public thing.  This is a political problem calling for ethical reflection and 
critique, because a form of care and a class of caregivers remain marginal.  One central 
political vision to emanate from feminist theory represented a similar transformation.  
Care in public would be respected, valued, and practiced competently and 
democratically.90  The case of humanitarianism suggests that vision might need to be 
tempered:  it appears at least difficult and at worse near impossible to recognize all care 
in public all at once.  Moreover, the history of humanitarianism suggests interpolating 
care in the public sphere might mean disarming it as an expressly political force, 
diminishing its transformative potential. 
While useful, the concepts of public and private spheres are contested.  Given 
contentions the public-private sphere framework is essentialist, Eurocentric, and 
anachronistic, it will be particularly crucial to specify these concepts and to articulate 
descriptive and analytical payoffs.  In the next few sections this chapter canvasses 
understandings of public and private spheres in ideology and political theory; outlines the 
analogy to international relations; puts that analogy to use to account for the bifurcation 
of care; and frames the problems of hierarchy and partial publicity. 
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Public and Private Spheres 
The concepts of public and private spheres emerged in Western politics and 
political theory, and while similar modes of organization have been identified in many 
parts of the world, I adopt these terms deliberately to assess a mode of order largely 
extended or reinforced from Europe and North America. 
References in Western political thought to private and public spheres portray a 
specific ordering of politics and society, idealizing and normalizing a gendered and 
racialized social and political order.  The opposition of these terms evoked a contrast 
between places, namely, the household in contrast to some form of political assembly.  
Beyond categorizing distinct spaces, these concepts identified and differently valorized 
contrasting activities.  The conception of the private sphere was identified with care and 
reproductive labor, while the public sphere symbolized citizenship.  In political thought 
the public sphere was normally where men participated in politics and earned a wage to 
support their families; the private sphere was normally where women raised children, 
prepared meals, and maintained the home.  Ideas about gender propriety propped up this 
order of things, and obscured its economic determinants. 
Thus, these concepts relate to distinctive sex and gender roles, specifying what 
people belong in these different places to perform these different activities.  Separate 
sphere ideologies idealized white women as deferential, dependent, docile, nurturing, and 
self-sacrificing, and naturally suited to the space of the home and family, and idealized 
white men as strong, autonomous, rational, decisive, and, most of all, naturally oriented 
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to the concerns of the common and well suited to politics.91  In this way separate sphere 
ideologies specified the organization of society not only according to gender, but also 
according to class and race.  Men and women in poverty were marginalized.  Men and 
women of color were excluded, pushed out of even the norms of the private sphere.92  
Thus, although only a small part of the populations of European and North American 
societies embodied these ideals, what was considered “normal” created expectations for 
everyone, and could be particularly painful for those to whom norms were unattainable. 
Separate sphere ideologies assigned values to the contrasting roles they defined.  
The public sphere was highly valued as a realm of collective endeavor and government, 
while the private sphere was cast as a realm of individual and familial concerns; the 
public sphere represented the existence of all things common, while the private sphere 
represented their absence.  This sense of lack is captured in the very language of the 
private sphere, invoking “privation” from the public sphere.93  A partial explanation for 
this differential valuation is the monopoly on the creation of knowledge.  Public actors 
have counted among their advantages the capacity to represent others, and to shirk 
responsibilities to engage in care themselves.  So how caregivers perceived their own 
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situation has been buried.94  In many contexts women caregivers were unable to greatly 
shape cultural ideals and political thought. 
In the twentieth century, political actors and theorists turned these concepts to 
different uses.  Barbara Bair found an affirmation of “separatism” was integral to Marcus 
Garvey’s Pan-African movement, precisely because men and women of color had been 
violently excluded from the norms of public and private spheres.  Bair explained, “The 
self-definition of separate spheres for black women and men can be seen as a direct 
reaction against attribution of stereotypical ‘feminine’ qualities (passivity, subordination, 
exclusion from skilled and professional employment) to black males and of stereotypical 
‘masculine’ qualities (strength, authority, and physicality) to black females.”95  In the 
second half of the twentieth century some feminists critiqued public and private spheres, 
even while they moved to retain these categories and domains of life with reassigned 
values.  Jean Elshtain figured in this group, alarmed institutionalized childcare would 
follow the abolition of the private sphere and would produce “obedient, oversocialized 
rule-followers who unquestioningly do their ‘duty’ and do not challenge authority as 
adults.” 96  As an alternative to such arrangements and as a bulwark against the reign of 
markets, Elshtain defended the private-familial sphere as an ideal.  Still other feminists 
pushed to deconstruct these rigid divisions, for example, to contest their racist and sexist 
assumptions, to extend the range of the values of the private sphere, and to expand 
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understandings of what places and activities count as political.  Contrary to received 
knowledge, these feminists argued, homes, daycares, schools, nursing homes, rest homes, 
retirement communities, and hospitals are already political, and, furthermore, the range 
of sites associated with politics, including community centers, town halls, town squares, 
central parks, coffee shops, universities, statehouses, legislatures, as well as other 
gathering places, sites of communication, and centers of government and publicity should 
be sites of care. 
These concepts have clearly been overworked.  No conceptualization can or 
should incorporate the abundance of meaning these concepts have carried for diverse 
purposes.  I in no way wish to endorse the hierarchical order these concepts enforced in 
dominant political ideologies.  Nor do I take lightly the numerous critiques of the use of 
these terms for analysis.  But there are now countless examples of how deploying public 
and private sphere concepts as tools of analysis and critique can be productive in 
challenging ideologies and existing political conditions.  In International Relations, in 
particular, frequent references to a global public sphere suggest there is an opening to 
think about how it is situated in relation to a global private sphere. 
For the analysis of current conditions, I find useful a contribution from Hanna 
Pitkin, which delineates the meaning of these spheres along three dimensions.  First, 
according to Pitkin, public means “accessible,” “open to scrutiny by anyone,” and 
“visible as a focus of attention.” 97  To identify the public sphere with accessibility, 
openness, and visibility is to think of it as a domain of life that can not only be seen, but 
rather as one at the center of a shared horizon.  Activities or processes that appear in view 
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on occasion are not necessarily part of the public sphere.  This sense of public 
corresponds to an interpretation of the private sphere as a domain of life that is less 
accessible, out of view, and closed to scrutiny to people at large.  Significantly, this 
closure has often corresponded to a lack of positive valuation for work associated with 
the home and family. 
A second connotation of public is that, as Pitkin explains, it “affects all or most of 
us.”98  This second dimension is closely related to the first, conjuring a system of policies 
or issues purportedly of concern to everyone in a society rather than to a particular sector.  
Private issues, and the sphere that addresses them, pertain to the smallest social 
constituencies, involving people in their most immediate affective and familial 
connections.  This dimension of meaning formulates the contrast between, for example, 
the traditionally public concern for providing security for a whole nation, and what 
appears to be a private concern for providing care to kin.99  This is basically a matter of 
scope.  The scope of the public is as wide as society, while the scope of the key 
organizational unit of the private sphere is the couple or family. 
A third meaning of public relates to “governance or control.”100  This sense of 
public should be familiar.  The public sphere involves the organization of governance:  
defining insiders and outsiders, deliberating, promulgating law and policy, and enforcing 
laws, among other operations.  Existence in the private sphere might mean being unable 
to take part in action, participation, sharing power, and public care.  It might also mean 
being subject to governance rather than being a participant in governance.  Note the 
                                                
98 Ibid. 
99 Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
100 Pitkin, "Justice: On Relating Private and Public," 329, 30. 
  57 
public sphere extends the concept of governance, first, by including the system of 
visibility and recognition that surrounds it, and, second, by more clearly specifying 
governance as a relation between privileged and marginalized groups and, in doing so, 
moving attention from governors to relations of governance.  Politics does not exist 
beyond the edge of the private sphere, but rather constitutes this divide, creating 
favorable and unfavorable positions in political relations. 
A final conceptual note is in order.  Gender has little to do with Pitkin’s 
conceptualization of public and private spheres.  Others have interpreted the relationship 
between these spheres as a gendered relationship where ideologically, the public sphere 
depends on distinguishing itself from the private sphere, and, materially, the public 
sphere requires the essential reproductive labor performed in the private sphere.  Despite 
the importance of the activities performed in the private sphere, its contributions to the 
public sphere are regularly obscured.  This dependence and concealment is best 
considered a gender power relation.  Otherwise, there is good reason to loosen the 
connection between public and private spheres and specific gender roles.  There is too 
much variation to retain a narrow understanding of women and feminine identities versus 
men and masculine identities to define public and private spheres, respectively.  Both 
femininity and masculinity figure into the definition and constitution of the private sphere 
in the international system, a point I return to below. 
Before turning to world politics it warrants acknowledging references to public 
and private spheres in current academic work are almost always critiques.  Three lines of 
criticism are particularly salient.  One common criticism is these terms present a false 
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binary, which is a problem in that binaries are a mechanism of control that operate by 
reducing the world to overly simplistic terms, such as either/or propositions, that manage 
the potential range of our individual and collective existence.101  Binaries tend to elide 
and wreak violence on human diversity.  Obviously many mentalities, subjectivities, 
practices, and behaviors are not described by the public-private sphere framework.  The 
reality of women political actors and men caregivers is obscured, as is the wider 
complexity of sex and gender.  While sometimes directed at the concepts of public and 
private spheres, this critique is often better aimed at society and its norms that enforce 
regularity and obscure diversity, propagating identities on a small set of models.  No 
system of norms can provide a detailed map of the factual terrain.  As far as the 
categories of public and private spheres—it is possible to deploy these as critical 
concepts while avoiding simply recapitulating norms.  Using minimalist versions of these 
concepts and loosening them from presumptions about gender and sex, as I do, are two 
steps in this direction. 
Another common criticism is:  where are work and capitalism?  Locating work 
has proved to be a conundrum for feminist analysts.102  On the one hand, political 
theorists have tried to respect a tradition of meaning inherited from the ancient Greeks.  A 
single word, oikos, referred to the market as well as to the home.  On the other hand, the 
private sphere connoted “woman’s place” in the home, so it seemed inconsistent to use 
this concept to cover activities outside the home, too.  It might be impossible to address 
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this problem to the satisfaction of all critics.  But we can at least keep in mind that in 
practice the private sphere has been a place for waged work, too, though it was underpaid 
work.  In the global context it continues to be the case that care work is performed by a 
class of underpaid men and women. 
A third challenge is that these concepts are Eurocentric, inapt outside the West, 
and worse, indicative of a colonizing intellectual project.  Hibba Abugideiri advanced a 
version of this argument, suggesting, first, that a dichotomous spatial order never 
described Egyptian society, and, second, that reading power in terms of public 
participation obscures Egyptian women’s historical experiences.  Women midwives, she 
found, worked inside and outside of the home in the early twentieth century, and 
experienced a measure of subordination in relation to doctors, yet also experienced power 
in relation to untrained assistants.  Their work was furthermore politically significant for 
in reducing infant mortality they contributed to the survival of the Egyptian state.  On this 
basis, Abugideiri called the public-private conceptualization a “Eurocentric analytical 
tool whose effect is to obscure the very gender power it ostensibly seeks to measure.” 103 
There should be no presumption these concepts apply everywhere.  But these 
concepts can also be vehicles for critique, particularly when they track Western 
colonialism in reorganizing societies around the world.  Moreover, these concepts can be 
turned around to criticize the societal formations they emerged to represent.  Thus, I do 
not disregard concerns related to the potential essentialism, narrowness, and 
Eurocentrism of these concepts.  But I do think it is worth probing the extent to which 
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these terms can be useful in beginning to come to terms with the organization and politics 
of care in international relations. 
  
The Global Public Sphere 
Today, as the roles assigned to men and women in many countries have become 
less rigid, some thinkers have argued public and private categories are no longer very 
useful.  Conceptions of public and private spheres seem anachronistic, a pair of epistemic 
remnants of a time mercifully passed.  I take issue with the notion the social order these 
concepts represent is obsolete.  Far from having been abolished, public and private 
spheres have been deepened and vastly extended—in fact, they have been globalized—
and the consequences are now more serious than ever. 
Scholars already know the public sphere is global.104  Citizenship is no longer 
practiced strictly within national borders, and humanitarians have often numbered among 
the cosmopolitan actors who enjoy the privileges of global citizenship.  Global citizens 
travel relatively easily across borders, manage the levers of power in organizations of 
global governance, make decisions on issues of world political import, and receive a 
modest degree of international recognition and sometimes acclaim.  Like citizens of old, 
when global citizens rally into action, they appear to shed domestic and parochial 
identifications and concerns in order to serve the common good as well as transcendent 
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ideals.105  Global citizens appear to be bold, independent, and entrepreneurial—they seem 
to be free agents acting on their own initiative, by means of their own resources, with 
care for humanity and the world as their prerogatives.  They travel between nations to 
design, create, and take part in nongovernmental organizations, engage in dialogue, 
agitate for democracy and justice, and design global futures.  Scholars call this group of 
individuals and organizations “global civil society.” 106  What Hannah Arendt said of 
political action seems true of global citizenship—that it “needs for its full appearance the 
shining brightness we once called glory, and which is only possible in the public 
realm.”107  The public sphere, what Arendt termed the space of appearances, is where 
individuals receive recognition as political actors. 
While it may not be possible to speak of a world government, there is global 
governance.  The commonplace view of global governance focuses on how international 
organizations like the World Trade Organization and the International Criminal Court 
facilitate coordination among states and impose regulations on state behavior.  There are 
also formal and informal forums for communication.  Along these lines, Mark Lynch 
conceives of a public sphere, whether national or global, as “the site in which members of 
a society exchange justifications and arguments oriented toward establishing a political 
consensus.”108  Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall deepen this view, looking to “the 
rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that 
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are fundamental elements of power.”109  Governance is more than the technical practices 
of deliberating, promulgating law and policy, and enforcing laws; it also involves the 
organization and operation of power.  The presence of power has been hard to see due to 
the ideological bearings of global governance.  As Barnett and Duvall put it, “Liberalism 
is the spirit in the machine.”110  This is to say contemporary institutions of governance 
reflect liberal premises and aims, such as the expectation of progress, the advancement of 
globalization, and the promotion of democracy, human rights, and peace.111  Increasingly 
care also figures into this liberal order. 
Visibility is produced by a global grid of media organizations and research 
institutions that create and circulate knowledge.  Manuel Castells refers to “the 
communications-based public sphere” to underscore the centrality in global politics of 
“the media communication system and Internet networks, particularly in the social spaces 
of the Web 2.0, as exemplified by YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, and the growing 
blogosphere.”112  Castells highlights as well the importance of UN conferences in the last 
decade that “were essential in fostering a global dialogue, in raising public awareness, 
and in providing the platform on which the global civil society could move to the 
forefront of the policy debate.”113  Visibility is also produced through information 
politics, when transnational activists disseminate information about human rights abuses 
to achieve their goals.114 
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The creation and circulation of common knowledge, understanding, and meaning 
helps to draw the scope of the global public sphere.  The scope of this domain of life is 
further established by the membership and mandates of intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations.115  Both types of organizations claim the widest possible 
constituencies, alternately avowing service to an international community and, more 
generally, to a human community.  The language of humanity appears in human rights 
law and in the framing of organizational mandates, including that of the International 
Criminal Court, which prosecutes crimes against humanity in addition to war crimes and 
crimes of aggression.  The language of an international community is also pervasive.  The 
scope of organizations in the global public sphere is reflected and reinforced as well in 
the types of issues these organizations take up, which are significant enough that they 
cannot be managed or resolved by a single state, issues such as transnational crime, 
international trade, and war. 
Some scholars are skeptical about the relevance of the concepts of the global 
public sphere.  Stein Sundstøl Eriksen and Ole Jacob Sending argue the global public 
sphere is not useful as an analytical concept, because global public institutions do not 
have the capacity to implement governance decisions that national public institutions do, 
nor are global public bodies directly accountable to a global constituency.116  Yet, their 
implicit point of comparison seems to be to a democratic state, and an idealized one at 
that.  They assess the capacity of institutions in the global public sphere to implement 
decisions by drawing a comparison to nation-state governance, but in practice states 
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exhibit wide variation in their governance capacity.  This comparison skews their 
analysis.  Take their claim that in national settings “citizens can have influence on the 
state [through participation] and by the fact that states are accountable towards 
citizens.”117  In actuality, states have often excluded large portions of their constituencies, 
refusing full participation.  Moreover, they argue in the international domain public 
“actors are ‘particularistic’ in a way that the state is not at the domestic level.” 118  They 
mean that at the global level public actors tend in practice to serve narrow interests—a 
partial consequence of the sheer impossibility of representing everyone in the world—yet 
actual public spheres within nation-states have also tended to serve narrow interests.  
Furthermore, in Pitkin’s conceptualization, there are other dimensions aside from 
governance and particularity along which public (and private) spheres can be defined and 
distinguished.  And as I have already discussed, it is possible to understand that global 
governance exists even in the absence of a global government. 
 
The Global Private Sphere 
I argue something like a private sphere persists on a global scale and should be 
conceptualized as such.  This concept is important to highlighting institutions that 
contribute to subordinating a whole class of caregivers, depoliticizing the care they 
provide, while naturalizing and normalizing their circumstances.  To reiterate:  I advance 
this argument for description, explanation, and critique.  It is by no means my goal to 
advocate for the reinstitution of the private sphere on any level. 
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Consider the transformation of women’s work in the United States.  Many 
American women who wish to pursue a vocation outside of the home find it is possible to 
do so—and women seem to have access to the full range of careers and public service 
opportunities.  Yet, we have not seen a resolution to inequality in the household, the end 
of domesticity, or “free choice” for women in the pursuit of work.  Now there are new 
norms that govern the private sphere:  women and men in the U.S. increasingly turn to 
global markets to employ migrant women and sometimes men to clean their houses and 
watch their children; and hospitals and elder care facilities recruit migrant workers for 
vacancies that are otherwise difficult if not impossible to fill.  In an important sense, old 
gender roles and relations remain intact, yet the positions once filled by wives, widows, 
servants, and slaves are now, even more than previously, occupied by women and men 
from other countries.  Private spheres persist and remain unseen, unappreciated, separated 
from and seemingly antithetical to politics.  Thus, the concept of the private sphere 
remains relevant to the theorization of political and social life, even in the United States 
where we like to think it was long ago abolished or transformed beyond recognition. 
The dimensions of governance, visibility, and scope are useful in conceptualizing 
the global private sphere.  The international expansion of the private sphere has entailed 
retreat from public governance, and the expansion of rule under capital.  In thinking 
about the forces driving this development, I find particularly useful Robin Goodman’s 
conception of “re-privatization” to describe the reemergence of the norms and practices 
of the industrial era private sphere under global capital.119  She views continuity between 
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the old private sphere and the contemporary global private sphere in “the current 
corporate and financial practice of avoiding the regulatory state by directly capitalizing 
on a type of labor that resembles women’s work of the industrial era in its legal status, 
tasks, and definitional traits.” 120  Neoliberalism contributes to the tenacity of this 
globalizing system of traditional sex and gender norms, helping to explain the regularity 
with which women continue to be enlisted for remunerated care work.  Goodman 
continues, “The category of the private that recognizes certain work as female work and 
therefore as ‘lacking,’ ‘unproductive,’ nonremunerative, or ‘nonprofessional’ also inflects 
inside the increasingly feminized, increasingly privatized sphere of ‘third world’ labor as 
functionally distinct from its control and management apparatuses located in the 
industrialized and financialized economies of the ‘first world.’” 121  In this way Goodman 
connects renascent gender roles to the expansion of globalizing capital and global 
governance.  Also in this vein, Rhacel Parreñas has argued the globalization of traditional 
care ideologies exerts “the force of domesticity” which refers to “the continued relegation 
of housework to women or the persistence of the ideology of women’s domesticity.”122  
This ideology enlists women, particularly migrant women, in addition to some men, into 
performing labor.  Processes of privatization ensure that this domain of life is consistently 
inaccessible, out of view, and closed to scrutiny.  Reinstituting a “natural” role for 
women as caregivers also makes it difficult to see to what extent this is a political, and 
hence potentially contestable set of processes.  In short, despite all of the talk of 
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empowerment and opportunities, this new private sphere offers few opportunities for 
sharing power or participating in global governance. 
With regard to scope, there are no international organizations to make the case 
that care (as care, not simply labor) is of concern to the world as a whole.  Instead, the 
household as a hub for affective and kinship relations remains a key constituent social 
and political unit in local contexts.  But it is critical to recognize its global dimensions.  
The global household, Maliha Safri and Julie Graham write, “is defined as an institution 
formed by family networks dispersed across national boundaries.  These networks are 
composed of nuclear and extended families and friends.”123  As individuals emigrate to 
provide care, their families are stretched across borders. 124  Safri and Graham conjecture 
800 million people or 12% of the world’s population live in global households. 125  
Household members express affiliation even at a distance by sending remittances, which 
facilitate household consumption and finance investment that improves household 
production processes. 126  Household production includes care, such as: “child care, health 
care, elder care, affective labor, education, cooking, cleaning, shopping, laundry, sewing 
and mending clothes, gardening and food production, household maintenance and repair, 
and so on.”127  Some of this labor occurs at a distance, through communication over the 
phone and Internet.  What the global household leaves out is paid care, omitting all those 
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households that employ international domestic workers.  However, just because care is 
paid does not mean that it is any more visible.  Just as in the past the private sphere meant 
invisibility or lack of recognition, so it remains true on a global scale.  As Drucilla Barker 
writes perceptively, “Social exclusion, isolation in the home, and the invisibility of 
domestic workers in the public sphere are necessary to the profits and functioning of 
global capital today.  The proper performance of affect, respectability, and domesticity is 
required for migrant domestic workers whose livelihoods depend on the trust and 
goodwill of their employers.”128  The household is an obscure site of politics. 
Thus, the private sphere seems to concern not the whole of the international 
community or humanity, but instead, on the one hand, people in global households and, 
on the other hand, consumers and producers.  In addition to other forms of exclusion 
from global governance, the private sphere restricts migrant workers from processes of 
knowledge production.  Caregivers in the global private sphere cannot as easily partner 
with corporate media organizations or activate other means for public self-presentation.  
That organizations and individuals involved in international care migration do not have 
access to this type of representation helps us to better understand the marginal global 
status of this domain of life.  The reintroduction of essentialist gender ideologies 
contributes to the relative invisibility of these processes. 
In sum, people have moved between homes and locales, contributing to such 
dramatic transformations of what was formerly “private” that those places should now 
also be described as “global.”  The global private sphere includes globalized institutions 
like the household, where paid and unpaid care is central.  In contrast to the global public 
                                                
128 Barker, "Querying the Paradox of Caring Labor," 582. 
  69 
sphere, the global private sphere is defined by the relative subordination, invisibility, and 
particularization of activity in this domain. 
The concepts of global public and private spheres make possible a better analysis 
of care in world politics, which I unfold in the next several sections.  First, these concepts 
help to provide an account of the divided status of care, specifically how and why 
humanitarians appear special despite the fact they are paralleled by care in the context of 
international migration.  Second, these concepts help to show why, while we might on 
first reflection celebrate the publicity of care, it remains partial and problematic.  Third, 
these concepts highlight the problem of gendered hierarchy, where diffuse relations of 
domination connect humanitarian and migrant caregivers.  In short, with these concepts 
we can better understand the limitations of this revolution in care in international 
relations. 
 
The Political Division of Care 
The global public sphere has transformed care.  Humanitarianism, as a movement 
for live-saving relief and assistance, defined by voluntarism, humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, and independence, has been elevated and it has become a natural, normal, and 
ideal form of care.  It exists by virtue of its identification with humanity, the wide reach 
of global media, and institutions of global governance.  This vision of care is propagated 
by major organizations of global governance like the World Health Organization and the 
United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in addition to 
nongovernmental organizations like International Medical Relief, Médecins Sans 
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Frontières, and World Vision.  Humanitarian organizations focused on emergency relief 
provide short-term shelter, provisions, and medical assistance, while others focused on 
development seek to improve food security, develop educational and health resources, 
establish democratic institutions, and raise the social and political status of women.129  
Spreading ideals and norms goes far beyond simply monitoring contracts and 
compliance.  Humanitarian governance, Michael Barnett writes, signifies a “project to 
shape lives, habits, dispositions, and institutions in order to improve the well-being of 
people.”130  Through organizations of global governance humanitarian care is codified 
and provided a principled basis, setting values for the international community. 
The visibility afforded to humanitarianism by virtue of its location in the global 
public sphere is a crucial aspect of this transformation.  Nearly all humanitarian 
organizations advertise their activities as a matter of informing the public about their 
work.131  Many engage celebrities and political officials to help spread awareness about 
humanitarian causes and to solicit donations.132  The media frequently reports and usually 
praises the activities of humanitarian agencies at the same time it mobilizes financial 
support for them in what one observer has wryly called “moral fervor mediatronically 
applied.”133  Alex de Waal credited Bernard Kouchner, the co-founder of Médecins Sans 
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Frontiéres, with the invention of “humanitarian action as a brand of theater.”134  As such, 
the public is where international humanitarians perform and win recognition for their 
caring endeavors.  The spectacle of disaster also contributes to their high profile, which 
may explain why humanitarianism in times of emergency emerged as “the official face of 
international humanitarianism.”135 
Media are not limited to newspaper and television advertisements.  Consider how 
humanitarians appear in American media.  In 2003, the National Geographic Channel 
aired a special television series called “Doctors without Borders:  Life in the Field,” with 
episodes including “Into the Crisis Zone,” “Borders and Babies,” and “Deliverance.”  It is 
not uncommon for humanitarian organizations to host YouTube channels, Twitter 
streams, and Facebook pages, and all at least have websites.  The largest of the 
humanitarian organizations have magazines, journals, and book series.  Médecins Sans 
Frontières releases new books at a pace academics would envy.  Humanitarian leaders 
like Paul Farmer and James Orbinski are interviewed on news programs like “Charlie 
Rose.”  Their books are available in local bookstores and community libraries.  As a 
consequence of this publicity, Americans are familiar with their work.  Most can list the 
names of large humanitarian agencies, and admire individuals who volunteer their time 
and endure difficulties to assist strangers. 
Humanitarians are rewarded with public approbation internationally, too.  For 
their virtue as well as their labor and sacrifice, the United Nations designated August 19th 
World Humanitarian Day and May 8th World Red Cross Red Crescent Day.  Exemplary 
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humanitarians receive honors and prizes, such as the Church World Service Humanitarian 
Award and the CARE International Award for Humanitarian Reportage.  The prestigious 
Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize is intended, in part, “to call attention to the 
worldwide need for humanitarian aid and to encourage others to expand their support.”136  
Humanitarians have been frequent recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize.  The founder of 
the Red Cross Movement, Henry Dunant, was one of two recipients of the Peace Prize in 
1901.  The International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross 
Societies shared the Peace Prize in 1963.  Since then, Peace Prize winners have included 
UNICEF, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, and Médecins Sans Frontières.137  
Although not every humanitarian organization is awarded the Nobel Prize, every 
organization and every individual humanitarian participates in a system of recognition 
where their work is visible and highly valued. 
The claim to a worldwide constituency is another predicate of humanitarianism.  
This is evident in how nongovernmental organizations raise funds.  Appeals for donations 
claim that the organized response to emergencies is of concern to everyone in the world, 
because everyone could potentially discover themselves in crisis, and everyone should 
care that others receive assistance at such moments.  The scope claims of humanitarian 
organizations are reflected, too, in reported rates of participation.  For example, the Red 
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Cross Red Crescent literature frequently claims that each year it provides assistance to 
one in twenty-five people worldwide.138  The Red Cross also reports an extraordinary rate 
of involvement, asserting one in 500 people worldwide participate in voluntary activity 
with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.139  It is also worth noting humanitarians are 
imagined to care for many people at once—a humanitarian team serves an encampment 
of refugees, a population, a country, in the tens, hundreds, and thousands—in contrast to 
regular caregivers who seem to meet the needs of smaller constituencies. 
Those other caregivers are produced as “ordinary” due to the fact that they inhabit 
a quite different position in international relations.  Instead of participating in 
governance, caregivers are subject to the vagaries of globalized markets.  Without the 
ability to leverage more control in global governance organizations, there has not been 
the same formalization of principles to codify and validate the moral significance of care 
in migration.  Relevant international professional associations do have codes of conduct, 
though they are seldom oriented to care for humanity.  The preamble to the code for the 
International Council of Nurses is instructive:  “Nurses have four fundamental 
responsibilities:  to promote health, to prevent illness, to restore health and to alleviate 
suffering.” 140  These could be the responsibilities of a medical humanitarian agency, or 
of some branch of the humanitarian sector.  The preamble also underscores a version of 
the principle of humanity:  “Nursing care is respectful of and unrestricted by 
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considerations of age, colour, creed, culture, disability or illness, gender, sexual 
orientation, nationality, politics, race or social status.”141  The difference is that the code 
goes on to emphasize the priority of the individual and the family:  “Nurses render health 
services to the individual, the family and the community.”142  A nurse’s constituency is 
defined more narrowly than it would be for practically any humanitarian.  Interestingly, 
the original version of the International Council’s code did relate nursing to a wider 
global constituency.  It reads, "Service to mankind is the primary function of nurses and 
the reason for the existence of the nursing profession.  Need for nursing service is 
universal.  Professional nursing service is therefore unrestricted by consideration of 
nationality, race, creed, colour, politics or social status." 143  It is not clear what drove this 
revision, but it seems indicative of the privatization of nursing over time. 
Care in the context of migration does not receive the positive global publicity 
awarded to humanitarians.  Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo observes, “There is a parallel 
universe of women doing paid domestic work; it remains invisible, out of sight and 
consciousness of employers until the moment it is tapped.”144  In the United States, media 
do occasionally feature domestic workers, but not as caregivers making a fundamental 
contribution to society and common life.  The premier of the Lifetime series “Devious 
Maids” offers a type of visibility, and portrays the assistance domestic workers provide, 
but it also reduces women who do domestic work to stereotypes.  In 2013 The New York 
Times published a video opinion piece or “op-doc” called “The Caretaker” highlighting 
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an undocumented Fijian caregiver lovingly caring for an elderly American woman.  It is 
moving, yet it risks purchasing support for migrant care by cashing in on traditional 
gender tropes:  care is something maternal, thus something for families, thus apolitical. 
It is important to note a disconnect between international and national regimes of 
recognition.  Overseas Filipino Workers, or OFWs, are considered national heroes by the 
government of the Philippines.  And, although absent, overseas workers exert a presence 
in everyday life in the Philippines.  OFWs are regularly featured in daily newspapers, on 
television, as characters in popular novels, and as subjects of the latest social science 
research.  Their earnings help make possible the existence of shopping malls, which 
house international chains—among them, Starbucks, the Gap, Topshop, Accessorize, and 
Zara—offering a selection of services and retail goods out of reach for most Filipinos.  
The experiences of overseas workers are not only visible but audible: for two hours every 
weekday morning, the public radio station DZXL 558 in Manila now broadcasts Bantay 
OFW, which provides guidance to workers experiencing problems overseas and to those 
looking for employment.145  Still, again, this heroic portrait of migrant workers, including 
caregivers, has not been incorporated into international institutions.  And while there are 
professional accolades that go to nurses as well as to doctors who are migrants, these 
reward professional activity, not the arduous aspects of crossing borders and the 
potentially morally outstanding dimensions of caring for strangers in remote locales. 
This issue reflects how the global public sphere limits participation in knowledge 
production.  Research institutions do much of the intellectual work of representing and 
idealizing humanitarian care, disseminating books and journal articles and other forms of 
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media that inform global perceptions of what care means, usually cosmopolitan, 
compassionate, and selfless.  Even when representation includes southern humanitarian 
organizations, it still excludes non-humanitarian caregivers.  Whether intended or not, the 
institutionalization of principles increasingly excludes a whole class of international 
caregivers.  In most international organizations humanitarianism stands as an ideal and 
essential form of care. 
 
The Problem of Partial Publicity 
Envisioning public care has been a major objective for at least some feminist 
theorists and thinkers of care.  In her commentary on international care work, Arlie 
Hochschild, for instance, suggested we ought “to raise the value of caring work itself, so 
that whoever does it gets more rewards for it.”146  Care as humanitarianism could not be 
more prominent, and this very prominent public movement in world politics has clearly 
made real some aspects of feminist visions, featuring as it does an ethos of care and 
practices identifiable as care.  Michael Walzer estimates, “Humanitarianism is probably 
the most important ‘ism’ in the world today, given the collapse and discrediting of 
neoliberalism, and the general distrust of large-scale political ideologies.”147  However, 
world politics has seen only a partial revolution in care, underscoring the point that even 
if some forms of care achieve public recognition, not all forms of care and not all 
caregivers necessarily reap the benefits.  While it seems like a good thing that some 
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caregivers are able to marshal global power, publicity, and a worldwide constituency, 
other caregivers are marginalized through this transformation.  This is what I call the 
problem of partial publicity. 
We can see how partial publicity works in the way humanitarian care is idealized 
and normalized, obscuring and diminishing other forms of care, even though their 
contributions to common life are comparable.  This makes it all the more difficult for 
migrant caregivers to get control of levers of power and individually and collectively 
shape their conditions.  Consider the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
operates under the slogan “coordination saves lives.”  It is highly revealing no institution 
with the power of that institution claims “migration saves lives.”  When migration does 
figure in the purview of international organizations, it is interpreted as labor.  And to the 
extent the social contribution of migrants is recognized it is understood in terms of 
remittances—a portion of their earnings, which provide support for families for such 
things as food, housing, daycare, school, and visas, as well as community facilities 
including hospitals, suggesting an even closer parallel with the work of international 
humanitarians.  Instead of contributing to care for humanity—and to global progress—
international migration is seen to serve, on the one hand, particular families, and, on the 
other hand, the national development of states of origin through remitted earnings.  The 
care performed by international migrants is not characterized as care, nor is it defined in 
terms of principles, nor is it represented in terms of its general contribution to 
humankind.  Not surprisingly given these representations, the skills and professional 
training of migrant caregivers are constantly overlooked.  This is evidenced by the fact 
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that rather than gaining status by crossing borders, professionals often experience 
deskilling.148 
Other principles taken to define humanitarianism further show how it operates as 
a normal and ideal form of care.  Take, for example, the principle of impartiality.  
Impartiality is the idea that rather than taking care of your own first, aid should go to 
those who need it most.  Not nationality, proximity, or kinship, but great need should 
dictate who receives assistance.  Whatever its value, the principle of impartial care 
discounts those who care for people who are not among the neediest.  A doctor or nurse 
who seeks employment in a foreign country might take into account a variety of 
considerations in choosing where to work including favorable immigration policies, 
reasonable accreditation standards, and the availability of employment opportunities.  
The principle of impartiality also marginalizes those who care for their own families and 
friends.  Undocumented workers who bring children with them into the United States are 
often unable to obtain help from local and federal governments in caring for their 
children and loved ones.  As noted above, to cope, some rely on kinship networks and 
help family members cross borders to provide childcare.149  Although it is life-preserving 
care, and though they face hardships and perils in crossing borders, the care family 
members provide is clearly partial, again violating this defining principle of 
humanitarianism.  Sending earnings home as remittances—for instance, to help build 
homes, and community projects, and to pay for schools and school supplies—also 
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violates the principle of impartiality.  This is a remarkable exclusion considering 
worldwide remittances exceed official development assistance.150 
Another example is the principle of voluntarism.  The Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement idealizes care as voluntary service, because, according to an official 
statement, without it, the movement would be in “danger of becoming bureaucratic, 
losing touch with a vital source of motivation, inspiration and initiative, and of cutting off 
the roots which maintain its contact with human needs and enable it to meet them.”151  
Care that is waged is excluded from the definition of humanitarianism, and, implicitly 
care that is compassionate is excluded from the definition of migration.  It is true that 
care in migration is almost always premised on a contract that arranges an exchange of 
work for pay, which is not to say that it is fair, freely entered into, or scrupulously 
honored.  Yet, again, the presumption that care is either motivated by compassion or 
money obscures the contribution of people who migrate to care for their loved ones.  
Again, the upshot is that from the vantage point of the global public sphere and the 
humanitarian world, most migrant caregivers are marginal to this system of principles. 
The takeaway for political engagements, both local and global, is that making care 
public is fraught.  It is difficult to both specify a practice of care that can be widely 
recognized and celebrated, and at the same time to avoid instituting distinctions that 
might paradoxically contribute to the invisibility and marginality of some forms of care 
and some caregivers.  In hierarchical settings it seems all the more likely that the 
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diversification of care will map onto pre-existing asymmetries.  In such scenarios it is all 
the more important that privileged caregivers explicitly incorporate principles like 
equality and solidarity that could at least provide excluded groups a lever by which to 
gain greater access. 
Still, the division of caregivers between public and private spheres suggests the 
difficulty of building sector-wide alliances and solidarity, which may be a prerequisite for 
morally good care.  The kind of understanding necessary for acting in concert seems 
improbable given the intense socialization and processes of self-realization that are part 
of the current order of care.  Along these lines, David Kennedy explains, “Coming into 
awareness of oneself as the representative of something else—heroic agent for authentic 
suffering elsewhere—mutes one’s capacity for solidarity with those cast as victims, 
violators, bystanders, and stills the habit of understanding oneself to inhabit the world 
one seeks to affect.” 152  The problem is not just that an orientation to salvation may 
prevent humanitarians from seeking common cause with fellow caregivers.  The problem 
may instead by that this orientation emerges out of a broader system of conditions, global 
public and private spheres that thwart coalition, collaboration, alliance, and solidarity. 
 
The Problem of Gendered Hierarchy 
The concepts of global public and private spheres invite us to interpret gender in 
two ways, with reference to the gender ideologies that predominate in each sphere, and 
with reference to the structural relation between these spheres. 
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The new public status of care in international relations has not significantly 
troubled the gendered identification of care.  Given the close historical association 
between care, women, and the home, it would not have been unreasonable to hope the 
dramatic incorporation of care into the public sphere might change this, and perhaps undo 
some of the distinctions between public and private spheres.  Yet, no such revolution has 
occurred.  Gendered ideologies remain prevalent, constituting activities performed in the 
global public sphere as well as in the private sphere.  While care does not only concern 
the production of female, feminine, maternal, or wifely identities, as some feminist and 
gender theorists have implied, intense gender definitions and expectations define care in 
both humanitarianism and migration.  In many places, nurses, nannies, and domestic 
workers—including women and men—are subject to the more or less overlapping 
ideologies related to femininity, maternalism, and domesticity.  However, performances 
of care across the world instantiate a more complex normative system.  In addition to 
systematically shaping the life conditions of migrant women, globalized norms have 
ramifications for men, especially from the Third World.  For instance, migrant men from 
Asia care for American soldiers on military bases by doing such things as laundry, food 
preparation, and cleaning.  Isabelle Barker concludes that although it is men who perform 
care work, this arrangement does not upset patriarchal gender ideas.  To the contrary, US 
soldiers are cast “as bearers of a superior masculinity vis-à-vis feminized migrant 
workers.”153  Similarly, Lena Näre finds it is common for Italian employers to interpret 
male Sri Lankan domestic workers as “sweet, discreet, and humble—in sum, asexual, 
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submissive, and docile.”154  In a timely corrective and reminder, Martin Manalansan has 
pointed out not all migrants are or will be mothers or members of nuclear families, and 
that there are single and queer migrants, including men.155  He suggested considering 
desire, as well as persecution on the basis of sexuality as motivations for migration.  In 
addition, Manalansan recommended attending to the institutional production of 
understandings about gender and sexuality rather than taking them as pre-given. 
Again, at first, humanitarianism seems to represent the end of gender specific 
care.  Humanitarian organizations at least do not spread patriarchal tropes that care is 
natural for women and unnatural for men.  Nonetheless, activity in the humanitarian 
sector remains in some respects gendered. 156  With regard to how gender norms regulate 
global public life, Craig Calhoun observes women more than men continue to be 
constrained by obligations at home, including childcare, which makes it difficult for them 
to travel.157  And anecdotal evidence suggests when women do become humanitarians, it 
is less likely they will have a family.  “Look around,” one aid worker remarked to a 
reporter, “and you’ll see that this business is full of women thirty-five to forty-five who 
are strong, competent, good at what they do, and single.”158  The humanitarian sector as a 
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whole also embodies paternal norms in relation to recipients of assistance.  Uma Narayan 
has argued that care discourses embody the paternalistic assumptions that historically 
surrounded colonial projects.159  More recently, Michael Barnett has asked whether 
humanitarianism represents a kind of “paternalism.”160  Although he does not discuss 
paternalism as a gendered relation, he calls attention to how humanitarians sometimes 
deign to “know best” and act without full consent of affected parties.  Fiona Robinson 
detects paternalism in the fact that humanitarian caregivers assume to have superior 
knowledge of the situations in which they help others.161 
In addition to recognizing the ways care has been associated with gendered 
identities, we can also read gender in the hierarchical relation between global public and 
private spheres.  These two spheres exist in a diffuse relationship of dependence, where 
the global public sphere depends ideologically and materially on the work performed in 
the global private sphere, even while this dependence is obscured.  It seems at first 
impossible to identify a relation of dependence with the same immediacy as the 
traditional household relation.  To be sure, some transnational citizens rely directly on the 
labor of migrants; these arrangements sometimes make headlines when they turn into 
abuse.  But we should not lose sight of the fact that whole communities and countries 
depend on migrants.  All public actors and all public things need constant repair, 
maintenance, and improvement.  Without men and women to labor in agriculture, and 
caregivers to watch children, for example, transnational activists, intellectuals, 
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politicians, and humanitarians would have to do it all themselves, leaving less time for 
their creative work and public activity.  Another way of putting this is that most of the 
world’s citizens are dependent on women and men who migrate. 
There have been some hints in this direction.  Some feminist researchers argue 
poor countries furnish a labor force for other countries in a way that is analogous to the 
personal service historically rendered by wives.  Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie 
Hochschild draw this comparison explicitly, writing, “Poor countries take on a role like 
that of the traditional woman within the family.”162  Wealthy families could care for their 
children and elderly members, but they delegate this labor.  States, hospitals, and 
households can exercise control over migrant caregivers because these caregivers are 
feminized, and often situated in the informal sector, where low-wages and insecurity are 
normal.  Other feminists have depicted an international division of reproductive labor.  
They have said it is meaningful to think of care as a commodity in short supply, which is 
extracted from the Third World, leaving deficits of care around the world.163 
We can extend this analogy with reference to global public and private spheres.  
In their activity in the public sphere it is possible to think of how humanitarianism is 
attached to a notion similar to breadwinning.  Powerful countries—and perhaps the 
international community as a whole—derive a kind of collective character from 
humanitarianism.  It is true that humanitarians are not breadwinners for the international 
community in the literal sense that they earn an income to sustain it, but they fill this role 
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in the looser sense of accumulating and bringing “home” value.  We have already seen 
how the global public sphere systematically conveys worth on the particular practice of 
care formulated by humanitarianism—care that is universal, voluntary, neutral, and 
impartial.  The fact that states frequently attempt to appropriate humanitarian efforts 
suggests these activities are valuable.  The symbolic gains that humanitarians accrue 
derive especially from their connection to global progress, contributing to development 
across countries and the world in the form of less suffering and greater flourishing.  More 
literally, humanitarian organizations collect donations from the international community 
to fund disaster relief. 
Furthermore, in that relief aid does little to remedy deeper structural inequalities 
in the international system, humanitarianism might also function as a kind of “pass” for 
the international community, which serves as a kind of excuse or justification for not 
contributing in a more substantial way to economic restructuring and redistribution, 
analogous to the way traditional breadwinners took a “pass” on participating in care and 
other forms of domestic work.  To concretize this, consider the World Health 
Organization’s Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health 
Personnel, which lays out considerations for member states that seek to draw caregivers 
from other countries.  In its 10th and final article it suggests member states and 
nongovernmental organizations “should be encouraged to provide technical assistance 
and financial support to developing countries or countries with economies in transition, 
aiming at strengthening health systems capacity, including personnel development in 
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those countries.”164  I return to this code in Chapter 4, but for now I simply want to 
highlight how the code offers humanitarianism as a kind of compensatory gesture for the 
adverse effects of nurse recruitment.  These are the same types of gender relations that 
public and private spheres maintained in national settings. 
In this way, the concepts of global public and private spheres represent how both 
humanitarianism and migration are entangled and related in a broader system of power in 
international relations.  The manner in which the global public sphere makes 
humanitarianism visible—as a special and unique form of global care—makes the 
presence of domination all the more difficult to see.  That humanitarianism is founded on 
a basis of principles and claims to neutrality, impartiality, and universality only heightens 
the impression that this field has little to do with reproducing inequality and division. 
To read gender in international politics in this way is to depart from most current 
approaches that adopt a feminist or gender lens.  It is to see gender in structural terms, not 
to focus on gender as individual experience.165  My interest is in highlighting 
organizational aspects of the international system that produce and reproduce 
subordination.  The global private sphere and the global public sphere are fundamentally 
systemic concepts, not so different from “balance of power,” “security communities,” or 
“core,” “semi-periphery,” and “periphery.”  Developing world system concepts and 
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theories is relatively rare for feminist theorists who largely focus on particular local, 
historical, and organizational contexts.166 
On a final note, I am mindful of the risks of proposing a rigid dichotomy between 
two types of caregivers, which would do an injustice to vast diversity among caregivers.  
As one illustration, national humanitarians are placed in much the same position as 
migrants in that they are often treated by international humanitarians as laborers and 
excluded from managerial authority in humanitarian projects.  Parreñas has called 
attention to hierarchies among migrants.  Those who migrate are often able to do so 
precisely because they can hire caregivers who stay with their children.167  While this 
diversity and stratification among caregivers is important to recognize, it is also crucial to 
pay attention to how global public and private spheres hide this diversity. 
 
Conclusions 
The paired concepts of global public and private spheres can help us to 
conceptualize how care is organized on the world scale, and with what consequences.  An 
international system of governance with a worldwide constituency and worldwide 
visibility has contributed to the elevation of one form of care and the marginalization of 
another.  Humanitarianism appears in the world bearing what seem to be clear signs of its 
uniqueness—its principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and voluntarism are 
widely praised, and the delivery of relief in crisis situations is celebrated.  Yet, I have 
argued at the same time institutions of global governance center and authorize 
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humanitarianism, they marginalize the work of other caregivers, relegating them to the 
domain of the normal, national, local, familial, and personal.  Regular health 
professionals do not appear to work for suffering humanity, but for suffering countries, 
communities, households, and individuals—and perhaps not even for them, but for the 
wage they receive as compensation.  Since their labor is remunerated, their motives are 
presumed to be economic rather than principled.  International humanitarian care is 
prestigious; other varieties of transnational care are less so. 
The problem with the divided status of care is on the surface simply that it 
represents a stalled revolution.  It seems at first that the new public status of care in 
international relations represents a turning point or point of leverage that might make 
more significant and more diverse forms of care possible in the future.  Yet, the 
organization of care in international relations expresses the intransigence of material 
conditions at least as much as burgeoning freedom and greater scope for moral choice 
and actions.  Humanitarians are able to participate in the intimate minutiae of foreign 
societies because of their preponderance of material resources and their exclusive identity 
as expert caregivers.  In interpersonal relations and local settings there is a reasonable 
expectation that hierarchies in care relations can be overcome, or at least attenuated.  But 
in international relations, hierarchy appears to be extremely resistant to democratization. 
This means that the problems of partial publicity and gender hierarchy cannot be easily 
resolved. 
In the next chapter, I step back to trace how historical divisions anticipated 
contemporary segregation among caregivers.  Humanitarianism appears to be a special 
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Chapter 3 
 
ORIGINS OF THE WORLD POLITICS OF CARE 
 
The National Museum in Manila recently installed “The Progress of Medicine in the 
Philippines,” a vivid rendering of the history of care in the country.  The four giant panels 
by modernist painter Carlos “Botong” Francisco portray ideas, technologies, and 
practitioners of medical and spiritual care across the centuries.  The first scene 
foregrounds a woman with long black hair standing with arms stretched upward in front 
of an emaciated body, a king, and a crowd of onlookers.  The woman is a babaylan, a 
medicine woman or priestess, who possessed not only the power to heal but also 
intellectual and political authority.  More than dispensing remedies, she invested life and 
death with meaning.  The second scene centers on two Spanish friars, one studying at a 
desk and another gathering herbs.  To one side several men engage in acts of caretaking.  
The third scene shows American public health authorities in brown uniforms.  As 
historian Warwick Anderson explained, they had “assumed the power to examine 
Filipinos at random and to disinfect, fumigate, and medicate at will.” 168  In the painting, 
one American medical officer vaccinates a line of Filipinos, while another gestures to a 
crouched Filipino man to scoop a pile of dejecta into a nearby pail.  The fourth panel 
depicts a contemporary Filipino surgical team in white scrubs encircled by an x-ray 
machine, nurses, a lecture hall, an atom, and a mushroom cloud. 
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These scenes summon hard questions about care and world politics.  Among these 
questions are a few counterfactuals:  if not for colonialism, would the babaylan have 
survived through the centuries, contributing to the humanitarian world or perhaps 
creating a different world of care altogether?  What would international humanitarianism 
look like if this image of care defined its principles and modes of operation? 
The conventional wisdom about humanitarianism is that it is unique in world 
politics because of political visionaries who dared to fashion a movement around 
principles in a world governed by power.  If humanitarianism is Western, according to 
this narrative, it is because in an accident of history those bold visionaries—from 
Protestant missionaries to the founders of the Red Cross movement and the Rockefeller 
Foundation—happened to be born in the West.  Against this view, in this chapter I argue 
to the extent humanitarianism is a unique movement in world politics it is at least in part 
because from their privileged position in a hierarchical world order humanitarian actors 
diminished, excluded, and overpowered those who might have otherwise been partners, 
teachers, counterparts, or rivals in organizing and providing care.  In so far as 
humanitarianism is Western, and the prevailing understanding of care is Western, it is 
because actors in the West claimed the practice of care for themselves alone.  The 
exclusionary politics of humanitarianism went beyond the violent segregation and 
repression associated with colonialism.  Humanitarian actors promulgated distinctions 
and exclusions in foreign missions as well as in their own nations.  Poor people, people of 
color, older people, sometimes men, and sometimes women were all at different times 
excluded from the humanitarian world.  The subsequent institutionalization of 
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humanitarianism in an array of local, national, and international organizations meant that 
some of these patterns of privilege and exclusion endured, so that some people who 
crossed borders as caregivers would be excluded from humanitarian organizations, and 
assigned a lower status in world politics. 
This argument recasts the origins of humanitarianism.  From the beginning 
humanitarianism was both a creative and a conservative intellectual and political 
movement, one that construed care as a public good at the same time it abdicated 
egalitarian political principles like coalition, participation, and inclusiveness.  Now, while 
international humanitarians and international migrants both perform care that is often 
similar at the level of practice, international institutions recognize humanitarians as ideal 
caregivers and assign migrant caregivers the status of laborers.  This chapter will discuss 
how the division and specialization of care in world politics has unfolded, and how a set 
of historical forces have gradually untied and differentiated international humanitarian 
care from other forms of care. 
The scope of this chapter is broad, and I do not try to comprehensively cover 
ground that has already been travelled in excellent histories of these fields and the 
organizations and individuals who populate them.169  I draw on these histories, in 
addition to other secondary sources and primary materials.  I begin by identifying roles 
and social relations related to caregiving in the home in the United States and United 
Kingdom and continue by tracking the extension of caregiving roles and ideas outside the 
home to the community and world.  Examining this expansion through the lens of the 
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profession of nursing, I trace how international humanitarian projects defined themselves 
in relation to and often in distinction from regular national health services. 
In this chapter I illustrate and exemplify these dynamics in relation to North 
Atlantic humanitarianism around the turn of the twentieth century, focusing on the period 
from roughly 1890 until 1920.  I reference American humanitarianism in the Philippines 
as a particularly important example of exclusionary dynamics. 
 
Care in the Home:  Processes of Division 
Over the course of the second half of the 19th century, some caregivers—namely, 
nurses, teachers, and, eventually, humanitarians—left the home while others remained in 
their own homes and in the homes of others to perform housekeeping labor that society 
considered menial.  Those who could would claim the most socially valued care activities 
and leave the rest to others.170  Rather than the complete exclusion of care from the public 
sphere, this process resulted in stratification and a spectrum of care activities between 
public and private spheres. 
At the beginning of the 19th century in the United States and the United Kingdom 
most care was performed in the home.  This included raising and educating children, 
preparing food, and ministering to the sick.  Women were typically responsible for these 
activities, but their labor was not divided spatially from the labor of men.  Men and 
women worked together in and around the home at least until the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  Their activities were specified by conventional sex and gender 
definitions, to be sure, as men farmed, for example, while women cooked, cleaned, and 
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cared for children.  Yet, these duties were performed in close proximity, which meant 
that gender definitions could not be elaborated with reference to spatial concepts.171  The 
role of women could not yet be defined in exclusive relation to the home.  That came 
later.  Proximity between the sexes held even in medical care.  When married couples set 
up medical practice together, as they often did, only some specializations like surgery and 
midwifery were defined in gendered terms, where husbands were responsible for the 
former and wives the latter.172 
With industrialization at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th 
century, this changed.  Upper- and middle- class white men were able to pursue 
employment and citizenship activities outside of the home.  In the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the public sphere came to be associated with men in their roles as 
citizens and breadwinners, heads of household, and protectors.  The new ideology of 
separate spheres granted the work of privileged men outside the home a double 
legitimacy.  It was legitimated as socially useful activity that contributed to the building 
of the common world.  It was also legitimated by virtue of the fact that their earnings 
made it possible to buy commodities including foodstuffs and fabrics that eased the 
burden of domestic work.  Their work visibly and tangibly improved the material 
environment of the household. 173  At the same time that public activity came to be 
associated with men, the home came to be understood as a place that was inappropriate 
for men and the expression of masculinity.  Florence Nightingale observed in 1852 that 
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British society had no mercy for men who spent too much time in the domestic sphere 
and ridiculed them as “knights of the carpet,” “drawing-room heroes,” and “ladies-
men.”174  Thus, powerful sex and gender norms closed this sphere of activity to upper- 
and middle-class men. 
For the most privileged, home became increasingly removed from politics and 
paid labor.  Wives, servants, and slaves remained in the home and the fields.  They cared 
for husbands and children, in addition to maintaining the living space.  For middle-class 
American and British women, caring for others was supposed to be its own reward, and a 
natural expression of their instincts and skills.  Women were perceived to lack the 
spiritual disposition, intellectual competence, and physical suitedness for participation in 
public ventures.  John Stuart Mill observed, “All the moralities tell them that it is the duty 
of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to 
make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections.”175  
Not surprisingly, then, there were few socially acceptable alternatives for women to work 
outside of the home, and these typically involved doing traditional domestic labors.  
Women left the home to do textile work in factories and to teach.176  Women also left 
their own homes to care for the ill or to work as nannies or domestic workers. 
The “cult” or “thralldom” of domesticity contributed to the consolidation of this 
spatial reordering.  Domesticity implied, first, a distinction between the home and its 
domestic activities, and the world, and its economic and political activities.  Yet this 
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ideological and perceptual distinction went still deeper.  As Nancy Cott explained about 
the emergence of the private sphere in nineteenth-century New England, “Women’s 
sphere was ‘separate’ not only because it was at home but also because it seemed to elude 
rationalization and the cash nexus, and to integrate labor with life.”177  The home 
embodied a distinctive set of virtues that stood in contrast to the profit-seeking machinery 
of capitalism and the standardization it entailed.  The institutionalization of the private 
sphere depended on the elaboration of a set of principles that distinguished between men 
and women and identified each as uniquely suited to a particular domain and set of 
activities. 
There were always differences between ideology and reality.  Women worked 
outside their own homes, and men also worked in the homes of others.  An 1880 survey 
reported that both women and men were employed in the household.  Women were hired 
as chambermaids, cooks, housekeepers, laundresses, nurses, seamstresses, and waitresses, 
while men were hired as butlers, coachmen, choremen, cooks, and gardeners.178  
Conditions for these laborers varied dramatically.  For example, some domestic workers 
were understood to be just part of the “family,” with mixed implications.  Lucy Salmon 
noted in 1901, “An American who can be considered one of the family is the very one 
who most appreciates the difference between being one of the family and like one of the 
family.”179  Then as now, rather than implying better treatment, to be like one of the 
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family often meant to be coerced into longer working hours for inadequate 
remuneration.180 
Practices of care have themselves been differentiated.  Dorothy Roberts has traced 
a distinction between “spiritual care,” on the one hand, and “menial care,” on the other.  
Roberts suggested spiritual housework has been “valued highly because it is thought to 
be essential to the proper functioning of the household and the moral upbringing of 
children.”181  In contrast, menial housework has not been valued precisely because it is 
“strenuous and unpleasant” and also because it is believed “to require little moral or 
intellectual skill.”182  Mignon Duffy found a similar division, and drew attention to the 
distinction between “nurturant” and “nonnurturant” care.183  Nurturant care relates to 
providing care directly in relationships.  It is represented by the work of mothers, nurses, 
doctors, and other caregivers whose work has come to be respected.  Nonnurturant care 
involves “dirty work” like cleaning and gardening and is not valued in public.  Nurturant 
care is socially valued to a greater extent than nonnurturant care.  Historically these 
distinctions mapped onto race and class stratifications.  Duffy argued, “The gendered 
separation of public/work and private/family spheres that had begun during the industrial 
revolution intensified through the first half of the twentieth century, as did the 
expectation that middle- and upper-class women should be the perfect housekeepers and 
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mothers.”184  To cope with their added responsibilities and to maintain their status, 
middle class women monopolized the nurturant care of children while delegating the 
“dirty work” to poor women.185 
The profession of nursing emerged out of these dynamics.  Before the 1850s, the 
hospital nurse was not yet a socially recognizable role requiring a specific course of 
academic preparation.  Care for health had been a matter of individual concern.  It was 
for each individual to monitor his or her own state of well or ill being.  One would track 
the relationship between changing conditions in the natural world—the phases of the 
moon, for example—and the appearance of symptoms of illness.  Family members, 
midwives, and lay healers would also provide care over the life course.  This changed in 
the late nineteenth-century.  Nursing became a vocation practiced predominantly in 
hospitals rather than in homes and by professionals rather than amateurs.  The drive to 
professionalize healthcare advanced in spite of the fact that women midwives in the 
United States and the United Kingdom had acquired immense knowledge about healing.  
Women healers gained competence in caring through experience while doctors more 
often learned their trade from books and lectures.  Nonetheless, as the practice of 
medicine professionalized, the knowledge of midwives was increasingly discounted and 
they were persecuted, sometimes as witches, for their ability to cure.186  Ultimately the 
move toward professionalization was made possible by a group of nurses who, in a bid 
for respectability, joined ranks with doctors against “amateur” healers. 187  This process of 
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division resembles the differentiation between “nurturant” and “nonnurturant” care that 
Duffy detailed.188  The creation of a nursing profession meant the creation of nursing 
schools with high barriers to entry, shutting out those who were not young, white, 
middle-class, and responsive to discipline.189 
 
Care Across Borders:  Processes of Exclusion 
Organized efforts to improve public health across borders are several centuries 
old, dating back at least to the early modern period.  Dominican, Franciscan, and Jesuit 
missionaries followed Spanish and Portuguese imperial actors to North and South 
America, Africa, and Asia.  Anastacia Girón-Tupas recounts that, among other such 
efforts, in the 1500s and 1600s Franciscan missionaries in the Philippines founded the 
Hospital de Indios, the Hospital de Aguas Santas, the Hospital de Dulac, and the Hospital 
de Nueva Caceres.190  Aside from missionary groups, the oldest global organizations 
dedicated to succor communities across borders may have been the Sisters of St. Joseph 
de Lyon, founded in 1650, and the Daughters of the Holy Spirit, established in 1706.  
Founded in 1810, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions may have 
been the first US-based missionary society.  These were charitable, religious 
organizations, as were most if not all of the earliest precursors to 20th century 
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international humanitarian organizations.191  If nursing is understood loosely as attending 
to the ill and the needy, it is older even than these organized efforts.  Humanitarianism 
and nursing, however, both emerged in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, and 
received an impetus from the Crimean War in 1853. 
Among those who tried to assist soldiers in the British conflict with Russia, the 
most famous was Florence Nightingale.  She is the foremother of humanitarian nursing, 
as she not only formalized the practice of nursing, but, in doing so, explicitly sought to 
fashion a place for at least some women in public, as is evident from her earliest 
writings.192  In 1852, more than a decade before John Stuart Mill’s complaint against the 
subjection of women, Nightingale shot off a furious polemic entitled “Cassandra” that 
condemned Victorian society for confining women to the home and trivializing their 
lives.  “Why have women passion, intellect, moral activity—these three—and a place in 
society where no one of the three can be exercised?” she asked.193  Nightingale had little 
patience for the conventional answer:  “The family?  It is too narrow a field for the 
development of an immortal spirit, be that spirit male or female.”194  Nightingale 
continued, “Women dream of a great sphere of steady, not sketchy benevolence, of moral 
activity, for which they would fain be trained and fitted, instead of working in the dark, 
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neither knowing nor registering whither their steps lead.”195  She herself wanted 
“something to live for.”196 
Nightingale found her calling in the battlefields of the Crimea.  She was thirty-
two-years old when she wrote “Cassandra.”  Two years later, she entered into service for 
the British.  Nightingale shared the view of most of her compatriots that the British had 
bungled relief efforts and badly, and she pushed for reform.  Other parties to the Crimean 
War already received assistance on the battlefield from religious groups.  According to 
one historical account:  “Sisters of Charity were there nursing France’s soldiers, and 
Sisters of Mercy were nursing those of Russia.  ‘Why have we no Sisters of Charity?’ 
somebody asked in the London Times.”197  Nightingale set up a relief corps called a 
Sanitary Commission that would later be a model for the organization of war relief during 
the American Civil War.  Nightingale and her commission are also reputed to have been 
an inspiration to Henri Dunant when he sought to organize help for the soldiers of the 
Battle of Solferino in the Italian war for independence from Austria.  Nightingale and 
Dunant disagreed, however, on the need for a permanent relief society and, though they 
were close contemporaries, they were never collaborators. 
This formative moment in nursing and in humanitarianism already points to the 
norms and exclusions that would define these fields in later years.  Note that in her call 
for women to work outside the home, Nightingale appealed not for “steady opportunity 
for waged work” but for “steady opportunity for benevolence.”  At the same time her 
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vision disputed the limited range of activities deemed appropriate for women, it also left 
in place the expectation that women would be self-sacrificing and would live for others.  
More significantly, this vision is also limited in that it is attached to class privilege and 
whiteness.  Nightingale herself had been comfortably situated in the upper middle-class; 
her resources made her unusual journey possible and shaped her assumptions.  Although 
Nightingale envisioned nursing as a profession that would be inclusive with respect to 
class, in practice the new profession excluded poor people and people of color.  In the 
United States, nursing schools declined former domestic workers, apparently in an effort 
to avoid lowering the status of the field.198  Like other forms of nurturant care, 
increasingly nursing was associated with whiteness while domestic work was left to 
people of color. 199  These patterns of exclusion were not confined to the United States, 
but seem to be pervasive wherever the profession of nursing was instituted on the 
Nightingale model. 
The life story of Mary Jane Seacole, born in Kingston to a white father and a 
black mother, exemplifies these dynamics.  Although she did not have formal training in 
medicine, Seacole was known as a “nurse and doctress.”  She was also an adventurer, and 
lived and worked not only in Jamaica but also in Panama and other countries, running a 
restaurant and battling Cholera epidemics as she went, ministering to her patients with 
mustard plasters and other cures.  Seacole wrote, “I am not ashamed to confess—for the 
gratification is, after all, a selfish one—that I love to be of service to those who need a 
woman’s help.  And wherever the need arises—on whatever distant shore—I ask no 
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greater or higher privilege than to minister to it.”200  She wanted to serve as a nurse in the 
Crimean War and traveled to England to lend her talents to the cause.  “War, I know, is a 
serious game,” she reflected, “but sometimes very humble actors are of great use in it.”201  
However, her offers of help were rejected—first by the British War Office, then by the 
British Medical Department, and finally by Florence Nightingale’s associates in London.  
She wondered, “Did these ladies shrink from accepting my aid because my blood flowed 
beneath a somewhat duskier skin than theirs?”202  Seacole was disappointed but 
determined.  She decided to go to the front anyway, supporting herself by buying 
provisions and selling them to soldiers, eventually setting up a store and restaurant.  She 
brought relief and camaraderie to soldiers, including those in the 97th regiment, which 
included Jamaicans who were “put to so sad a use, three thousand miles from home.”203 
At the same time the humanitarian world barred entry to some, it invited others in.  
Prior to this time, in the early 1800s, humanitarianism signified an unmanly concern for 
others, as when in 1850, Tait’s Magazine made reference to “the puerile whimperings of 
an effeminate humanitarianism.”204  It is not clear whether Henri Dunant’s response to 
suffering at the battle of Sulferino changed norms about humanitarianism and 
masculinity, or whether he benefited from norms already in the process of transformation.  
Perhaps the association of care with war helped to make humanitarianism an acceptably 
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masculine pursuit.  Whatever the deep cause, Dunant managed to put care on the global 
agenda and to enlist both men and women from Europe and North America. 
His first act was the creation of the International Committee for the Relief of the 
Wounded, renamed the International Committee for the Red Cross in 1863.  Each country 
would have its own Society, with the ICRC for oversight.  Gustave Moynier, the 
organization’s first president, articulated a set of moral priorities to guide the new 
organization.  He described four principles:  “foresight:  preparations should be made in 
advance, to provide assistance should war break out; solidarity:  whereby the Societies 
undertake to help each other; centralization:  employing only one Society in each 
country; mutuality:  care is given to all the wounded and the sick, irrespective of their 
nationality.”205  The inclusive and egalitarian spirit of these principles is notable, 
emphasizing mutual help between societies and to all nationalities.  Nonetheless, 
humanitarians would find it difficult to translate this vision into practice, as the history of 
the American Red Cross illustrates. 
 In the United States, Clara Barton became a champion for the establishment of a 
new Red Cross society.  Germany, England, and other European powers had already 
instituted national societies, so the United States was late to the game.  Battlefield relief 
was poorly organized, though it did exist.  When Americans rebelled against British rule, 
there was nothing like an organized humanitarian response to battlefield suffering.  
American soldiers in the Revolutionary War depended on wives and good Samaritans to 
do what they could for the wounded.  There was little progress over the next decades, and 
efforts to provide medical relief during the Civil War were haphazard and not centrally 
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coordinated.  Individuals who wanted to help soldiers journeyed to battlefields and 
hospitals, among them some whose names we know—like Walt Whitman and Louisa 
May Alcott—as well as thousands of others whose names are less familiar—like Arabella 
Griffith Barlow and other wives who accompanied their husbands into war service.206 
After years of lobbying and hard work, in 1882, Barton succeeded in getting the 
United States to ratify its membership in the Red Cross movement.  It engaged early and 
often in providing war relief and disaster relief in the United States and other countries.  
Sarah Elizabeth Pickett recounted: 
“In the United States the Association rendered aid to victims of the 
Michigan forest fires in 1881, of the Mississippi and Ohio River floods 
during subsequent years, of the Galveston storm and tidal wave in 1900, 
and in a few other instances.  As to its work overseas, the farmers of the 
Middle West in 1892 sent under the Red Cross flag a ship-load of corn to 
Russian famine sufferers, and in 1896 aid was given to victims of 
Armenian massacres in Turkey and Asia minor.” 207 
 
From the beginning the American Red Cross was bent on recruiting professionals 
to ensure its public image as a respectable organization.  Whatever the merits of this 
strategy, historian Julia Irwin observed it “denied untrained, amateur women, 
traditionally the lynchpins of American humanitarianism, any role in ARC leadership or 
decision making.” 208  At the same time it “provided a valuable opportunity for female 
professionals to advance their careers or to assume leadership roles that would have been 
far less obtainable in the United States.”209  The recruitment norms of the ARC suggest 
the practice of distinguishing between nurturant care and nonnurturant care or “dirty 
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work” was repeated once again in this upgrading of care.  It is telling that candidates for 
service were assured being a humanitarian would involve much more than simply 
“handing black steaming coffee to refugees trooping past a station canteen or distributing 
raisins and apples at the point of destination or fixing up straw beds and food stations for 
people.”210 
In addition to amateur women, people of color were also excluded from the 
nascent American humanitarian movement.  At the outset of the First World War, Booker 
T. Washington remarked dryly:  “I really think it would be worth while to consider 
sending a group of black missionaries to Europe to see if something can be done for the 
white heathen.”211  His comment alluded to the colonial and racial cast of American 
humanitarianism at the time, and he was not the only one who noticed.  Several years 
later, Charles Mason and Robert Morton of the Tuskegee Institute wrote letters protesting 
the exclusion of African Americans from the Red Cross war effort.212  Emmett Jay Scott, 
an assistant to the Secretary of War, fielded most of these grievances.  Many letters he 
received specifically objected to the exclusion of African American nurses.  He reflected, 
“This vexing question is being put to me almost daily by colored newspaper editors, 
colored physicians, surgeons, etc., who are constantly bombarding my sector of the War 
Department, inquiring what has been done, and urging that something should be done in 
the direction of utilizing professionally trained and efficient colored nurses.” 213  Scott 
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later remembered, “There was a manifest disinclination to utilize colored nurses, and not 
because they were not competent.  Thus racial discrimination triumphed again, and 
although a few colored nurses were assigned to half a dozen or more camps, practically 
none of them were sent overseas to nurse and minister to the fighting men of their own 
race.”214  In solidarity, Esther Pohl Lovejoy, a doctor, activist and humanitarian, reported, 
“The Medical Women’s National Association, which met in June 1917, adopted a naïve 
resolution calling upon the War Department for a square deal regardless of sex, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”215  Although the nascent humanitarian movement was 
progressive in some respects, racist ideas and ideologies limited the political imagination 
of white humanitarians who were unwilling or unable to accommodate greater inclusion. 
Julia Irwin has suggested that combatting discrimination was of little interest to 
the American public, and given that the ARC was desperate for public participation and 
financial backing, the organization bowed to the assumptions and priorities that were then 
current.  She found American Red Cross “War Council leaders refused to upset the status 
quo, calculating popular support from white Americans to be more important than 
fighting for racial advancement.”216  If public pressure was the only explanation for 
exclusion there would be no reason to expect the American Red Cross and other 
humanitarian organizations to extend exclusionary practices, but racist practices also 
marked the projects of the American Red Cross in American territories overseas.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
the World War for Democracy ... A Full Acount of the War Work Organizations of Colored Men and 
Women and Other Civilian Activities, Including the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A. And the War 
Camp Community Service, with Official Summary of Treaty of Peace and League of Nations Covenant 
(Chicago: Homewood Press, 1919), 451. 
214 Ibid., 448. 
215 Esther Pohl Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), 7. 
216 Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening, 102. 
  108 
American National Red Cross nurses went to the Philippines as well as Cuba and Puerto 
Rico to engage in relief campaigns.  In each country, a coalition of forces pushed for the 
adoption of new hygiene, medical, and nursing ideas and institutions.  At the same time, 
they pushed out existing ideas and institutions for providing care and dictated the terms 
under which people could become caregivers. 
American Red Cross projects in the Philippines are instructive.  The Filipino 
revolution began two years before Spain ceded control to the United States in 1898.  This 
revolutionary period gave rise to the country’s first Red Cross organization.  Rosa Sevilla 
de Alvero was one of a group of women who mobilized to provide aid to casualties on all 
sides.  Alvero recalled, “We went to dress their wounds and did everything we could to 
help them.  There were no enemies nor allies in our work; they were all patients who 
needed our help and care.” 217  Alvero continued, “When the Filipino-American 
revolution broke out in 1899, I was summoned with other Filipino women, all of whom 
belonged to the intelligencia, by Doña Hilaria de Aguinaldo to form the Filipino Red 
Cross.”218  The leadership of the organization petitioned for official recognition from the 
international Red Cross movement, but the request was denied because the United States 
had assumed control of the Philippines and recognition as an independent country was a 
prerequisite for recognition as a Red Cross Society.219 
Instead of greeting an independent Filipino Red Cross, during the first years of 
U.S. colonialism, the American Red Cross sent nurses and nurse educators to the 
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Philippines, as well as to Cuba and Puerto Rico.220  Lavinia Dock oversaw the American 
Red Cross chapter in the Philippines.  Dock and her Red Cross associates reinforced an 
ideology of feminine domesticity, purveying ideas about what constituted appropriate 
nursing practice.  This included importing the notions that men were not suited to be 
nurses, and that healthcare was best provided by trained professionals in hospitals.221  
The American Red Cross training schools were essential in laying the institutional and 
ideological foundation for nursing in the country and are part of the explanation for the 
large out-migrations of nurses in the second half of the twentieth century, as I discuss 
below. 222 
In addition to overseas work, governmental and nongovernmental programs in the 
United Kingdom and the United States drew people from overseas to learn nursing and 
medicine.  In the United States, Catherine Ceniza Choy reported, “The colonial 
government established the pensionado program, beginning in 1903, that sponsored an 
elite group of several hundred Filipino young men and a few young women to further 
their education in the United States and return to the Philippines.” 223  Choy noted this 
constituted a “collective experience that inspired, encouraged, and facilitated 
international migration.”224  Other Filipinos would follow in their footsteps, even if not 
directly sponsored through the pensionado program.  While the United States expected 
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students to return to the Philippines after completing their educational programs, this was 
not always the case. 
In Cuba and Puerto Rico, too, the United States government and American 
nongovernmental organizations sought to develop and initiate a series of reforms in 
nursing.  The first nursing school in Cuba opened in 1899 and in the next two years, the 
U.S. Department of Charity oversaw the opening of six additional nursing schools, all 
with instructors from American institutions.  The superintendant of Hospital Santa Isabel 
in Matanzas reflected the racism of the staff at these hospitals:  “As inheritors of customs 
and prejudices founded on Moorish habits, we find the women of Cuba an affectionate, 
emotional, and irresponsible people, without much moral, mental, or physical force, 
incapable of sustained effort, and—most to be deplored—without ideals or standards that 
excel.”225  She also recorded that these schools were designed to “further the best 
interests of the nursing profession,” to “secure for the students upon graduation a degree 
or title which will be…a recognized means of securing employment,” and to deliver “a 
benefit to the mass of suffering humanity.”226  The claim to serve suffering “humanity” 
while diminishing the actual people being served is reflective of a hierarchical 
relationship. 
British projects in India followed a similar pattern.  Baptist missionaries instituted 
“The Ladies’ Association for Zenana Work” in 1867, “Zenana” being the term the British 
chose to name the women’s domain of the household.  In 1880, the Church of England 
initiated its own “Church of England Zenana Society.”  Later, in 1885, a humanitarian 
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association was created called “The National Association for Supplying Female Medical 
Aid to the Women of India.”  The Dufferin Fund and the Victoria Memorial Scholarship 
Fund were both scholarship-granting foundations oriented toward medical education for 
women.227  All of these associations and foundations contributed to the creation of 
medical centers and nursing schools, enlisting women students, and funding them.  Soon, 
hundreds of women were enrolled in medical and nursing programs. 
The racism of turn of the century activist and humanitarian organizations should 
not come as a surprise.  Nevertheless, it continues to be worthwhile to bring these 
currents to the surface, particularly given that they contributed to dividing caregivers.  
These divisions did not disappear over time; to the contrary, they were diffused and 
exacerbated.  One way that divisions were spread was through the establishment of 
educational institutions for medicine and nursing. 
 
Care and Gender 
It is worth reflecting on the ideas and ideologies attached to the model of nursing 
at this time.  Professional nursing was regulated by ideas that in many respects reasserted 
rather than overturned norms of femininity and domesticity, especially for privileged 
women.  The consequences of the institution of the profession of nursing were palpable 
to women, for to fall short of the ideal of the modern nurse was to be professionally 
incompetent.  At every opportunity, nursing reformers contrasted their ideal with an 
image of a lesser type of woman and nurse. 
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The appearance of this other woman frequently resembled the fictional Sairey 
Gamp, whom Charles Dickens set on the world in Martin Chuzzlewit.  She was ill-kempt, 
poor, uncouth, fat, unattractive, old, a drunk, a mortician as well as a nurse.  Nursing 
treatises of the time reflect how the very mention of her name functioned as a shorthand 
commentary on the unsuitability of certain groups of women for nursing and midwifery.  
In her history of nursing in the British Empire, for example, Sarah Tooley disparaged 
“dais or indigenous midwives” calling them the “‘Gamps’ of India, only considerably 
worse than the immortal ‘Sairey.’”228  A history of American nursing proclaimed that by 
the 1890s, “Hundreds of attractive young girls, immaculate and eager to please, were 
replacing the Sairey Gamps who had so long held sway.”229  This characterization 
remained influential for decades and in 1937, one commentator asked in exasperation, 
“would it not be more to the point for the nurse to take her measure in comparison with 
real persons who motivated the purpose and perpetuated the service of nursing care of the 
sick?”230 
While Sairey Gamp was a comic figure, references to her convey a serious gender 
politics around nursing at the inception of this profession.  Gatekeepers tried to ensure 
only a particular kind of woman would enter the nursing profession, one as close as 
possible to the embodiment of youth, beauty, good-breeding, good-education, and 
frequently whiteness.  Nurse leaders sought nursing recruits from the upper classes—the 
higher their social standing, the better—arguing that this would raise the profile of the 
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nursing profession.  They frequently imposed strict educational, age, and marital 
requirements to realize their vision.  Tooley went on to explain about nursing students in 
British India, “Nurse candidates are required to read and write well, and produce 
certificates of good character.  They must be between the ages of twenty-one and forty, 
and only single women, widows, or women who have been permanently deserted by their 
husbands, are eligible for employment.”231  American nurses were subject to similar 
strictures.  According to a mid-century account of the development of the profession, the 
new nurse was “one form of ‘new woman’ who could be loved, who needed not to 
defend herself against public opinion, and who, in consequence, had nothing masculine 
about her and was led into no strange forms of behavior.  Her virtues were those admired 
in the old kind of woman, while familiar skills took on a new efficiency under trained 
hands.  Her public lavished praise on her.”232 
This comment points to something unexpected in the status of nursing during the 
transition to the twentieth century.  One striking feature of nursing in the United States 
and the United Kingdom in its first decades was its publicity.  We have already seen the 
fame garnered by Florence Nightingale and her followers was on a scale only the likes of 
Angelina Jolie and Mother Teresa have known.  In the United States, Louisa May 
Alcott’s account of her experiences nursing in the Civil War, Hospital Sketches, was a 
bestseller.  Especially during the First World War, it was common to see nurses marching 
down the streets of major cities like Chicago and New York to garner support for the war 
effort.  The image of a nurse cloistered in the private sphere does not square with the 
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massive parades of nurses down the streets of these cities.  American and British nursing 
lived in the public sphere at this time.  Yet we ought to question the political effects of 
the adulation for nurses on parade.  These visuals deepened the association of nursing 
with a particular kind of white, middle-class femininity, subordinating these nurtruant 
caregivers in relation to citizens and privileging them in relation to non-nurturant 
caregivers.  Domestic workers, for instance, were not invited to parade in public.  And 
nursing would not remain in the public sphere into the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
At any rate, professional associations helped knit together nursing in the United 
States and United Kingdom in this period.  The first and still preeminent international 
nursing organization was the International Council of Nurses (ICN).  It germinated after a 
meeting of nurses in 1893 in Chicago at the World Congress of Representative Women, 
which coincided with the World’s Fair.  The International Council was established six 
years later and headquartered for most of its first several decades in London.  It is 
significant not only as an international organization for caregivers but also as the first 
ever international medical professional association.  Initially, it represented nursing 
associations from three countries:  the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  
It sought to standardize and spread nursing by establishing relationships with nurses’ 
associations in as many countries as possible, in much the same way that the League of 
National Red Cross Societies coordinated (and coordinates) the activities of the National 
Red Cross Societies. 
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Accounts from the time suggest women nurses found it easier than women 
doctors to serve overseas.  Of note is the relief work of American Women’s Hospitals.  
Created by the Medical Women’s National Association to provide relief during WWI, 
from 1917 the AWH contributed to the delivery of medical care in the United States, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Greece, Japan, China, Korea, the 
Philippines, and eighteen other countries.233  According to Esther Pohl Lovejoy, the 
organization was “a humanitarian achievement” with “a unique place in the field of 
foreign relief.” 234  Lovejoy reported, “This relief agency, which was inaugurated while 
the United States was mobilizing for war, is the outgrowth of the desire of American 
medical women for their share of the work they were qualified to perform.  Our 
Government provided for the enlistment of nurses, but not for women physicians.”235  
The AWH eventually entered into alliance with the Red Cross, yet the latter deemed “the 
age limit for women acceptable for overseas service was, with special exceptions, 
between twenty-five and forty years….The official old age limit for men was fifty-
five.”236  So even this progressive organization encountered entrenched limits.  Changing 
social norms and expectations was no easy matter, in part because it was so difficult to 
marshal forces of publicity and visibility.  Again according to Lovejoy, ”We have never 
been rich enough to maintain a publicity department, at home or abroad, for the purpose 
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of keeping the details of our work before the public, and thereby hangs many a tale 
untold.” 237 
 
Humanitarian Institutions at the Turn of the Century 
For a time at the beginning of the 20th century, there were affiliations and 
interactions between those we now identify as humanitarian nurses and those we identify 
as migrant nurses.  This occurred primarily in the context of nursing education programs 
established by colonial, philanthropic, and missionary institutions.  Red Cross 
institutions—both the International Committee of the Red Cross and a few of the 
National Societies—actively participated in nursing education.  The Rockefeller 
Foundation was also important in organizing public health nursing schools and in 
financing scholarships for education in public health nursing.  Again, however, these 
interactions were not carried out on a plane of equality.  The institutionalization of these 
dynamics in new organizations would contribute to the endurance of hierarchies among 
caregivers and the societies that send them. 
Even in these early years of humanitarianism, the American Red Cross was not 
alone.  The largest American nongovernmental organization was the International Health 
Board, an outgrowth of the Rockefeller Foundation.  The Foundation’s first attempt at 
health service had been the creation of a Sanitary Commission in 1910 to eradicate 
hookworm in the American South.  The Commission deemed its efforts successful, and 
subsequently expanded its operations to include U.S. territories and other countries.  In 
1913, the Rockefeller Foundation established the International Health Board to advance 
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health initiatives around the world.  The primary focus of the International Health Board 
was the eradication of diseases such as hookworm, tuberculosis, malaria, yellow fever, 
and typhus.  Erroneous scientific conclusions and premature treatment programs rarely 
led to a significant reduction in the prevalence of these scourges and sometimes had 
deadly consequences.  A vaccine against yellow fever, for example, caused jaundice in 
Brazil and later in the United States.  Heinous racial ideas led to testing vaccinations and 
treatment procedures on non-white and non-American people.  Moreover, when the 
organization settled on a treatment they believed would be successful, they denied it to 
those who it deemed too uncivilized or biologically unsuited to respond to the 
treatment.238 
A more enduring legacy of the International Health Board was the array of 
institutions it created.  It created, expanded, and reorganized both nursing schools and 
hospitals.  Even though the group’s directors did not think well of nurses and begrudged 
funding these schools, they found nurses essential to the large-scale public health 
programs they sought to implement.  It funded nursing programs in France, Poland, 
Venezuela, and other countries.  Its most famous project may have been the Escola de 
Enfermeiras Anna Nery in Brazil, which it opened in 1926.  American women who 
worked at these schools served as public health nurses or “health visitors.” 239  The 
International Health Board experienced a mid-life crisis around 1928, deciding attempts 
to try to build public health infrastructure were overzealous and too far beyond the 
original mission of the Foundation.  Many programs to build and improve health 
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institutions were defunded and abandoned in favor of full attention to researching and 
vaccinating against diseases.  Nonetheless, attention to nursing schools would resume in 
1931 with funding for the Toronto School of Nursing. 240 
The International Health Division also granted scholarships for students to study 
nursing at European and North American schools, such as the Toronto School of Nursing 
and Teachers College at Columbia University.  Early programs sponsored students from 
other countries, who, it was presumed, would return to their communities as leaders and 
teachers in nursing and public health.  In part because of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
students from around the world studied nursing at British, Canadian, and American 
institutions.  In the United States, the most prominent school was Teachers College at 
Columbia University in New York.  The New York Times reported in 1923, “There are 
students in the Department of Nursing and Teaching at Teachers College registered from 
Sweden, Russia, Palestine, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, China, the Philippines, Japan, 
Asia Minor, Syria, Great Britain, France, and Canada.  Other countries of Europe, South 
America and Asia have sent students.”241 
The American Women’s Hospitals steered a slightly different course than other 
new humanitarian organizations.  When possible the organization used its funds to hire 
women doctors in hospitals in other countries rather than sending doctors from the United 
States.242  Its battle for position in an evolving field of relief anticipated struggles over the 
meaning of humanitarianism, struggles which would reemerge in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  After WWI, for instance, both the AWH and the YMCA resisted the 
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allies’ neutrality concerning Turkish brutality against Armenian refugees in the city of 
Smyrna.243  It is an alternative humanitarianism, one that anticipated the work of Doctors 
without Borders and other in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Along with the Red Cross, the Rockefeller Foundation and the AWH were a 
handful of other organizations, notably the Sisters of Charity, the American Fund for 
French Wounded, the American Friends Service Committee, the Serbian Child Welfare 
Association, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the YMCA, 
Near East Relief, and the Marine Hospital Service. 
 
Institutionalizing Difference 
The consequences of the health institutions initiated by humanitarian projects 
were substantial, for the worldwide currency of a single standard of modern professional 
care later made possible the mass movements of international migrants in this field.  
Parvati Raghuram has identified "three moments" of medical migration in connection 
with British colonialism.  Of these, one moment was the movement of British medical 
workers to India for employment; another moment was the movement of Indian medical 
workers to Britain for training; a third moment involved providing new medical schools 
for women in Britain.244  In this same vein, Barbara Brush has argued “the introduction of 
American nursing methods and ideas set off a chain of events that may have facilitated 
the creation of a ready-made workforce for future short-staffed United States 
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hospitals.”245  It is because the United States instituted nursing in the Philippines 
Americans today recognize nurses from the Philippines.  Similarly, the British recognize 
nurses in South Africa and India because it was under British rule that nursing was 
reorganized in those countries.  Moreover, these movements set a kind of precedent for 
the overseas travel of all nurses, humanitarian and others.  During these years, it became 
commonplace for women nurses to cross borders, establishing routes for the frequent 
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific movement of nurses in the second half of the twentieth 
century.246 
The wave of new organizations created after the Second World War did not 
fundamentally break with old patterns.  The World Health Organization was created in 
response to a mandate in the United Nations Charter, officially beginning work in 1948.  
The World Health Organization assumed the goals and projects of several older 
international organizations, including the Rockefeller Foundation International Health 
Division, the Office International d'Hygiène Publique, the International Tuberculosis 
Campaign, and the International Health Office of the League of Nations.  The WHO 
would also work closely with the Ford Foundation.  Over the next decade, the World 
Health Organization absorbed parallel institutions including some elements of the short-
lived but active United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which existed 
for three years, from 1943 until 1946.  With the exception of the UNRRA, most of these 
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other organizations had been dedicated to eradicating and managing diseases.  In short, 
the WHO represented a re-institutionalization in the area of international health. 
From its first years, attending to monitoring and building the capacity of 
worldwide health workforces were priorities.  The constitutional ideas of the WHO 
include the principled assertion that good health makes for good international relations:  
“The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is 
dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and states.”247  This founding 
document also stresses the duty of each state to organize healthcare for its own 
population.  It reads, “Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples 
which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.” 248  
It is noteworthy governments do not possess sole responsibility, and, significantly, most 
would have substantial assistance fulfilling this responsibility in the decades to follow. 
The WHO and its regional affiliates became directly involved in spreading the 
nursing profession.  For instance, the WHO affiliate for Latin America, the Pan-
American Health Organization or PAHO, organized the placement of nurses around the 
continent to monitor nurse-training programs and make recommendations for 
improvements.  The World Health Organization also took up where the Rockefeller 
Foundation left off in contributing to a program of fellowships for nursing education 
abroad, usually for advanced courses in nursing for those who already had some training 
in the field. 
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The WHO, as a large global organization, avoided some of the exclusionary 
movements of earlier humanitarian efforts but also repeated some of them and on a much 
larger scale.  The WHO set the worldwide agenda for health, identified experts and 
teachers in care and trainees in care, and defined the curriculum for caring.  The 
privileges including publicity, governance, and role definitions that the WHO claimed for 
the humanitarian world would not be fully shared by organizations and agents in 
migration then or in later years. 
This transformation of care involved ascribing needs, articulating values, 
organizing projects for change, and creating institutions to undertake those projects.  
These activities were often premised on a conception of the self as one caring in contrast 
to another as one not yet capable of caring.  This viewpoint was expressed in 
exclusionary practices that prevented some societies from participating in care on their 
own terms, both in the organization of institutions and in the delivery of care.  These 




This chapter has reflected on the history of care in humanitarianism and 
migration, and it has continued to trouble the dual stories approach to care in world 
politics.  Scholarship and commentary on humanitarianism likens the emergence of 
humanitarianism in the West to a chance event—it was happenstance that Dunant 
discovered battlefield suffering in nineteenth-century northern Italy.  Scholarship and 
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commentary on international migration in medicine and nursing locates the historical 
roots of caregiving in colonialism and the unequal world order it created.  It is tempting 
to try to force these narratives together and to suggest from one point of origin in the 
West two lines of care descended, each diverging due to its own internal logic and 
responsiveness to particular external factors.  Yet, such an approach would be flawed if it 
concealed the diffuse political relations between these fields, as well as the direct 
encounters between those who inhabited them. 
Humanitarianism is not accidentally First World any more than domestic work is 
accidentally Third World.  It is not that an event akin to a random mutation presented 
Western actors with an idea for humanitarianism, and the movement survived because it 
happened to emerge on the scene in a part of the world with the resources to finance it, 
and the political interests and moral enlightenment to motivate it.  Important players in 
North Atlantic humanitarianism repeatedly ignored, barred, disqualified, and 
delegitimized some men, some women, poor people, people of color, and Third World 
people who petitioned to join them in alliance and action, or sought to chart their own 
independent course of care.  Conditioned, of course, by wider stratification, these 
exclusions established and reproduced norms and institutions that persisted over time.  To 
the extent there is an underclass of caregivers today it is at least in part due to these 
exclusions and plays of power. 
Caring is so important to all societies, local and global, that exclusion from public 
practices of caring should be interpreted as an injustice, and, indeed, it is frequently 
experienced as such, as this chapter showed.  In the next chapter, I suggest how the 
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partial incorporation of care in the global public sphere contributed to a species of power 
politics around care in the second half of the twentieth century.  I analyze competitive 
state efforts to alternately give and get care, with serious consequences for the survival of 
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Chapter 4 
 
POWER POLITICS IN SLOW MOTION 
  
In the last few days of February 1962, John F. Kennedy delivered a speech to Congress 
about the nation’s health needs.  For years, major American newspapers had run articles 
about dire shortfalls in the country’s stock of healthcare personnel.  “Shortage of Nurses 
Found a Peril to Health of Nation” screamed one front-page story from the New York 
Times.249  Along with other challenges to national wellbeing, Kennedy called attention to 
these shortages, signaling the importance of “highly trained and skilled professional 
people” who were then in “very short supply.”  Near the end of his speech, Kennedy’s 
remarks turned in a slightly different direction.  In addition to taking action on behalf of 
needs for care in the United States, he argued “it is imperative that we help fulfill the 
health needs and expectations of less developed nations, who look to us as a source of 
hope and strength in fighting their staggering problems of disease and hunger.”250 
Kennedy’s comments are revealing.  The First and Second World Wars had made 
it clear that care, especially care for troops, was vital to state survival.  Kennedy seemed 
to understand care continued to be critical for the nation even when it was not at war, and 
that securing care for Americans and providing care to other populations were both 
important policy goals.  It is significant that in displaying a giving attitude toward the 
“staggering” needs of other nations, Kennedy effectively communicated that while U.S. 
                                                
249 New York Times, March 3, 1952, 1. 
250 John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on National Health Needs," in The American 
Presidency Project (Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=9077, February 27, 1962). 
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needs might be serious, they did not constitute a fundamental vulnerability or potential 
source of dependency, much less a problem that other countries could or should help to 
remedy.  His confidence belies the reality that in 1962, U.S. hospitals were already hiring 
doctors and nurses from other countries, at a pace that would accelerate in years to come 
as a result of more concerted efforts to recruit them.  To the degree that Kennedy’s 
rhetorical moves are representative of a more general field of policy moves—where great 
power states seek to quietly secure care at home and conspicuously project care abroad—
they hint at the place of care in politics among nations, and call for further analysis. 
In this chapter I explore this policy knot.  Kennedy’s remarks are a record of a 
moment in which interactions between national groups increasingly took the form of 
caregiving and care-receiving.  Yet for the most part these acts of care were not evidence 
of bonds of trust nor proof of harmonious relations, as one might expect given 
commonplace idealized images of care that conflate it with goodwill, goodness, and 
nonviolence, rendering it an antidote or alternative to politics.  To the contrary, there are 
significant politics in operation.  The United States was giving and getting care under 
different conditions—getting care surreptitiously while giving care in a kind of moral 
display—and reinforcing its power position in both cases.  Its interests were served in a 
material sense, from gaining care providers, and in a symbolic sense, from displaying 
signs of compassion (and perhaps also its sovereignty, responsibility, security, and so 
forth).  It is improbable the United States could have so successfully sustained the 
appearance of its own dominance after the Second World War had the world understood 
the tens of thousands of caregivers who emigrated to the U.S., not as individuals who 
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availed themselves of opportunities provided by a munificent superpower, but as a 
movement of people who provided life-sustaining foreign assistance and contributed to 
nation-building.  Nor could Kennedy have as easily perpetuated the taken-for-granted 
subordinate image of other countries if the humanitarians they received had been 
identified simply as service providers. 
These are indications of a dynamic with a loose affinity to what realist scholars in 
the discipline of International Relations call power politics:  gains by one state mean 
losses for others; gains mean greater security and losing means less; and a favorable 
security situation is difficult to maintain.  According to realists, the interstate politics of 
security is produced by the structure of the international system.  In the absence of a 
world government to ensure the security of states—a condition known as anarchy—states 
have no alternative but to seek to acquire as much power as possible in order to improve 
their odds of survival, an imperative that leads to competition and conflict among 
them.251  Realists are right about the centrality of the politics of security in the 
international system, and about its systemic determination, but their premises are too 
limiting.  While in a strict sense I agree there is no world government, I suggest 
international hierarchy more significantly constitutes and conditions states.  And I argue 
the international system features not only conflict but also care, with both material and 
symbolic stakes for states.  Giving care, getting care, and refusing care are all aspects of a 
politics of security through which the position and identities of states are produced and 
reproduced, exhibiting a kind of power politics in slow motion. 
                                                
251 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
  128 
I suggest below that the concepts of global public and private spheres highlight 
conditions on states in getting and giving as well as refusing care in the context of 
migration and humanitarianism.  Nearly all states give care internationally, but for some 
states the (humanitarian) care they send is magnified in significance by the global public 
sphere, while for other states the (migrant) care they send is diminished as a contribution 
to international life.  This differential publicity has implications for the states themselves, 
as those that send humanitarians tend to achieve a positive global profile—they are 
identified as humanitarian donors—while other states do not receive the same positive 
recognition.  The clearest instance of this is that the United States is identified as a 
humanitarian donor in the global public sphere—and seems to benefit from this 
identification, as I discuss below—and in the meantime draws considerable resources to 
care from other countries, benefitting from the relative invisibility and regularity of care 
in what I have called the global private sphere.  In part because of these conditions some 
states are able to get care, and get care more easily than others, and to improve their own 
security.  As in the realist’s world where in anarchy state efforts to increase security only 
reproduce and intensify the state imperative to compete, these political moments 
reproduce the hierarchical order that found them, reinstating stratification among both 
caregivers and states.  These are “slow motion” politics in that the effects are most clearly 
visible over long periods of time. 
What is different about this chapter in comparison with those preceding is that it 
focuses more directly on state-based humanitarianism, and it engages more fully with the 
major theoretical perspectives on international relations.  This engagement begins with a 
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confrontation with realism, which may be a surprising turn since realist perspectives have 
generally been anathema to feminist views on world politics.  While I would not wish to 
commit to an alliance, I want to make the case that the realist apprehension of state power 
and international system dynamics can be useful to thinking about the world politics of 
care.  We need to do more to recognize care serves political logics in the world system, 
and to understand the politics through which care reproduces those logics. 
I proceed in several steps.  In the first section, I review liberal, feminist, realist, 
and critical understandings of care in relation to national security.  After providing a 
picture of worldwide shortages in healthcare personnel, I then outline three important 
moments in the politics of care:  the politics of getting care, giving care, and refusing 
care.  I continue to look to the profession of nursing to exemplify trends in a wider 
politics around care, which also involves dentists, midwives, pharmacists, physicians, and 
other medical specialists.  I remain focused on the United States and its relations and 
interactions with other countries.  And I draw on major reports and legal instruments 
from international organizations, especially the World Health Organization, in order to 
get at the ideas and ideologies circulating in the global public sphere. 
 
Perspectives on Care and Security Politics 
Scholars of International Relations are not well equipped to think through care in 
relation to the interstate politics of security.  Realist scholars fail to theorize care, 
conceiving of the politics of security in terms of interstate contests for military 
supremacy.  Liberals do attend to care, but do not sufficiently attend to the way power 
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and politics produce it.  Critical and feminist theorists have moved toward a more 
rigorous analysis of care but still have not gone as far as they might to contemplate the 
politics of care that emerge in the international system. 
While realists have had little to say about care, a turn to realism is instructive to 
think about how international structure produces politics.  In anarchy, where there is no 
world state to ensure welfare, each state must look out for itself.  States jockey for power 
and position, with the goal being to achieve dominance over the other states in the world 
system.252  Because there is no global police power, states will engage in war-fighting 
and other strategies to increase their power and their chances of survival. 253 
If care crosses the mind of a realist, it is as an afterthought, perhaps as an intuition 
that populations need care to exist.  Indeed, realists of all stripes recognize the population 
is an important dimension of latent power.  On this issue, John Mearsheimer explains, 
“Population size matters a lot, because great powers require big armies, which can be 
raised only in countries with large populations.”254  While theoretically important, the 
category of the population nonetheless remains analytically marginal, at least for 
Mearsheimer, because in his view the power represented by populations can be better 
indexed by wealth.  That the concept of the population is ancillary only further shows 
realists are still some distance from being able to understand the capacity to care as a 
basic power resource (or a secondary power resource, or even a topic for discussion).  It 
                                                
252 This vision of endless power-seeking comes from offensive realism.  Ibid. 
253 It bears noting that while realists refer to survival as the ultimate state concern, state “death” through 
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254 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 61.  I thank Joan Tronto for pointing out to me that 
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is possible to conceive of how military capability and the capacity to care for a 
population have a similar functionality for the state.  Military power matters, because it 
translates into state capacity to deter, repel, withstand, and launch attacks and ultimately 
survive.  Realists might recognize that, on their own terms, care matters because it 
implies the possibility for populations to exist in times of peace, in war, and in the 
context of other emergencies.  In the end care makes possible the war-making efforts of 
the state, as is most clearly evident when the state calls upon its population to fight.  In 
any case, while realists miss this opportunity, they do present a framework for 
understanding security politics that is useful. 
Liberals tend to construe care as essentially subpolitical or as essentially good.  In 
general, it is difficult to understand power and politics through a liberal lens since liberals 
tend to locate the determinants of international politics at the individual or state level of 
analysis.  Economic liberals treat care migration as individual entrepreneurism or as trade 
in health services, sometimes through the lenses of “brain drain” and “brain gain.”255  
Cooperation theorists also tend to have an optimistic view of care, situating it in a 
progressive view of history, as is in evidence in writing on the international doctrine 
known as Responsibility to Protect, which triggers military intervention when 
governments are unwilling or unable to stop massive violence within their borders.  Anne 
Marie Slaughter argued for acting in accordance with R2P and organizing international 
intervention to stop the violence in Syria, reasoning, “Standing up for that principle will 
                                                
255 See, for example:  Richard D Smith, Rupa Chanda, and Viroj Tangcharoensathien, "Trade in Health-
Related Services," The Lancet 373, no. 9663 (2009). 
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result in a world that will be more stable, prosperous and consistent with universal 
values—the values Americans know as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”256 
Feminist theorists do attend to care and power to a greater extent than liberals, but 
still underrate the international politics of care.  Feminist theorists of care like Fiona 
Robinson have contended traditional perspectives on ethics in international relations err 
in refusing to attend to relations and practices of care, which Robinson affirms are 
essential to human life.257  Recently she honed this argument by showing the concept of 
care provides a way to redefine and reevaluate human security.  Her aim was to 
underscore “the importance of relations and networks of responsibility and care in 
determining people’s everyday experiences of security and insecurity.”258  Hers was a 
timely intervention into several interdisciplinary debates.  Yet while Robinson sees care 
reflects “domination, oppression, injustice, inequality, and paternalism” her account of 
the politics of care is thin.259  Although she trains her attention on how care reflects 
power, she does not think through how care engenders and configures other political 
dynamics between states like deliberation, competition, contestation, conflict, and the 
construction of enmity and alliance.260  This is in part because in focusing on human 
                                                
256 Washington Post, June 10, 2012, A19. 
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258 The Ethics of Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security, 10. 
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making an ontological claim” The Ethics of Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security, 28.  These 
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security, Robinson misses the way that care relates to national security and international 
politics. 
Robinson’s contribution does not stand alone.  She is joined by other feminists 
who might not always center care or conceptualize it as such, but nonetheless reveal the 
close proximity between caring practices and national security institutions, showing, for 
instance, the way sex work is organized around U.S. military bases across the world.261  
This critique of conventional national security analyses complements Robinson’s 
approach to human security.  Again, while I acknowledge this scholarship makes a 
significant contribution, these feminist writers could do more to see and assess how care 
operates in and generates international politics.262 
Thus, we still need better resources for theorizing the politics of care.  Critical 
theorists bring together the concerns for human security and for national security.  Like 
realists, critical theorists of biopolitics understand processes in the international system 
generate security imperatives, including war.  But unlike realists, critical theorists do not 
take the relationship between the state and its population for granted.  Michel Foucault 
historicized the attachment of states to care, casting it as the peculiar concern of 
contemporary states.  Foucault described the original power of the state, sovereign power, 
as the power to kill, or to take the life of individuals. 263  Since the latter half of the 1700s 
this old regime of power has been joined to and transformed by a new regime of power 
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al., Society Must Be Defended : Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76, 241. 
  134 
“to make live.”264  The subject of this new regime of power, what Foucault terms 
“biopower,” is no longer the individual, but the population.  Foucault was the first to 
explicate the biopolitical order of “mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power,” 
which governs the population and takes responsibility for life.265  The fields of 
intervention are multiple:  “biopolitics will derive knowledge from, and define its 
powers’ field of intervention in terms of, the birth rate, the mortality rate, various 
biological disabilities and the effects of the environment.”266  This power is effectuated 
through regularization, for instance, through the regularization of “medicine whose main 
function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coordinate medical care, 
centralize information, and normalize hygiene.” 267  This is not merely a domestic matter.  
The organization of biopower makes possible the conduct of war.  Because states depend 
on populations for justifying and prosecuting war, states benefit from the promotion and 
management of the life of populations.  Thus, in theorizing biopolitics, Foucault relates 
the imperative to organize care with the imperative to conduct war. 
Although not a contribution on par with Foucault’s, a recent piece from the field 
of security studies theorizes a somewhat similar linkage of the domestic imperative to 
care with international politics.  In an article in International Security, Mark Haas has 
assessed the national security implications of the high cost of elder care.  He predicted 
that in the near future governments will find they are compelled to capitulate to popular 
demands to subsidize care for their aging populations, and this will cause a “geriatric 
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peace” to break out.268  Haas observed the average age of the population in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan is already high and is steadily 
increasing.  New data suggest the imperative to secure professional caregivers will be all 
the more urgent in the future given that family caregivers are less likely to be available to 
provide unpaid care.  A report released by the American Association of Retired People 
estimates that in the United States the ratio of middle-aged people available to care for 
older friends and family members will decline in the next several decades, from a ratio of 
7 family caregivers for each person in late old age in 2010 to a projected ratio of 3 to 1 in 
2030.269  At any rate, Haas speculated that with the increasing expense of elder care and 
ever tightening budgets, states will have less discretion to spend on military resources, a 
limitation that will lead to great power peace.  This is a creative and provocative 
argument, yet it would not convince realists who expect states will always prioritize 
military power over domestic welfare services and other secondary policy alternatives.270   
More generally, Haas assumes all that a state needs in order to provide care is enough 
money to subsidize it.  But this is not a tenable assumption:  even states with sufficient 
funds are not necessarily able to remedy deficits of care.  One implication is that in the 
future there would be additional costs in recruiting caregivers, meaning states will need to 
spend even more money on elder care than Haas imagines.  It is of note nurses are of 
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special importance in delivering elder care, not just in hospitals but also in care homes, so 
they would be especially important to this development. 
Again, Foucault and Haas could not be more different in terms of their 
theorizations and locations in political thought.  Nonetheless, it is useful to notice how 
their accounts run in parallel.  Both relate the national imperative to organize care to 
international politics, whether to war or peace (Foucault on the former; Haas on the 
latter).  Foucault’s account of biopower, in particular, has been enormously generative in 
the study of world politics.  I do not seek to further extend his account here, however, 
primarily because I am interested in studying how states are themselves both subjects and 
objects of care, and what forms of politics aside from war and peace the domestic 
imperative to organize care generates.  I recognize he would problematize the terms I use 
here, for instance interpreting deficits of care as a mechanism that produces a field of 
intervention for power. 
Although I do not seek to offer a rival lens, I do want to respond to these 
perspectives by underscoring several dimensions of the international politics of care that 
they overlook.  Realists say care does not rate as a power resource or as a means of 
survival, where in fact continuing state efforts to get care indicate it is crucial to their 
existence, and ongoing and costly efforts to engage in displays of care suggest caregiving 
is also important.  Robinson, Haas, and Foucault all in different ways provide an account 
of why states might be concerned about deficits of care and motivated to seek care from 
other societies.  But all give analytic priority to the organization of care domestically.  
Tracking how states give and get care—and under what conditions and with what 
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consequences—can contribute to a better understanding of the international politics of 
security. 
 
Hierarchy and Deficits of Care 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century international organizations explicitly 
charged states with the responsibility to attend to needs and to provide care for their 
populations.  The constitution of the World Health Organization asserts, “Governments 
have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled only by the 
provision of adequate health and social measures.” 271  Yet, by the end of the Second 
World War, virtually all states found they had deficits of caregivers.  In his 1960 report to 
the U.S. Congress on the World Health Organization, Senator Hubert Humphrey from 
Minnesota commented, “No country on earth has enough resources for health; every 
country is trying to expand its resources.”272  A little more than fifty years later, data 
show there are some 89 countries that have fewer personnel than what the WHO has 
specified as a critical minimum of 2.28 nurses and midwives for every 1,000 people.273  
The World Health Organization warned, “In every country, rich or poor, the story is the 
same.  There are not enough nurses.”274 
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While deficits of care have been reported in almost every region of the world, 
cross-national inequalities in staffing levels reflect deeper asymmetries in the 
international system.  James Buchan and Linda Aiken report, “At a country level, there is 
a hundred-fold difference in the ratio across the world, between the countries with the 
lowest reported ratio, in Africa and South East Asia, and the countries with the highest 
reported ratio, in Europe.”275  According to WHO data, in the most recent reporting year, 
the United States had a ratio of approximately 9.8 nurses and midwives per 1000 
population; Japan had a ratio of 11.5; the United Kingdom 8.8; Brazil 7.6; India 1.7; and 
China 1.5.276  Researchers have found that in Southeast Asia, “five countries (Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) fall below the critical shortage threshold of 
2:28 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population, as defined by WHO.”277  They 
estimate this gap constitutes “a shortfall of around 23,2417 relative to the current 
workforce.”278  And in sub-Saharan Africa, there is estimated “one physician for every 
8,000 people in the region.”279  According to one assessment, “Africa, which has been 
estimated to harbor 25% of all of the world’s diseases, has only 1.3% of the world’s 
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health staff.”280  These widespread deficits suggest most countries do not have the human 
resources to provide regular healthcare services. 
Nurses play a particularly critical role in healthcare delivery.  Low nurse staffing 
levels tend to correlate with adverse health effects, one explanation being “that nurses 
contribute importantly to surveillance, early detection, and timely interventions that save 
lives.”281  Studies of nurse staffing have found lower nurse staffing levels correlate with 
higher patient readmission rates. 282  Research has also found that low nurse staffing 
levels are associated with higher mortality rates. 283  One study in the United States 
concluded, “Nurse staffing was an important factor accounting for lower AIDS mortality:  
an additional nurse per patient day reduced the odds of dying within 30 days of admission 
by half.”284  According to another study, “Patients in hospitals in the upper quartile 
(where nurses had the heaviest patient loads) were 26% more likely to die overall and 
29% more likely to die following complicated hospital stays than those in the lowest 
quartile.”285 
One important characteristic of care is that it cannot be easily expanded, making it 
difficult to quickly resolve deficits of care.  The sheer expense of educating healthcare 
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personnel is a hindrance as in times of austerity states are reticent to subsidize 
professional education for caregivers.  And economists warn countries that investing too 
much in their healthcare infrastructure will hinder economic growth.  The issue of cost 
aside, enlisting recruits to the care professions can be challenging.  Most care requires 
intensive investments of time and energy by humans.  Although there are efforts to 
mechanize care and to deliver care remotely, new technologies have not yet eliminated 
the need for human caregiving.  In most countries at least some forms of caring like 
domestic work are associated with “dirty work” or menial labor, yet even the care 
professions that have a higher social status have trouble attracting new caregivers into 
their ranks.  Social changes have transformed the pool of candidates for these jobs.  In 
many places women who now have many career options open to them choose nursing 
less often.  Given the difficulty in securing caregivers, it is not surprising that even 
comparatively small staffing shortfalls in wealthy countries generate concern.  Calling the 
nursing shortage a national-security crisis, Marilyn Rothert of Michigan State University 
College of Nursing explained, “We're not able to deal with the current healthcare needs in 
the country right now.  And if we don't have enough now and if a catastrophic event 
occurs, that's going to increase our needs, and we are going to have an even greater 
crisis.”286  Researchers from the United Kingdom speculated, “the number of lives that 
could potentially be saved through investments in nursing throughout NHS hospitals 
could be in the thousands every year.”287 
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As these comments intimate, shortages of healthcare personnel raise broad 
concerns for state and sub-state actors.  Whether due to a recognition of the importance of 
human security, as Robinson suggested, or rather deriving from a national security 
imperative, as Haas and Foucault proposed, deficits generate security predicaments for 
states.  Without sufficient caregivers, states cannot complete their ethical obligations, 
satisfy the demands of their population, or organize the power to “make live.” 
 
Politics of Getting Care 
Because of the difficulties remedying deficits of care through domestic 
production, states and entities below the level of the state often turn to other states for the 
means to deliver the forms of care most fundamental to life, primarily medical care.  
Compared to educating a health workforce, doctors and nurses can be gained much less 
expensively by drawing them from other countries.  By recruiting foreign caregivers 
countries are able to save on financing their health workforce because they do not have to 
subsidize the expensive infrastructure needed for educational institutions.  Recruitment 
from other countries also saves time, since it takes years for a cohort of caregivers to 
matriculate through a program of higher education.  Getting care from other countries is a 
political process that both reflects and reproduces international hierarchies.  The concepts 
of global public and private spheres help to draw out these dynamics. 
Wealthy countries in North America, Western Europe, North Africa, and the 
Middle East draw nurses and other health professionals from countries in Eastern Europe, 
the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia, which prompts low-income countries in these regions 
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to look for healthcare workers elsewhere, especially in African countries.  Yet for the 
most powerful states, the global private sphere functions at once to conceal and, to 
borrow Foucault’s term, “regularize” the care that the most powerful states receive.  
Thus, these conditions systematically privilege some and disadvantage others.  These 
differential conditions and stakes matter because some states are ultimately able to get 
more care—and get care more easily, whereas others are constrained, put in a position to 
more carefully negotiate the terms under which they send and receive care. 
The global expansion of care markets has made possible the redistribution of care 
to wealthy countries.  The United States derives a measure of security from the 
institutionalization of the international nurse market.  According to Mireille Kingma of 
the International Council of Nurses, “Foreign-educated health professionals represent 
more than a quarter of the medical and nursing workforces of Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.”288  In the United States around 170,000 nurses, 
over 5% of the nurse workforce, are foreign-trained.289  However, around 15% of new 
registered nurses are foreign-trained.290  Almost half of foreign-trained nurses came from 
the Philippines, close to 10% from India, and around 10% from Canada.  In Canada 
approximately 8.4% of the nurse workforce, and nearly of 17% of nurses in geriatrics and 
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long-term care have been educated in foreign institutions.291  And in the United Kingdom 
around 21,592 nurses or 3% of the nurse workforce hails from other countries.292  While 
the United States and the United Kingdom have drawn nurses from Jamaica, “Jamaica 
has been able to make up for some of this loss by recruiting skilled nurses from inside the 
region (Cuba and Guyana) as well as outside the Caribbean (India, Ghana, Burma, 
Russia, and Nigeria).”293  
The Middle East also draws many nurses from other countries.  Strikingly, in 
Kuwait more than 93% of nurses are migrants.294  While data on cross-national staffing 
are not easy to access, it is of note that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Libya, and Qatar have employed hundreds of nurses from the Philippines each year. 295  
In the first decade of the 21st century, the most common destination for nurse migration 
from the Philippines has been the Middle East.  Saudi Arabia hired almost 10,000 from 
the Philippines in 2009 alone. 
Of course, it is important to avoid an overly simple interpretation of these in-
flows and out-flows of care.  In the Philippines the international nurse market and the 
expansion of postgraduate nursing education has contributed to the overproduction of 
nurses.  In that country there are some 400,000 unemployed or underemployed licensed 
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nurses.296  Nonetheless, the departure of experienced nurses, nursing professors, and 
nursing leaders remains a concern.  And although remittances may improve the overall 
economic situation for countries that receive them, they do not facilitate the delivery of 
care in the short term.  The most important point is simply that nurse migration does not 
represent an even “trade” between countries that attract care and countries that send care. 
In the global public sphere, international organizations like the World Health 
Organization contribute to giving meaning to these flows of care.  States that send care 
are represented very differently from states that get care.  Deficits of healthcare workers 
(and states with critical deficits) are made visible as a hindrance to global progress.  
Witness the 2010 WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of 
Health Personnel, which declares “the severe shortage of health personnel, including 
highly educated and trained health personnel, in many Member States, constitutes a major 
threat to the performance of health systems and undermines the ability of these countries 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and other internationally agreed 
development goals.”297  This speaks to the point that deficits are produced politically, and 
tend to reinforce pre-existing hierarchies. 
The WHO Code of Practice reflects how the recruitment of nurses is receiving 
some attention in the global public sphere.  Yet, it emerges in the public sphere as a 
problem to be managed by individual states—and its problematic aspects are not 
conceptualized in terms more commonly used to characterize global public problems, 
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which might concern the international community as a community.  Nurse recruitment is 
not conceptualized as an international crime, for instance.  Yet, as others have pointed 
out, while drawing doctors and nurses “may lack the heinous intent of other crimes 
covered under international law, the resulting dilapidation of health infrastructure 
contributes to a measureable and foreseeable public-health crisis.”298  Note that a crime 
would imply some type of international reckoning.  This is precisely what powerful 
actors in the global public sphere want to avoid.  Hence, in comments accompanying the 
draft guidelines for monitoring the WHO code, the United States recommended that the 
phrase “governments are responsible for monitoring the extent to which the overall 
objectives and principles of the Code are being met” be changed to “governments are 
encouraged to monitor the extent to which the overall objectives and principles of the 
Code are being met.”299 
Also consider that nurse recruitment is not conceptualized as a war.  Thus, while 
it would never be considered legitimate for the United Kingdom and the United States to 
attack Jamaica and hurt its people, it is considered normal that they draw nurses from 
Jamaica and other countries, with some evidence of similar consequences.  These states 
cannot launch a legal or legitimate attack that would kill, but they can draw resources that 
would result in far more than 1,000 deaths, the current criterion used to classify a conflict 
as a war.  Democracies “fight” with other democracies in this way, presenting another 
challenge to accounts of a “democratic peace,” which refers to the historical absence of 
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open war between democracies.  The upshot is that neither the United States nor the 
United Kingdom is identified as a criminal state or an aggressor—at least with reference 
to care—with one consequence being that their status, if not reinforced, is not damaged 
through these actions.  To the contrary, when the United States and the United Kingdom 
receive caregivers identified as immigrants, the conventional view is that they are the 
benefactors. 
Part of what it means for nurse migration to occur in the global private sphere is 
that we cannot see how dependent powerful countries are on care from other countries.  
Yet, given the large numbers of care providers they have attracted, if the care they have 
received were to suddenly disappear, it would seriously impact the healthcare systems in 
these countries.  It would also reveal what has been true all along—that the needs of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and other powerful countries are staggering, but their 
needs are met, at least in part through international migration in care, in other words, 
foreign aid.  Yet, not only do these countries for the most part not come to crisis, but they 
do not figure into the global public sphere as care receivers.  Recall that, in contrast, 
when states get care through humanitarianism, there are public fundraising efforts held on 
behalf of states experiencing emergencies.  When states attract international migrants for 
care, the international community is not drawn in. 
Thus, we need to think more carefully about dependence.  As an illustration, 
consider that in Fiona Robinson’s account of human security, it is primarily low-income 
countries that figure as dependent and vulnerable.  She notes, “income-rich states, and 
individual families within those states, may be dependent upon migrant women to fill 
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gaps in care provision.”300  When she calls on us, however, to “keep in view the agency 
of those who are dependent” it is clear she does not have in mind the agency of 
Canadians.301  While I agree humanitarians also in some cases create dependencies, in 
most cases, humanitarian groups do not fully redress deficits of care, even for small 
communities within a nation-state.  Countries that receive humanitarian care, however, 
seem to be more vulnerable and more dependent on the international community.  The 
place of humanitarianism in the international public sphere helps to explain this.  
Humanitarian care has a high profile, where media rehearse a standard narrative where 
humanitarians provide assistance only to “needy” people. 
The historical experience of Haiti helps to illustrate how the visibility of some 
forms of care lead outside observers to judgments about dependence.  Humanitarian 
agencies have long entered the country to provide assistance after violent storms, most 
recently in 2004 and 2008, and some organizations never left.  Hundreds of medical 
workers with Catholic Relief Services, Partners in Health, and Doctors without Borders, 
among other organizations, were in Haiti at the time of the 2010 earthquake.302  They 
were joined by additional volunteers, among them, nurses from the United States.  What 
the media coverage after the earthquake did not report is that around the year 2000, 
roughly 13,000 Haitian nurses—or 94% of the nurse workforce—had taken up foreign 
employment.303  Counterfactual reasoning is always troublesome, but the scale of the 
                                                
300 Robinson, The Ethics of Care:  A Feminist Approach to Human Security, 99. 
301 Ibid., 97. 
302 New York Times, January 13, 2010. 
303 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "International Migration Outlook: Annual 
Report," 213.  This figure reflects those who have obtained foreign employment in OECD countries only, 
so it may actually underestimate the total number of nurses and doctors who have emigrated.  As I noted 
earlier with respect to Caribbean countries, this figure accounts only for those employed in OECD 
  148 
recent humanitarian effort in Haiti was surely conditioned by the emigration en masse of 
Haitian health workers in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Fiona Robinson suggests “while the government and people of Haiti may be 
temporarily and inevitably dependent on donor countries, especially after the recent 
earthquake, this fact should not blind us to the agency of Haitians not only in responding 
to ‘crisis’ but also in their everyday struggles with poverty.”304  Robinson is a careful 
thinker, yet it is not clear even in this case dependence was “inevitable.”  She overlooks 
an important part of the world politics of care because she considers humanitarianism and 
migration separately.  This oversight makes possible the inferences that Haiti is not itself 
a “donor” country; that Haiti can only receive assistance; and that Haiti’s need for 
assistance is in some sense natural and not political.  Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, humanitarianism may not have been the inevitable sequel to a series of 
meteorological and seismic events in Haiti. 
 
Politics of Giving Care 
The politics of getting care, like the politics of giving care, become visible when 
we put to use the concepts of global public and private spheres.  Again, we can better see 
how giving care is produced politically.  While nearly all states “send” or “emanate” care 
in some form, different conditions correspond to different material and symbolic effects.  
States known for sending humanitarian caregivers can reap the benefits of an enhanced 
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international profile.  They seem closer to the ideal of a sovereign state:  independent, 
resourceful, and secure.  In contrast, states that send care as migration may increase their 
Gross National Product, but continue to be cast in the global public sphere as 
“developing.” 
While most states send care, not all are identified as humanitarian donors.  Those 
who are identified in this way tend to be either governmental aid agencies or 
nongovernmental purveyors of humanitarian aid.  In terms of financing, “The USA 
remains the single largest donor, contributing some 33 percent of global government 
funding in 2005, followed by the European Union with 15 percent, Japan with 7 percent 
and France and the UK each with 6 percent.”305  My focus in this chapter is primarily on 
state-based humanitarian aid, but nongovernmental organizations tend to follow a similar 
pattern.  On the latter, the most important sector-wide survey of humanitarian action, 
ALNAP, reported, “Roughly 45% of INGOs in the humanitarian system are based in the 
US, 18% are from Western Europe (excluding the UK and France), 11% are from the 
UK, 6% are from Asia, 5% are from France and 3% are from Africa.”306 
The problem of partial publicity surfaces here and is particularly evident in how 
African countries are collectively represented.  The ALNAP brief stated, “The largest 
portion of humanitarian spending goes to longstanding, conflict-related needs in 
Africa.”307  The report suggested further, “Africa is currently less advanced in terms of 
regional humanitarian mechanisms, and requires additional capacity within the key 
regional mechanisms, such as the South African Development Community (SADC) and 
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the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”308  The particular merits 
of this assessment aside, it is important to notice the order of ideas it represents and 
reproduces.  When it circulates as common knowledge, it identifies and produces African 
states as having needs and as being “nondonors,” at best as giving rise to local 
nongovernmental organizations.  To further emphasize the politics at play here and to 
denaturalize this conventional wisdom, consider that “[a]pproximately 65,000 African-
born physicians and 70,000 African-born professional nurses were working overseas in a 
developed country in the year 2000.”309  Some of these African-born doctors and nurses 
provide direct assistance to populations in countries recognized as humanitarian 
“donors”; indeed, “almost one in ten doctors working in the UK are from Africa.”310 
For states able to claim the role of care “donors,” humanitarians serve several 
functions.  Humanitarianism might reinforce their power, or at least earn some gains in 
international approval.  Indeed, Pew Research found that after the 2004 tsunami that 
struck Banda Aceh, Indonesia, “Roughly eight-in-ten (79%) said that post-tsunami aid 
from the U.S. had improved their impression of America, and positive views of the U.S. 
more than doubled, rising from 15% in 2003 to 38% in the 2005 poll.” 311  Pew polling 
found a similar pattern in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami northeast of 
Toyko, Japan.  Pew reported, “the United States military launched ‘Operation 
Tomodachi,’ a major humanitarian aid mission to help the Japanese government respond 
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to the crisis.”312  At any rate, “The effort made a strong impression on the Japanese 
people—ratings for the U.S. reached sky-high levels following the American mission.”313 
In this way powerful states take advantage of the visibility of the public sphere 
when they deploy humanitarians.  Humanitarianism might even be taken as a signal of a 
state’s power.  The nature of the international system forces states to be resource misers, 
protective of their interest in survival.  This usually means prioritizing funding for 
offensive and defensive military capabilities.  When a state is seen to spend resources on 
other kinds of projects that are not of first order of importance to its survival—like 
international humanitarian care—it may be seen as an indication that its economic 
resources are more than adequate.  Such a signal can be expected to be most powerful 
when states have a clear and immediate interest in spending on more conventional 
security resources.  Similarly, when a state chooses not to undertake projects to deliver 
care across borders it could be interpreted as a signal that it has too few resources and 
must reserve them for projects that more directly serve its primary needs.  In this way 
care might enhance a state’s reputation for power, increasing its prestige and ultimately 
its international authority. 
Indeed, prestige is not a trivial end for states.  Robert Gilpin defines prestige as 
the widespread perception of a state’s power capabilities.314  Gilpin writes, “Prestige is 
the reputation for power, and military power in particular.”315  He clarifies, “Whereas 
power refers to the economic, military, and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers 
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primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its 
ability and willingness to exercise its power.”316  Like power capabilities, however, 
prestige is important in that it enables a state to exercise control over other states.  Gilpin 
explains, “In international relations, prestige is the functional equivalent of the role of 
authority in domestic politics.” 317  Seeking prestige or the perception of power is in the 
interests of states in addition to finding the means to preserve their physical security by 
increasing their power capabilities.  For some states giving care presents this possibility.  
Whether or not caregiving is a core interest, however, is less important than the contrast 
with states that send care in the private sphere and face conditions that offer no such 
opportunity for the affirmation of power. 
Look at the humanitarianism of the United States and China.  When the United 
States sends care it tends to serve its interests and reinforce its power position.  The 
coincidence between the expansion of the overseas operations of the American Red Cross 
and the emergence of the United States as a world power is suggestive of this dynamic.318  
In more recent times, David Rieff has argued the state instrumentalization of aid work 
has been particularly apparent in conjunction with NATO’s military action in Kosovo and 
the US war against Afghanistan.319  Colin Powell’s oft quoted remark that humanitarian 
organizations would be a “force multiplier” gets at the role that U.S. military officials 
hoped humanitarian organizations would play in its war with and occupation of Iraq.  It is 
equally revealing that China’s rise has been accompanied by the expansion of its 
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humanitarian activities.  It seems intent on building its international profile as a caring 
country, and one that respects and treats with dignity those whom it assists.  China 
presents its humanitarian program as a superior alternative to Western humanitarianism.  
It claims to provide care to others who it treats as equals as exemplified by its assistance 
to African countries.  Li Anshan writes, “The principles guiding China-African relations 
include equality and mutual respect, bilateralism and co-development, no-political-
strings-attached and non-interference with domestic affairs, and stress on the capability of 
self-reliance.”320  The concern with establishing its distinctiveness in relation to Western 
aid itself speaks to the importance of public perception in the global public sphere.  But, 
again, the most important point is that China’s humanitarianism, its caregiving, reinforces 
its power position. 
Humanitarianism is important enough to these states—and important enough to 
the international community—that they sometimes seek to outdo each other to deliver 
care.  After typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines in November of 2013, the United 
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom vied with China to win the competition for relief 
in that geopolitically important region.  Reporting in the New York Times, Andrew 
Jacobs, judged, “The outpouring of foreign assistance for the hundreds of thousands left 
homeless and hungry by Typhoon Haiyan is shaping up to be a monumental show of 
international largess—and a not-so-subtle dose of one-upsmanship directed at the 
region’s fastest-rising power, China.”321  For the United States and other great powers, 
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spectacular emergencies provide a particularly opportune occasion for giving care, since 
these events are highly visible and care activities appear especially valuable. 
In contrast to states that send humanitarians, states that send migrant caregivers 
can find their own capacity to organize care diminished.  This may be especially true for 
smaller countries in Africa and the Caribbean that have experienced the most significant 
numbers of departures relative to the total size of their health workforces.322  In Africa, 
78% of nurses from Burundi have emigrated; 66% of nurses from Gambia; 81% of nurses 
from Liberia; and 63% of nurses from Mauritius.323  In the Caribbean, around the year 
2000 roughly 81.6% of nurses from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were working 
abroad; 78% from Barbados; and 72.9% and 74.4% Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.324  
In Jamaica, hospital administrators fill openings for nurses but have had trouble finding 
nurses with the training and experience of those who have emigrated.325  Even Cuba, 
which has a state-based program of medical internationalism, has struggled with the 
departure of caregivers.  Cuba has long sent health workers abroad, at least in part as a 
strategic attempt at medical diplomacy.  Cuban doctors and nurses find these multi-year 
opportunities attractive because they offer greater status and pay than they would receive 
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in Cuba.326  One study found, “When tens of thousands of health workers accepted 
temporary overseas posts, their absence was acutely felt at home.”327  Cuba’s 
international humanitarian ambitions have undercut the provision of routine healthcare 
services to Cubans.  The public image of providing care internationally came at the cost 
of providing care domestically. 
 
Politics of Refusing Care 
While states have an interest in care, states, societies, and sub-state communities 
do not always eagerly admit foreign caregivers, whether in the context of 
humanitarianism or migration.  While states actively undertake efforts to recruit 
caregivers, caregivers are often met with expressions of inhospitality.  Balking, policing, 
ingratitude, intolerance, racism, sexism, and violence surface in response to care in 
humanitarianism as well as to care in migration.  To some degree hostile reactions to care 
are unsurprising.  Care can threaten personal and collective aspirations to independence; 
caregivers can impose parochial ideas and interests; caregivers can upset cultural norms; 
and caring can lead to unintended, uncaring outcomes.  Some scholars believe the 
involvement of humanitarians in politics has caused violence against aid workers, but the 
presence of violence in response to migration suggests another dynamic may be operating 
in both contexts.  It is essential to recognize that continuity, and to see that the refusal of 
care does not occur only at the interpersonal level. 
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Summarizing conditions when humanitarians are denied access, Melissa Labonte 
and Anne Edgerton suggested intransigent states are unfamiliar with or insufficiently 
committed to international norms concerning civilian protection, and thus out of step with 
the international community.328  Yet, many states refuse care, and not all states are 
international pariahs.  When the United States refuses care, or limits it, it is not 
considered out of line with international norms.  The New York Times reported that in the 
aftermath of hurricane Sandy the Iranian Red Crescent offered to deliver aid to the United 
States to assist “the flood-stricken people of America.”329  Whatever the intentions of the 
Iranian Red Crescent, the mere possibility of an offer of assistance was reportedly 
received as an affront that the American government declared it would refuse.330  
Similarly, after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported the 
Philippines had offered assistance to the United States, and was not received with much 
enthusiasm.  The article quoted George W. Bush:  "I'm not expecting much from foreign 
nations because we haven't asked for it.  We love help, but we are going to take care of 
our own business as well."331 
Two points are of note.  First, the United States had in fact received “much from 
foreign nations” through international migration from the Philippines (as well as many 
other countries).  It is especially striking—and telling—that the United States would 
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refuse free international assistance.  At a time of severe budget shortfalls, objectively, the 
United States should prefer free over paid care.  The fact that it does not suggests there is 
something going on beyond strict calculations of self-interest.  Second, while the United 
States has many domestic resources for humanitarian assistance, the denial of assistance 
seems to have little to do with objective need.  Just recall the dire circumstances in the 
aftermath of hurricane Katrina: 
“Over 1,800 people lost their lives to the hurricane, the largest US 
hurricane death toll since 1928.  Infrastructure damage is estimated to be 
around $81 billion.  Two weeks after the hurricane struck, over a million 
people had fled the area, the largest displacement since the US Civil War.  
Faced with such a massive disaster which disrupted not only the city but 
also virtually every system that the disaster responders relied upon, there 
is little wonder that a newly developed and untested system failed.”332  
 
Interestingly, some of the states that receive the most aid express ambivalence 
about it.  According to Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, “In 2004, six countries 
received an estimated half of all humanitarian assistance:  Iraq (16 percent), Sudan (11 
percent), Palestine (8 percent), Ethiopia (6 percent), Afghanistan (6 percent), and the 
DRC (4 percent).” 333  Perceptions of aid vary, both among these governments and among 
the people.  In a study it undertook on how it was perceived, Médecins Sans Frontières 
found in Iraq "medical aid was viewed almost as a humiliation."334  Years of brutal 
occupation, of course, explain why Iraq would be especially reticent about aid from 
Western countries.  But this is not the only example.  Sudan reportedly viewed 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur as an “embarrassment of major proportions to a 
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country in the throes of painfully public paroxysms of nation self-definition.”335  
Similarly, “Ethiopia has consistently perceived its 40-plus-year interaction with the 
international humanitarian community as being highly paternalistic.”336 
It warrants reflecting on Ethiopia’s experience.  There, “the government 
repeatedly expresses the view that humanitarian organizations operating in Ethiopia are 
service providers whose activities should strengthen the government and its national 
image.”337  The tendency for humanitarian activity to extend beyond service provision—
or seem to—has led Ethiopia to impose extreme bureaucratic regulations that limit 
humanitarian work or render it impossible.  This is revealing since according to the 
government, “Ethiopia has just 1600 doctors serving a population of 83 million but needs 
a minimum of 8000.”338  One assistant health minister acknowledged, “We face a critical 
problem.  We plan to train more doctors and increase their pay.  It will be a massive 
training [of doctors] because we have a gap of over 80%.”339  It seems clear that Ethiopia 
needs care, yet it is in a position that it cannot accept humanitarian care, at least in the 
way it is institutionalized in the global public sphere. 
Instead of being outliers on this issue, these countries reject humanitarian aid in a 
manner that runs parallel to the behavior of the United States; all seem to be concerned 
about their image.  This is understandable if we recall how the global public sphere has 
transformed care, making it a central feature of the public horizon and part of a common 
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universal project.  The global public sphere stages a contest between the international 
community, on the one hand, and individual states, on the other.  While humanitarian 
actors are charged with promulgating “[h]umanitarian principles—humanity, neutrality, 
independence, and impartiality,” state governments are expected to show “[r]espect for 
humanitarian principles and IHL [International Humanitarian Law].” 340  There is 
pressure here and a power play:  “Relief should not avoid the state, but seek at least in 
part to induce the state to meet its responsibilities.”341  Receiving care has come to be 
understood to be for countries with gross needs that governments cannot or will not 
adequately address in a responsible manner.  Actors rarely frame their rejection of 
humanitarian care in terms of refusing the implication of irresponsibility, but this impetus 
for refusal seems possible given that states generally accept other kinds of care—through 
the global private sphere—and exclusively refuse humanitarian care.  Such actions seem 
to resist an implied demotion in the international hierarchy of prestige.  Yet, the security 




Care is commonly conflated with goodwill and nonviolence, in opposition to war 
and the struggle for security.  On the surface it appears as if practices of care and war 
could not be more different—care conserves life, while war destroys life—but care and 
war both arise out of structural conditions in the international system unlikely to change 
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soon.  Given the pervasiveness of deficits of care states seek to get care to improve their 
material welfare.  But this is not all.  A wide lens on care reveals that states also seek to 
give care to enhance their own status and to delegitimize other states; and when they 
receive care states undertake to reverse or mitigate identification with vulnerability and 
dependence.  To extend my critique of dual stories—it is not just individual caregivers 
who are misunderstood by viewing migrants and humanitarians in isolation, so too are 
states that send and receive them.  States sending migrants are cast as “developmental” 
and states sending humanitarians are cast as “donor governments.”  States receiving 
migrants are “normal” while states receiving humanitarians are “needful.”  These 
identifications do not reflect some objectively given material reality; instead they point to 
the political construction of states in relation to care and to each other. 
I began the chapter with John F. Kennedy at midcentury, and I conclude with one 
of his contemporaries.  In contrast to his realist colleagues who perceived only tragedy 
and pathos in international politics, Reinhold Niebuhr also saw irony.  Rarely have the 
ironic shadings of international politics been more evident than in the American 
experience after the Second World War when it discovered new moral confidence 
coupled with extraordinary power capabilities.  “The irony of our situation,” Niebuhr 
wrote in 1952, “lies in the fact that we could not be virtuous (in the sense of practicing 
the virtues which are implicit in meeting our vast world responsibilities) if we were really 
as innocent as we pretend to be.”342 
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In the twentieth century contests to give and get care sometimes assumed tragic 
proportions, as when the departure of thousands of caregivers incapacitated healthcare 
delivery in the societies that lost them.  Yet, the incongruousness in claiming to give 
indispensable care to others, while concealing yet depending on care received from others 
is more than tragic.  It is ironic that the United States sends care to other countries in 
public displays that heighten the impression of its power, at the same time its own power 
is possible precisely because of the care that it quietly draws from other countries. 
Niebuhr balked at efforts to build new international organizations to solve 
persistent problems in international relations.  He disliked the “abstract constitutional 
schemes of which our idealists are so fond,” for he thought such projects tended to be 
“indifferent toward the urgencies and anxieties which nations, less favored than we, 
experience; and to betray sentimentalities about the perplexing problems of human 
togetherness in which only the powerful and the secure can indulge.” 343  Niebuhr 
believed the basis for real community was not likely to be a “conscious moral idealism” 
but instead a kind of “religious humility,” which would be comprised in part by a “sense 
of the mystery and greatness of the other life, which we violate if we seek to comprehend 
it too simply from our standpoint.”344  Niebuhr reflected, “Genuine community is 
established only when the knowledge that we need one another is supplemented by the 
recognition that ‘the other,’ that other form of life, or that other unique community is the 
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limit beyond which our ambitions must not run and the boundary beyond which our life 
must not expand.”345 
The next chapter further explores the difficulty of applying the ethics of care 
given the international politics of care.  I examine these issues through the lens of the 
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Chapter 5 
 
THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE VISIT 
 
The curtain opens to a town in ruin, businesses bankrupt, buildings dilapidated, 
conditions so miserable its residents are not “living on the dole” because they are not 
“living” at all but “vegetating” and “rotting to death.”346  A wealthy visitor arrives, 
promising assistance, and is greeted with all the enthusiasm the town can muster.  The 
visitor is Claire Zachanassian, a former resident.  She declares she will help the town of 
Guellen, but she wants something in return:  “I’m giving you a million, and I’m buying 
myself justice.”347  And this is what she has in mind:  “A million for Guellen if someone 
kills Alfred Ill.”348  The townspeople decide there is some rightness to the request—after 
all, Alfred once left Claire, his lover, with a child and no means of existence but 
prostitution.  Alfred must suffer for his misdeeds (not Claire, who had bought and 
destroyed every business in town).  The people murder Alfred, Claire pays them, and 
Guellen prospers. 
In “The Visit” Friedrich Dürrenmatt offers much more than a story of revenge.  
His play is also and more significantly a problematization of the nature of the relationship 
between visitor and visited, a relationship that has long been taken to be of special moral 
significance.  Scholars have understood the visit to present opportunities to exhibit virtue 
and justice, because visitor and visited are often strangers to each other, and they give 
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care that is neither obligated by a kin relationship, nor rewarded by immediate, tangible 
gains.  There are at least two respects in which Dürrenmatt calls this view into question.  
First, he portrays the relationship between visitor and visited as asymmetric; it is 
characterized by a wide differential in power.  Claire has vastly more material resources 
than the Guelleners, and they have extremely dire needs.  Her humanitarianism and their 
hospitality are undertaken in a context of necessity, not in a context of freedom, and so 
are far from saintly acts of virtue performed solely for the right or the good.  Second, the 
title and storyline bid us to understand the visit as a whole—including not only an 
exercise of power, but a history, a sequence of actions, and the consequences of those 
actions—and to appreciate that all of this taken together should be the subject for ethical 
reflection, not the individual parties to the visit as if each could be understood exclusive 
of the other outside of history.  While Claire extends assistance in order to settle old 
accounts, the people of Guellen welcome Claire to cope with the pressure of extreme 
poverty.  The visit cannot be fathomed apart from these terms. 
Guellen’s predicament speaks to ongoing scholarly debates about the ethics of 
hospitality.  Political and international theorists have discussed the meaning of 
hospitality, the right to receive hospitality, the duty to provide hospitality, and the moral 
valences of hospitality, as in whether it is so fundamental a human experience it is 
ethics.349  Political theorists commonly use the concept of hospitality to interpret the 
responsibility of states to receive refugees and undocumented migrants.  Jacques Derrida, 
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for example, insists justice fundamentally requires that everyone, including states, extend 
hospitality to all, without conditions.350  Other theorists tap a line of argument dating to 
Immanuel Kant to argue states should be able to exclude imperial and otherwise 
“inhospitable” visitors who seek much more than refuge or residence.351  Still other 
theorists argue fundamental limits to knowledge make it impossible to know in advance 
who should be received and who should not, with the implication being that grounds do 
not exist for a morally definitive “you’re not welcome.”352 
While this scholarship offers much that is of value, it has not fully engaged the 
issues Dürrenmatt’s drama raises.  Even among international theorists, the tendency is to 
fix the politics of hospitality within the state that receives visitors, at the moment of their 
arrival.  We should worry about what is sacrificed when we too narrowly understand 
politics in relation to the decision on entry—namely, “should the visitor be received, yes 
or no?”—and lose sight of wider histories and geopolitical conditions.  While it is easy to 
be captivated by Claire, she cannot be characterized apart from her history with the 
inhabitants of Guellen.  The lesson is the proclivity to argue for or against hospitality by 
summoning a monstrous, godlike, saintlike, or otherwise stylized visitor may be a 
problem to the extent it distracts attention from the historically structured interactions 
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between visitor and visited that make them who they are.  Parties to the visit are only 
comprehensible in relation to history and to each other. 
With these matters in mind, I explore possibilities for theorizing the ethics of the 
visit in historical and political context.  Calling on the broader arguments of this 
dissertation, I seek to advance a threefold argument in this chapter.  First, I argue that 
unconditional hospitality is not a good or just principle across all contexts.  This is 
because societies face immense differences in the risks, benefits, and consequences of 
hospitality.  An ethics of hospitality should be sensitive to variation in political 
circumstances and consequences.  In fact, together the Kantian and Derridean arguments 
I alluded to above are useful and complementary in that they illuminate the ethical 
salience of different political conditions that shape the visit.  To simplify greatly, the 
Kantian perspective signals the importance of historically produced conditions in creating 
the context for the decision on the visit.  When the visitor is more powerful than the 
visited, as in imperial encounters, an ethics should favor the one who is visited.  The 
Derridean perspective in effect suggests an ethics should enjoin powerful countries to 
reduce barriers to less powerful visitors. 
Second, I argue this orientation to conditions makes it possible to think through 
how the gendered world order I have described in earlier chapters bears on the reception 
of caregivers.  Conditions of publicity and privatization give rise to distinctive politics of 
hospitality.  The problem of partial publicity is again relevant.  Publicity empowers 
international humanitarians relative to states, as well as substate groups such as warring 
parties.  International humanitarians can take advantage of the media coverage that 
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follows them, for example, and because of the (near-) global unanimity on the worthiness 
of their actions, they can recruit states, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
organizations to act in alliance with them and exert pressure on recalcitrant parties.  In 
contrast, in the global private sphere, transnational caregivers are at a disadvantage in 
relation to powerful states.  Their work is feminized, understood in economic terms, and 
seen as serving local and familial interests, not global concerns.  Their work is of 
marginal concern to the international community, a “problem” for each state to “solve” 
on its own with a range of policy measures. 
Third, these political conditions carry implications for ethics and tactics.  The 
global public and private spheres not only condition hospitality and, in different ways, 
reinforce the relationships of power between visitors and those they visit.  In addition, 
because these conditions so significantly shape practices of hospitality, they may actually 
limit or even pre-empt the politics surrounding hospitality at the state or substate levels.  
An ethics of hospitality therefore cannot afford to ignore them.  These international 
conditions—alongside the policy conditions that each state imposes on visitors—need to 
be weighed in the ethics of hospitality.  It would make good strategic sense for political 
engagements to aim at re-opening the politics of hospitality and challenging these 
international conditions and institutionalized practices of hospitality.  To better imagine 
the range of potential ethical and political moves, it is useful to move more deliberately 
onto the terrain of care ethics.  Care ethics might suggest hospitable practices to include 
building relationships and cultivating gratitude.  Pursuing these arguments thus provides 
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me with an opportunity to recast the ethical implications of the historical and conceptual 
arguments already in play. 
For several reasons, then, debates surrounding hospitality furnish particularly 
fitting material to begin to conclude this dissertation.  This has been a project about two 
groups, humanitarian and migrant caregivers, who cross borders and are subject to 
varying conditions though they perform similar activities.  The politics of hospitality is 
clearly at issue. 
In addition, while my comparisons of the circumstances these groups confront has 
included ethical reflection, particularly regarding the relative privilege of humanitarians, 
these comparisons are limited as moral reckoning.  It warrants also asking what practices 
of the visit would be without any conditions, an exercise that cannot be undertaken only 
by examining the world as it is today.  Such an exercise would involve taking into 
account not only what is realistic but also what is “hyperbolic,” as Derrida puts it.353  The 
hyperbolic in this case is an exaggerated picture of justice that serves as a means to 
scrutinize actual conditions. 
Finally, as concepts, hospitality and care appear to have given rise to quite 
different and distinctive ethical perspectives.  Because a feminist interpretation of care 
has guided most of the primary conceptual and analytical maneuvers in this dissertation, 
it makes sense now nearing the conclusion to reconsider the advantages as well as 
disadvantages of this lens, a task that is facilitated by comparative and contrastive 
reflection.  One of the strengths of a care perspective is its focus on how relationships 
generate responsibilities, while one strength of a hospitality perspective is its view on 
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how encounters and interactions produce ethical obligations, even in the absence of a 
direct, continuing relationship.  While the ethics of hospitality has not been systematized 
to the same extent as the ethics of care, and so cannot provide detailed prescriptions on 
how hospitality should be granted or who should bear its burdens, there is nonetheless an 
opportunity for mutual learning.354 
The ethics of care aside, the practice of caregiving would still present an excellent 
case for investigating the ethics of hospitality.  Caregivers are particularly important 
visitors—after all, everyone needs care, and it is difficult to imagine too much good care, 
whether in an individual life or in the life of a community or nation (it is not difficult, of 
course, to imagine too much bad care, such as care characterized by incompetence, 
unresponsiveness, paternalism, or maternalism).  It would be easy to assume caregivers 
would be welcome everywhere.  They are not, however, and they should not be.  The 
reasons include the problems just mentioned, as well as the wider relations of power that 
care reflects.  The end goal is to specify how these factors bear on hospitality, and to 
draw out their implications for ethics. 
I proceed as follows.  In the first section below, I recall how Kant advances an 
argument for restricting hospitality in his famous treatise Perpetual Peace.  Kant was 
unusually attuned to the problem of imperial visitors and to the need for restrictions on 
hospitality.  In the subsequent section, I consider how Derrida responds to Kant, reading 
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with and against him, drawing not only on Kant’s political writings but also on the 
distinction in his moral philosophy between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative.  
I address the difficulties thrown forward by the imperious visitor for Derrida’s Universal 
Law of Hospitality, which centrally informs his perspective on hospitality.  Next, I think 
through how the gendered world order I have been describing—which is organized by 
public and private spheres—conditions the visits of caregivers in humanitarianism and 
migration.  To assess how this “conditioning” matters, I turn to a care perspective. 
 
The Case for Restricting Hospitality 
 
The political thought of Immanuel Kant on hospitality provides a sensible starting 
point, both because he has been a key reference for contemporary theorists, and also 
because he was one of the most prominent modern philosophers to struggle with the 
problem of the “inhospitable” international visitor.  It is not that ancient thinkers and 
modern natural law theorists had entirely overlooked hospitality, but at least among his 
contemporaries, Kant treated the problem of unwelcome visitors more systematically and 
with greater sympathy for the predicament of the visited.355 
It was in his famous treatise Perpetual Peace that he elaborated his argument for 
the illegitimacy of the imperial behavior of commercial enterprises and “commercial 
states.”  His basic contention was that such behavior would thwart progress toward an 
enduring international peace.  Cosmopolitan visitors of this kind, he contended, should be 
subject to heavy restrictions.  He wrote, “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions 
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of universal hospitality.”356  Kant believed hospitality was due to international visitors 
who sought no more than to present themselves in foreign locations and would not make 
excessive demands on their hosts.  He called this the “right to resort,” which comes from 
the German word Besuchsrecht and is sometimes translated as the “right to visitation.”  
Kant defined the right to resort as the right of the visitor to be received peaceably.  He 
explained, “hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when 
he arrives on someone else’s territory.”357  Note what a minimal demand this is.  Kant 
even suggested the visitor seeking resort could be denied if he would not perish as a 
result.  “He can indeed be turned away,” Kant wrote, “if this can be done without causing 
his death.”358 
Kant contrasted the international visitor who can claim the “right to resort” with 
another type of international visitor who can claim the “right of a guest.”  This 
terminology comes from the German word Gastrecht and is sometimes translated as the 
“right of residence.”  The language of “guest” and “resident” applies when a stranger 
seeks more than presentation in a foreign location, and therefore puts greater demands on 
the host.  Because of these greater demands and extra burdens, Kant insisted the reception 
of guests should be negotiated, not presumed.  He argued that since “the right of a guest 
to be entertained” demands more of the host, it “would require a special friendly 
agreement whereby he might become a member of the native household for a certain 
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time.”359  Kant could not imagine how peace could be pursued if international visitors 
could simply assume the status of guests.  European visitors could and did presume 
residence overseas, no matter the inconveniences they caused, the violence they 
perpetrated, or the resistance they encountered. 
Notice how the right of the guest seems to be a kind of concession, wherein Kant 
introduced some “give” so the whole architecture of his argument better withstands 
challenges.  Kant likely anticipated his contemporaries would not go in for the argument 
international travel could only be visitation—that would have been far from customary 
practice in his time—but maybe he thought they would accept a slightly more flexible 
formulation. 
Regardless, the consequence of this framing of cosmopolitan rights is to rule out 
all acts of empire.  Europeans were constantly “inhospitable” in the sense that they 
always exceeded the entitlements of the visitor.  Along these lines, Kant wrote of 
European countries, “the injustice which they display in visiting foreign countries and 
peoples (which in their case is the same as conquering them) seems appallingly great.”360  
As visitors, Europeans traveled and conquered, obviously exceeding the right to 
presentation.361  And Kant did not seem confident Europeans could negotiate their stay 
and live in other countries as guests.  If they could not even be trusted as visitors, how 
could they be trusted to remain true to the more demanding commitments required of 
guests?  It seems that for Kant, even if Europeans had negotiated some kind of “special 
agreement,” it could hardly have been “friendly” in spirit.  Again, dominating another 
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country plainly exceeds the claims of a guest since conquest has nothing in common with 
living at peace.  Accordingly, Kant argued Japan and China did right to severely restrict 
the entry of Europeans.  In short, Kant seems to have issued what amounted to a total, if 
understated prohibition on European travel.  It is not surprising he bobs and weaves in the 
process, for he was used to dodging the censure of the powers that be.362 
Kant’s interest in curbing the imperial ambitions of Europeans is particularly clear 
in light of his manifest anger in Perpetual Peace.  Consider, for example, Kant’s sardonic 
remark that “the commercial states do not even benefit by their violence, for all their 
trading companies are on the point of collapse.”363  Also of note are his comments on the 
hypocrisy of European countries and peoples who speak of universal principles at the 
same time their imperial behavior betrays those principles.  Kant writes, “And all this is 
the work of powers who make endless ado about their piety, and who wish to be 
considered as chosen believers while they live on the fruits of iniquity.”364 
Kant’s writing on hospitality continues to be relevant, providing a starting point 
for feminist and deconstructive work.  At the same time contemporary theorists of 
hospitality have turned to Kant, however, they have largely turned away from his anti-
imperial message.  One exception is the feminist intervention of Wendy Sarvasy and 
Patrizia Longo.  At the forefront of their commentary is Kant’s stance against the 
expansion of European commercial and political power.  Reading Perpetual Peace, they 
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observe, “Kant's intent was clearly to protect non-western peoples from the aggression of 
European settlers.”365  And they convincingly argue his anti-imperial stance remains 
pertinent, though they contend the international visitors most relevant in the 
contemporary world are not European settlers but settlers from other parts of the world 
who seek to live in Europe.  Their focus is specifically on migrant care workers like 
nannies who now often travel from poorer contexts to wealthier contexts and do not 
always receive a hospitable welcome.  Sarvasy and Longo continue, “The host no longer 
needs protection.”366  They seem to believe the “inhospitable visitor” no longer exists in 
the world, a position I want to argue is premature. 
The upshot of Kant’s formulation is to embed hospitality in the history of 
geopolitics.  To summarize:  everyone is entitled to travel the world and present 
themselves wherever they wish.  But those who want more than to present themselves 
will have to negotiate the conditions of their entry.  And those who have failed in the past 
to abide these procedures or who have broken promises may have a more difficult time 
negotiating permission.  While another theorist might have believed each European 
traveler to have an idiosyncratic history, manner of acting, and potential to be a 
responsible visitor, Kant suggested Europeans had a history of bad behavior, and 
formulated his account of the politics and morality of hospitality accordingly. 
Kant in this way adds a historical dimension to his account of the politics of 
hospitality, casting history as a de facto condition on the possibility for a hospitable visit, 
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which is in addition to two formal conditions—first, the general moral requirement that 
practices of visitation should move the international community toward peace, and, 
second, the more specific requirement for explicit negotiations between visitor and 
visited on the guest status of the former.  In other words, the actions of a group of visitors 
in the past speaks to their readiness to be visitors and guests in the future, and, indeed, 
past actions may effectively negate the potential for friendly negotiation for guest status.  
The primary weakness of this argument is that it does not include a mechanism for 
coping with situations where it is not the visitor but the host who disregards basic moral 
or ethical responsibilities, as Sarvasy and Longo point out.  In such circumstances, Joan 
Tronto contends, we do not want to grant further authority to the host and further 
disempower guests by forcing visitors to carry the Kantian “burden of demonstrating that 
they deserve membership.”367  Something more needs to be done to ensure hospitality to 
less powerful visitors, and without saddling them with an additional load of obligations.  
Derrida was prepared to think through this issue, as I discuss in the next section. 
 
The Case for Extending Hospitality 
Concerns about the predicament of refugees and other migrants underlie the work 
of Jacques Derrida on hospitality.  Derrida leaves to the side Kant’s concern with 
imperial and inhospitable European visitors in order to attend to visitors that travel to 
Europe.  His goal is not only to prepare a more open and hospitable reception for 
refugees and other asylum seekers and migrants but, even more ambitiously, to unsettle 
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the very premises of ethical thought.  I address the first aim in this section and the second 
aim below.  I begin by reviewing some of Derrida’s comments on hospitality, and I then 
turn to difficulties in coming to terms with the politics of the visit. 
Derrida’s engagement with hospitality cannot be understood without reference to 
what he calls, “the Great Law of Hospitality.”  This he explains is “an unconditional Law, 
both singular and universal, which ordered that the borders be open to each and every 
one, to every other, to all who might come, without question or without their even having 
to identify who they are or whence they came.”368  This is a direct response to Kant, 
whose comments on hospitality in Perpetual Peace he reads carefully.  Recall that for 
Kant, hospitality fundamentally meant a right to presentation in foreign countries, with 
the caveat that resettlement would require negotiation.  In contrast, Derrida advocates 
removing all conditions from the granting of hospitality:  visitors should not be limited 
only to presentation, and guests should not be required to negotiate “friendly 
agreements.”  Again, it is important to recognize the visitors Derrida had in mind are 
arriving in Europe from other parts of the world. 
While this demand to grant hospitality might at first seem so abstract as to have 
little relevance to politics, Derrida maintained that exactly what is valuable about an 
unconditional standard of this kind is that it is “hyperbolic” and is characterized by its 
“inflexible exigence” in relation to politics.369  These qualities mean that such a standard 
“alone can inspire here, now, in the urgency, without waiting, response and 
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responsibilities.”370  This law, like all laws, is compulsory.  The Great Law “demands, it 
even creates the desire for, a welcome without reserve and without calculation, an 
exposure without limit to whoever arrives.”371  This vision—or something like a “vision,” 
for he hesitates to use this word—proposes a set of standards that could never fully 
emerge from politics, or at least not all at once or so coherently. 
Derrida anticipated a paradox in translating this standard into policy and practical 
activity.  For in practice an unconditional granting of hospitality to all who arrive might 
ruin the host, thereby making the hospitable reception of any future visitors impossible.  
The ideal of hospitality is in fact diminished every time there is an “attempt to render the 
welcome effective, determined, concrete, to put it into practice.”372  Nonetheless, this 
Great Law serves at least as an inspiration and perhaps as an ideal, which hosts—whether 
their domain is the home, city, culture, or country—should try to come closer to 
approximating.  He writes, “This is the double law of hospitality:  to calculate the risks, 
yes, but without closing the door on the incalculable, that is, on the future of the 
foreigner.”373 
It bears noting the demand to open borders is unconditional for Derrida in much 
the same way an imperative is categorical for Kant.374  Derrida himself alluded to this, 
explicitly associating the categorical with the unconditional.375  This allusion makes it 
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worth briefly revisiting what Kant meant in calling an imperative “categorical.” 376  Kant 
explained an “unconditioned command does not leave it open to the will to do the 
opposite at its discretion and therefore alone carries with it that necessity which we 
demand from a law.”377  The categorical or unconditional is peremptory, admitting no 
preconditions, caveats, or exceptions.  The categorical for Kant and the unconditional for 
Derrida both imply rejecting the predication of a moral obligation on any kind of “if,” as 
in, “if you will not be a burden on the state, then you may live here,” one of the historical 
prerequisites to American immigration.  For Kant such a qualified obligation would be a 
hypothetical imperative; for Derrida it would be conditional.  Going beyond Kant, 
however, Derrida suggests the unconditional cannot be “imperative” because that would 
mean its performance could be dutiful when the Law calls for it to be “gracious.” 378 
At any rate, there is no question Derrida offers a powerful interpretation of 
hospitality.  Yet, in the remainder of this section, I want to gesture to some of the 
difficulties in coming to terms with the inhospitable visitor from this perspective.  
Crucially, in Derrida’s engagement with Kant on hospitality, he never references Kant’s 
fundamentally anti-imperial stance in Perpetual Peace.  Garrett Brown writes 
observantly, “Derrida seems to focus his attention on the idea that hospitality is 
something liberal countries owe to visitors who are powerless, downtrodden and in need 
of assistance.”379  Echoing Sarvasy and Longo though not citing their work, Brown 
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reaffirms, “This ‘conditioned’ limitation on hospitality by Kant was not an effort to 
promote a xenophobic nationalism, but was an attempt to limit imperial colonialism 
abroad.”380 
Thus, Derrida’s omission of imperious visitors is significant since, as we have 
seen, it was in response to this specific political problem that Kant put conditions on 
international hospitality in the first place.  Moreover, the omission is conspicuous, since 
Derrida reads Perpetual Peace with characteristic meticulousness, often quoting whole 
paragraphs and meditating on the meaning of sentences and words, leaving out or 
neglecting to comment only on the relevant passages on European visitors.  Given that he 
could not have avoided reading those passages, it is plausible he addressed the issue of 
imperial visitors in a lecture that has not been published or translated.  Or perhaps he 
used Perpetual Peace to develop his own perspective on hospitality precisely because its 
countervailing politics would make it impossible for future readers to believe Kant had 
provided him with a secure textual anchor, the consequences of which might even include 
an unmooring of the authority of the Great Law.  Whatever the explanation, as we begin 
to weigh the significance of the inhospitable visitor for world politics in the present-day, 
we might with Kant “suspect that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may none 
the less be covertly hypothetical.”381 
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At least one interpreter has reread Derrida to address the inhospitable visitor.  
Gideon Baker finds the inhospitable international visitor to be a major problem in 
modernity, and, in fact, a virtual constant in history.  He gives as one extraordinary 
example the arrival in 1519 of the Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortés to 
Tenochtitlán, the capital of the Aztec empire, where he was welcomed by Montezuma.  
Mistaking Cortés and his men for a divine envoy, Montezuma offered him everything, 
and ultimately submitted to imprisonment and forfeited his empire.  As Baker reflects on 
the event, “no host has come closer to offering unconditional hospitality and never have 
the results of hospitality been more terrible.”382  Baker also believes humanitarian 
military interventions are pertinent examples of the relevance of the ethics of hospitality 
to our time, though this requires a major reorientation of terms, as I discuss in a moment. 
Baker contends the inhospitable visitor is not a fatal problem for Derrida.  Instead, 
Baker suggests the possibility the visitor could be either a god or a devil, as he puts it, 
only highlights the highly political nature of the decision on the welcome.  He argues this 
decision is “undecidable” in that, “With regard to each and every foreigner that comes I 
must take a position between the poles of hospitality [unconditional and conditional], 
knowing that this is not, and could never be, a generalizable decision.”383  For Baker, the 
instability of the decision means there is likely to be a politics of a high order around the 
choice to receive or rebuff the one who arrives.  Because there is no way to adjudicate the 
decision apart from the circumstances presented in particular cases, he argues we should 
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expect the decision to create heated political contestation.  This argument is persuasive, 
but here Baker makes an unacknowledged though consequential break with Derrida.  For 
how could practices of the visit responsive to the Great Law of Hospitality be 
“undecidable” in this sense when that law is defined precisely by its “exigence,” not by 
its ambivalence?  This presentation of undecidability seems to represent an alternative 
ethical position.  Nonetheless, Baker’s discussion is helpful in construing the high stakes 
and volatile politics around hospitality. 
Baker has even more to say on this.  Continuing along these lines, he suggests that 
to the extent undecidability is in play, the politics of hospitality may be still wider in 
scope due to the presence of multiple decisions.  In addition to the decision on the 
reception or rejection of the visitor, Baker continues, there is also the “decision between 
the universality of law and rights and the singularity of the Other.”384  The difficulty here 
lies in the fact that in its generality law can never completely describe singularity.  
Universal laws will always contain a deficit of information about other selves, and 
hospitality will necessarily involve deciding how to bridge that gap between universality 
and singularity.  And there is still another kind of undecidability in play.  It has to do with 
whether to offer hospitality only here or also far from here.  As one application, Baker 
suggests that an ethics of hospitality pertains to humanitarian military intervention.  He 
argues a state in a position to receive visitors may also be in a position to extend 
assistance abroad.  Baker sees continuity in the predicament of those who arrive and 
those who are at a distance, for those at a distance might have arrived, too, if it were not 
for the difficulties caused by the very circumstances that prompted some to come.  If the 
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one who arrives is due hospitality and assistance, why not that one who does not arrive?  
Following this reasoning leads him to think of hospitality at home and intervention 
abroad as basically continuous practices. 
I contend this position is untenable.  Like Derrida, Baker ultimately situates the 
practice of hospitality in powerful states.  Actors in powerful states have to make a 
decision, though now it is a decision between only providing hospitality here, to those 
who arrive, or also attempting to extend assistance to those who do not arrive.  Strikingly, 
Baker does not entertain the possibility that people who would receive humanitarian 
interveners should be able to decide to welcome, restrict, or reject them.  It is not clear 
why he does not theorize this as a possibility, except perhaps that adding still another 
“undecidable” decision would make an already complicated picture more complex.  The 
fact that he does not do so is all the more surprising given that his impressive history of 
the inhospitable visitor clearly indicates the potential for precariously situated 
communities to be imposed upon, even destroyed, highlighting the importance of their 
capacity to issue an authoritative “no” (or “yes, if…”) on the reception of the visitor.  
While Baker makes a significant contribution in bringing to the fore the many sources of 
political contestation around hospitality, he misses the most important one:  the struggle 
of people around the world to reject imperious visitors or to at least set the terms of 
visitation.  This means ultimately Baker does not offer a satisfying corrective or 
addendum to Derrida. 
Put simply, unconditional hospitality does not seem to be a good or just standard 
across all contexts.  It reads one way in France and another way in Haiti, for example.  
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Think about the humanitarian presence that began amassing in Haiti even before the 
earthquake in 2010.  Is the vision, ideal, or standard “that the borders be open to each and 
every one, to every other, to all who might come, without question or without their even 
having to identify who they are or whence they came”?385  Haitians initially received 
humanitarians with minimal calculation or reserve.  But this may not have been for the 
best.  We now know some years out that the future of the foreigner that was not 
calculated in 2010 was a Cholera outbreak.  Epidemiologists identified South Asia as the 
origin of the strain of Cholera in Haiti, and eventually traced the spread of the bacteria to 
a camp of United Nations peacekeepers who had carried the disease from an outbreak of 
Cholera in Nepal.386  As of March 2012, more than half a million Haitians had contracted 
Cholera, leading to more than 7,000 deaths.387  Humanitarian organizations are now more 
well-intentioned, competent, and accountable than ever, but they are still unable to 
forecast or cope with the wild uncertainties inherent in actually providing protection and 
relief.  And unless the world becomes more predictable, it is unlikely they ever will.  
Should the ethical default be that humanitarians get an unconditional welcome? 
A reasonable argument might be made that Derrida would grant Haiti should put 
restrictions on visitation, because, again, Derrida was aware in practice hospitality would 
always be conditional.  Still, the greater the restriction, the farther Haiti would seem to be 
from unconditional hospitality, with the possible implication that it would be farther from 
manifesting an ethical existence relative to states privileged enough to be able to open 
their borders more fully.  Although Derrida surely would not have wanted to create a 
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status hierarchy with those closest to the unconditional at the top and the rest below, it is 
not clear how to prevent this unintended effect.  In equating the terrain of ethics with 
hospitality, and the practice of hospitality with complete openness, Derrida makes it 
difficult to read as ethical the rejection or limitation of humanitarians, even of some of 
them, or of any other visitor, whether in the present or historically. 
The problem with deriving the meaning and ethics of hospitality from the Great 
Law, or any universal ideal or maxim, is that political history and political contexts are 
rendered secondary, which is advantageous in some respects but also hazardous.  The 
movement between the universal and the singular seems to leave little possibility to 
consider the political and social formations in between these poles.  To think in terms of 
universals is to construe contextual specificity as irrelevant to hospitality.  To think in 
terms of singularities is to regard acts of hospitality as always contingent, the prospective 
visitor as always unknowable, and every decision on the welcome as if it were unlike any 
before it.  If everywhere, everyone encountered visitors just as likely to be threatening as 
not—and encountered them as frequently—at least the risks in striving to give hospitality 
unconditionally would be universally shared.  But this is obviously far from reality.  
Thus, such an ethics threatens to specifically disable less powerful societies in that it 
leaves few resources for justifying limitations on more powerful visitors, visitors who 
have a history of bad behavior, or visitors who in the course of the visit reveal themselves 
to be imperious or incapable of good behavior. 
These problems highlight the limits of a deconstructive ethic:  it is relatively 
unresponsive to some forms of politics and to some forms of power.  Part of what it 
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means to imagine an ethic as unconditional is to put it at a remove from politics.  As a 
consequence there is a hiatus between the ethical and the political that cannot entirely be 
overcome.  While this is useful for formulating a powerful call to action, hospitality 
clearly has a lot to do with politics.  It involves decisions, friends and enemies, violence, 
scarce goods, money, beneficiaries and casualties, desire, interest, instrumentality, power 
differentials, and powerful norms.  Derrida tells us as much.  Again, what Derrida does 
not allow to explicitly inform his ethics is how these political elements coalesce in 
patterns over time, within states and among them; it is not that a distinctive politics 
emerges with each new petition for hospitality.  It may not be the case that hospitality is 
politics, but it is certainly political in many respects. 
Derrida’s contribution is considerable, for it is surely crucial to continue to 
champion openness in European nations and in other powerful, intransigent societies.  
Yet Kant’s wisdom about politics and about how an ethic of hospitality can counter the 
god-on-our-side imperiousness of powerful visitors is too significant to discard.  In the 
next section, I make the case a perspective on care helps to differently contextualize the 
relationship between visitor and visited.  Conditions on hospitality are problematic, as 
Derrida argued, but the pertinent conditions are not only the result of policies and social 
relations internal to states.  There are also global conditions that shape patterns in 
hospitality across contexts, empowering or disempowering visitors in relation to those 
they visit.  I return to my primary focus on caregivers vis-à-vis those who receive care, 
and I am particularly interested in the conditions associated with a world order defined by 
public and private spheres.  Because the global public sphere and the global private 
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sphere reinforce and predetermine the nature of the relationship between visited and 
visitor, they may also restrict, marginalize, or otherwise diminish the politics around 
hospitality.  The publicity humanitarians are able to garner, and the seemingly universal 
support for their action, for example, may put pressure on those they visit to reduce or 
eliminate the conditions on their entrance. 
 
Reconsidering the Politics of Hospitality 
Caregivers crossing borders present a particularly important “test” for these 
perspectives on hospitality.  In the abstract caregivers would seem to be the most 
desirable of all strangers who might arrive.  What society wouldn’t want more care?  The 
previous chapter showed states actively seek caregivers.  Yet, neither the travel of 
caregivers nor the reception of caregivers can be taken for granted, for in many countries 
caregivers are restricted entry or denied entry altogether.  Perhaps in part because of the 
very nature of care—its indispensible contribution to life and the intimacy it frequently 
involves—the status of strangers as caregivers only intensifies the problems, the stakes, 
and the politics of extending hospitality.  What are the relevant international conditions 
on hospitality to caregivers, how exactly do they matter politically, and where do they 
leave us ethically? 
Global public and private spheres impose regularity in who cares and who gets 
care.  They naturalize and normalize international caregiving.  We see this especially 
with regard to the two paradigmatic caregiving relations I have been discussing 
throughout the dissertation.  There is the relationship where a powerful actor cares for a 
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less powerful actor—humanitarian organizations from relatively powerful countries 
usually convey aid to less powerful societies.  And there is the relationship where 
powerful countries and substate actors are able to command care from those who are less 
powerful.  As in national contexts these relationships of care are buttressed by the public 
and private spheres as globally extensive domains.  This dissertation has already shown 
how these two “spheres” of international politics are analogous to and in some respects 
extend the public sphere and the private sphere that have historically organized life in 
many countries. 
In addition to naturalizing relations of care, these spheres also naturalize practices 
of hospitality.  Recall that the high profile of humanitarians depends on the publicity 
granted to them in the global public sphere.  This is its “mediatronic” characteristic.388  In 
recent decades, humanitarian organizations have relied on extraordinary publicity 
campaigns to raise funds for their activities.  The media is essential to the fiscal viability 
of their efforts.  The campaigns are the primary mechanism by which their activities in 
the public sphere are represented as vital.  Humanitarians are portrayed as exemplifying 
an ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship, as representatives of humanity, as altruistic, 
philanthropic, capable, competent, and good willed, to name a few of the virtues 
attributed to them. 
In indirect ways, the media makes hospitality for humanitarians possible.  
Publicity strengthens the convention that humanitarians should be welcome, wherever 
they go.  This is exemplified by one of the images that circulated after the earthquake in 
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Haiti to recruit donors and raise funds for humanitarian organizations.  The image is of a 
Haitian man amidst rubble, reaching out his hand, the clear message being he needs 
immediate assistance.389  Such imagery makes it seem as if there were no choice to be 
made on humanitarian visitors; or rather, the choice has already been made and it is 
“help, now!”  Along these lines Himadeep Muppidi and Bud Duvall write, “The pain of 
the Other, their pain, sets off a frantic race in time.  They are dying!  Let’s do something.  
Place your finger on the carotid.” 390 
Assumptions around relief again reveal how the relationship of power and care 
has come to seem natural.  Publicity around humanitarianism conceals the fact that there 
ever might have been a real question about hospitality.  This is the limit of humanitarian 
publicity.  The fact that international humanitarians themselves receive hospitality tends 
to remain unseen.391  Humanitarians are not routinely represented as guests or even as 
visitors.  It is telling there are few if any shared “ethical” and “moral” rationales or 
standards for turning away, limiting, or expelling humanitarians.  Instead, humanitarians 
presume that, as responsible, competent parties, they should be allowed entrance 
everywhere and that negotiations are a way to access those they want to care for, not 
forums for deliberating on whether international assistance is needed or on what care 
might mean, including what principles might undergird operations, what each party 
brings to the table, and what will be best practices.  The logic of saving trumps such 
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considerations.  And to many this logic seems apropos, fitting and natural in the way 
firefighters presume they are justified in acting without invitation or prior notice, much 
less extended discussion over the terms of their stay and the precise nature of the 
activities they will perform.  The field of humanitarian diplomacy exists to train 
humanitarian negotiators to do better at getting access to populations.  To again turn to 
Muppidi and Duvall:  “the appearance of the Other, their sighting, is always an 
emergency….And their visibility, their emergence on the horizon of our community, is 
always already the moment of action and not dialogue or critique.”392  Rescue requires 
decisive action, or so the reasoning goes, and the necessary expedience cannot be 
achieved with too many restrictions or conditions. 
When the hospitality granted to humanitarians is visible it is when hospitality to 
humanitarians is refused, sometimes violently.  News outlets do publicize accounts of the 
expulsion of humanitarian organizations from states perpetrating massive violence on 
their citizens.  The effect of this pattern of media coverage is to make it seem as if the 
only possible reason for expelling humanitarians would be to prevent them from 
witnessing gross atrocities.  It comes to seem, in other words, the only reason there could 
be for refusing humanitarian assistance is political expedience, or, to put it more bluntly, 
to get away with murder.393  Such events attest to the fact the desire for care cannot be 
taken for granted.  There are likely many less spectacular moments when societies wish 
to limit assistance.  Humanitarians are in fact visitors—or visitors presuming to be 
“guests,” to use Kant’s more precise categorization. 
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Media also play a more direct role in shaping practices of hospitality.  The media 
provide leverage to humanitarian diplomats in their efforts to overcome the resistances of 
recalcitrant parties who would block humanitarians’ access to those in need.  This 
suggests one more way in which in the relationship of power between humanitarians and 
those they care for, humanitarians generally have the upper hand. 
A recent edited volume from Médecins Sans Frontières calls attention to the 
fraught, seemingly endless, and sometimes fruitless negotiations its representatives 
undertake to gain access to populations in distress.394  The volume is an admirable 
contribution, exemplifying the depth in which MSF critically examines its own 
practices.395  Still, the compilation of essays also discloses limits in how far the 
organization will go in this regard.  While contributors discuss negotiations extending 
over many years with government leaders, armed opposition groups, and other actors, 
only a handful of chapters even mention the possibility of a real dialogue with those who 
would be beneficiaries of their care.  Muppidi and Duvall remind us of the “multiply 
muted bodies that will never be heard within the global economy of care.”396  They ask of 
humanitarians, “What about engaging them as political beings, understanding their 
politics, their contexts and their conflicts?  What if they could be co-authors of their 
care?  What role for democratic engagement and not administration or governance alone 
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within the humanitarian economy?”397  Given the absence of any deep engagement with 
these questions, the MSF case reports on negotiations from around the world seem a bit 
thin and instrumental, harkening to Kant’s sense that negotiations might confer 
legitimacy on guests but that such legitimacy is obviated in the presence of imperiousness 
and the absence of good faith engagement.398 
The power position inhabited by humanitarians—and the limitations of these 
negotiations—is indicated as well by their capacity and willingness to withdraw 
assistance at a time of their choosing.  In a telling statement, Marie-Pierre Allié, the 
President of the French section of MSF, clarifies that “the issue for MSF is not so much 
achieving total freedom of action, but being able to choose its alliances according to its 
own objectives, with no allegiances and no concerns about loyalty.”399  This statement of 
the humanitarian principle of independence is relayed as an expression of courage, but, to 
anticipate my comments below, it is clearly problematic from a care perspective.  
Respecting the relationship between the ones who care and the ones who receive care is 
paramount in ensuring the ethical goodness of care.  It is difficult to understand how it 
can be possible to read practices of care as morally good in the absence of concern for 
maintaining that relationship and responsiveness to recipients of care. 
Reflecting the private sphere context, and a contrasting context of power and care, 
migrants have a very different international profile.  Derrida presents Hannah Arendt’s 
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comments on the variability of “anonymity and fame,” citing her suggestion that “‘[o]nly 
fame will eventually answer the repeated complaint of refugees of all social strata that 
‘nobody here knows who I am.’”400  Migrant workers are represented in the national 
media of the countries from which they hail.  In the Philippines and other countries that 
send many workers abroad, migrant workers are celebrated for their service to the 
country.401  There are also important international, national, and local advocacy and 
research organizations, and these organizations draw worldwide attention to the 
vulnerabilities and hazards migrants face.  But these portrayals do not usually celebrate, 
appreciate, and convey gratitude to migrant workers for the care they perform.  At most, 
their care in the private sphere is interpreted as following from necessity, not as virtuous 
humanitarian service.  Terms like cosmopolitan, impartiality, independence, and care are 
literally absent from the discourse on migration; they are not among the terms defined in 
the official glossary produced by the International Organization for Migration.402  In 
contrast, they would be principal keywords in any explanation of humanitarianism. 
It is easy to see the different power position that caregivers occupy relative to care 
receivers in this relationship.  In contrast to the reception of humanitarians, it is legitimate 
for states to treat migrants as visitors and guests.  While putting conditions on 
humanitarians appears to be a sign of impending or already ongoing atrocities, and thus 
of pariah status, it is utterly normal for states to place conditions on migrants.  The 
international community understands such restrictions as a mundane sign of a sovereign 
state in control of its borders.  We read and hear about states trying to exclude and expel 
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refugees and undocumented migrants.  Examples of this type of state behavior appear in 
the news daily.  For instance, in 2012 the Israeli government was reported to be pursuing 
measures to prevent and repatriate refugees arriving from South Sudan.403  In such cases, 
refugees are not permitted to be visitors, much less guests. 
The circumstances in which migrant caregivers depart also reveal their standing in 
their relationship of power with those they visit.  In some cases, migrant caregivers may 
choose to leave their work situation for idiosyncratic reasons.  Yet, they may also be 
forced to leave when the host government or employer chooses not to renew visas or 
employment contracts.  Unlike humanitarians, they cannot call on the international media 
to support their negotiations with states for a remedy and for access to the individuals and 
populations they would assist.  The feminization, privatization, and commodification of 
their work all contribute to reducing their prospects for entering into negotiations about 
their visit. 
There are broad processes of legitimacy and authority formation in play here.  
Bonnie Honig argues persuasively that foreigners can solve certain problems for the 
identities of democratic states.  Along these lines, she writes, “Sometimes, the figure of 
the foreigner serves as a device that allows regimes to import from outside (and then, 
often, to export back to outside) some specific and much-needed but also potentially 
dangerous virtue, talent, perspective, practice, gift, or quality that they cannot provide for 
themselves (or that they cannot admit they have).”404  Honig’s primary concerns are the 
narratives and self-understandings of democratic regimes, but the applications of her 
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argument are broader.  She helps us to see how identifying and receiving foreigners can 
contribute to the stability and legitimacy of certain political formations. 
In international relations, global public and private spheres are legitimized by 
practices of hospitality and vice versa.  Hospitality interprets individuals who move 
between countries as diplomats, workers, missionaries, refugees, humanitarians, and 
tourists, and helps to orient each state in relation to other states and not only in relation to 
states but in relation to certain norms and understandings, like masculinity and 
femininity, citizenship, and care, all issues central to this dissertation.  Another way to 
put this is that the system of dualities I have been describing is constantly reproduced 
here.  Practices surrounding the visit like requesting identification, creating visa 
categories, determining visa status, and granting visas can invoke the distinction between 
emergencies and normal times; between caregivers for society and caregivers affiliated 
with families; between voluntary care and remunerated care. 
In closing, I simply want to mark this as a potentially useful strategic lever, which 
I will return to again in the conclusion to this chapter.  A politics might include the aim of 
interfering with these acts of reception and, ultimately, with the norms they embody and 
the world order that they help to reproduce and stabilize.  Hospitality might be a site for 
publicizing—and celebrating—the care work of migrants.  And making the granting of 
hospitality to humanitarians visible would help to show that they are in fact visitors—and 
if they want to be guests, they will need to ask for permission. 
Such actions might help to mitigate forces of publicity and privatization and the 
way they serve to restrict the politics of hospitality.  In the case of migrant caregivers, 
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this restriction took the form of migrants being less able to participate in the decision-
making process around the visit.  In the case of humanitarian caregivers, the global public 
sphere helps to give them an edge in their negotiations for access.  In both cases, the 
effect is the same—to reduce the scope for a vigorous politics around the decision on 
entry.  In other words, the kinds of politics theorized by Baker, and that embody the 
difficulty of the decision on hospitality, may be less likely to materialize under the 
normalizing conditions of global public and private spheres.  The consequence for 
humanitarians is that they travel relatively easily, while the consequence for migrant 
caregivers is that they have relatively little power to influence their status. 
 
Rethinking Ethics? 
If hospitality is ethics, as Derrida suggests, it is either a complement to care ethics 
or a rival to it.  Care also entails an expansive description of human life and an ethos for 
human togetherness.  My purpose in this section is not to stage a grand contest and 
deliver care ethics a decisive victory, however, but instead to underscore how a care 
perspective can clarify additional ethical concerns.  In particular, a feminist care ethic can 
assist us in thinking about the relationship between visitor and visited, particularly when 
visitors are caregivers, and how public and private spheres contextualize this 
relationship.405  For an ethics of hospitality centers on the question, how will you treat the 
one who arrives?  In contrast, an ethics of care asks, how do you treat someone to whom 
you are already in some way related, or will be in the future? 
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There are affinities between hospitality and care as ethical perspectives.  
Hospitality is a universal moment of relating to others and to ourselves.  In that we are 
always leaving and entering, arriving and bringing into arrival, accepting others and 
aspects of ourselves, hospitality is basic to the human condition.  Derrida writes, “Insofar 
as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of 
dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to 
ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality.”406  
One is always potentially if not actually a participant in hospitality.  Accepting that our 
lives are not fundamentally about isolation or autonomy means deciding whether to treat 
those who are not here as foreigners, who could never be counted among us, or 
acknowledging relations that bind all of us, in ordinary times as well as in emergencies. 
Like hospitality, care implies rejecting the notion of an autonomous sovereign 
subject who is fully in control of reason and action, who is assumed in Cartesian and 
Kantian moral philosophy.  Care ethics is premised on the idea that human beings are 
seldom so self-possessed or self-reliant.  While specific kinds of care and needs for care 
vary widely, at least some forms of care are essential to human life, at least during some 
periods of the life span.  This means that one is also always potentially if not actually a 
participant in care. 
Yet, there are deep differences between these perspectives.  Care is premised on 
the assumption of an economy of actual personal relations among people (and states) who 
are sometimes caregivers, sometimes care-receivers, and usually both.  The ethics of 
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hospitality is not.  Derrida clarifies the Law is “beyond debt and economy.” 407  Instead of 
an economy of relations, hospitality appears to always involve the expectation of 
someone new.  Derrida is so insistent in linking hospitality to the new, the stranger, and 
the foreigner it is not clear whether the Great Law, which is ethics, governs how we are 
with those whom we already know.  Derrida himself seems to raise a question about this 
when in a final meditation in Of Hospitality he refers to a tradition of stories about fathers 
sacrificing their daughters for the purpose of saving their guests.408  He doesn’t make 
anything of this, but raises it as a final difficulty.  Hence, at the same time on one face the 
ethics of hospitality seems to entail a rigorous standard for practice, on its other face it 
appears to be silent on and irrelevant to how we treat those whom we know.  For theorists 
of hospitality it is the visit that triggers ethics, not relations that predate or extend beyond 
the visit. 
In contrast to this view on the ethics of hospitality, relationships are at the core of 
feminist care ethics.  It may well be the case there is a practice of hospitality that works 
in the moment of the first interaction, as I have said, yet what happens over time?  Care 
ethics does much better in supplying possible answers to this question.  Treating the 
visitor well, at first and in time, might mean providing competent, responsible, responsive 
assistance.  Theorists of hospitality ought to think further about how relationships are 
reinforced over time by a variety of institutionalized conditions, not just immigration 
policy.  
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A feminist ethics of care is political in a manner that a deconstructive ethics of 
hospitality is not.  Recall from Chapter 1 that the basic insight of understandings of care 
as a political concept, as distinct from care as a maternal or psychological concept, is that 
it is at least as much about power as it is about compassion.  It is precisely as a political 
concept that care acquires its analytical and critical sharpness.  As Joan Tronto writes, 
“Care becomes a tool for critical political analysis when we use this concept to reveal 
relationships of power.”409  Expressions of care index relations of power that might 
otherwise be unreadable as such.  Elsewhere Tronto continues along these lines, 
suggesting “any account of care forces us to ask constantly: who is caring for whom, 
what is the dimension of power in the care relations, and is that power distorting the 
nature of care?”410  In many caring relations, as between parents and their children, or 
between friends, power is normalized and institutionalized and does not draw attention or 
raise objections.  In some such cases power is not apparent.  A political ethics of care 
might be a realist theory in this sense of taking into account the pervasiveness of power 
and its effects. 
Still, care theorists can learn from theorists of hospitality.  While care theorists 
concentrate on how societies give care, how powerful societies receive care is as good a 
test of their virtue.411  And care theorists would do well to think harder about the 
freighted moment of the “new” and how difficult it is to do well by others in the absence 
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of a shared history and mutual knowledge.  A first interaction, the start of a process of 
being together, implies no prior mutual acquaintance and thus that the one in the role of 
caregiver has incomplete information about the one who is receiving care.  In care ethics, 
there may be something in the ethical moment of attention to cope with the “new.”  Yet, 
it is not clear that there is enough to deal with difference, or with the “unexpected” and 
the “uncalculable,” and the unpredictability and uncertainty these terms imply.  Derrida’s 
account of hospitality suggests how to act in such cases of unknowingness. 
While hospitality and care may differ in some ways, these dissimilarities are not 
so great as the differences they share with the more universalist perspectives that 
continue to dominate the approach to moral understanding in political science.  The 
available options for an international ethics seem to reduce to a choice between raising 
the status of the state or diminishing the status of the state.  Communitarians interpret the 
state as the primary site of community and hence moral bearing, while cosmopolitans 
diminish the state and treat individuals as fundamentally autonomous moral agents.  
Ultimately, as ethics, care and hospitality offer different yet complementary analyses and 
prescriptions.  Both of these perspectives improve our interpretation of the politics and 
ethics of the visit. 
 
Conclusions 
 The difficult choice the Guelleners confronted is one many societies face, whether 
the visitors are migrants, humanitarians, or not caregivers at all.  And there are no easy 
answers.  Because care is so essential to human life, because being cared for involves 
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risks, because caring involves risks, and because caring almost always involves wide 
differentials in power, the decision will always be difficult. 
In thinking the ethics of hospitality, Kant and Derrida remain important.  Kant 
reminded us that powerful actors, no matter their intentions, should not have a free pass 
to settle wherever in the world they wish.  This holds even when those powerful actors 
are coming to care.  Recent scholarship on the disconnect between good intentions and 
good outcomes has given new currency to the quip that the last thing anyone wants to 
hear is, “We’re the United Nations and we’re here to help.”  Even in the case of a large, 
respected international organization there should be a decision on entry.  Thus, whether 
hospitality is warranted cannot be taken for granted. 
Historical and global formations of power belong in the foreground of reflection 
on these questions, for these formations significantly condition the visit across contexts.  
The global public sphere and the global private sphere are particularly consequential, as 
they are significant in helping to predetermine practices of hospitality and may 
potentially pre-empt politics around hospitality within state and sub-state settings.  Thus, 
for instance, even while the MSF volume on its negotiations demonstrates admirable self-
reflexivity and openness, the book and the publicity tour that accompanied it also serve to 
generate consent for international humanitarianism and thus to promote international 
unanimity for humanitarian governance.  In other words, describing humanitarian 
negotiations does not in itself involve interrogating or dismantling the pressures that 
make humanitarian hospitality possible.  It might mean just the opposite—reinforcing 
those conditions and pressures. 
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These conditions, as much as specific policy restrictions states place on visitors 
should be the basis of political engagements.  Critical interventions into the politics of 
hospitality must not be limited to grappling only with the visitor in relation to politics 
within particular nations, societies, or localities.  This is not a wide enough view, since 
politics and morality cannot be contained within the boundaries of the nation state. 
There are other ways care ethics can provide guidance to the practice of 
hospitality.  To close, I want to suggest gratitude as a possibility.  Gratitude to caregivers 
would be appropriate in some, though not all circumstances.  When care receivers are 
powerful relative to caregivers, gratitude is a morally serious practice because it can 
address hierarchies in care relationships.  Remember Tronto suggests hierarchies might 
be addressed by democratizing care.412  Yet, the problem I have underscored throughout 
the dissertation is that international relationships seem particularly resistant to 
democracy.  Gratitude might be an alternative, if only a provisional one.  It represents a 
moment for powerful states and societies to recognize the assistance they have received, 
and the competence and sacrifices of those who provided it.  As such, it is one less 
moment in which the powerful reassert their position, and even a moment in which they 
readjust their standing, potentially reconfiguring this social relationship.  It has an affinity 
with hospitality, yet we must be hospitable to those who visit us but not necessarily 
grateful to them for their arrival. 
As a societal practice, gratitude is difficult.  Receiving care well necessitates 
adopting unfamiliar attitudes.  It means individuals and societies will not be able to fall 
back on a more familiar script of noblesse oblige, or show off the fruits of their privilege.  
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They will instead have to come to grips with dependence.  As such, it is a turn away from 
imperial power relations and practices.  In the United States, there is some recognition for 
caregivers:  Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, National Teacher’s Appreciation Day, a day to 
appreciate physicians, and a whole month to recognize nurses.  Tellingly, domestic 
worker activism has sought to raise their profile by organizing appreciation for their 
work.  Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo reports, “In March 2000, California state assembly 
member Gilbert Cedillo authored and received overwhelming assembly approval to 
recognize March 30 as Domestic Worker Appreciation Day.”413  Nonetheless, Americans 
could do much better in extending appreciation.  Of course, there are many instances in 
which a “thank you” would be impossible, inappropriate, or meaningless.  Still, even if 
speech is unavailable or has been incapacitated care receivers might still be able to 
express non-verbal or non-literal gratitude, and neighbors, friends, and kin certainly 
could. 
In any case, westerners anxious that “our” foreign assistance makes “them” 
dependent should confront the fact that we ourselves are dependent on international aid; 
that we may not ever be able to get ourselves out from our dependencies and debts; and 
furthermore, that we continue to have unmet needs despite all the assistance.  Societies 
that have wanted to help the United States in emergencies have already seen these needs 
exist.  Why not admit the truth of their characterizations, accept the help, and thank them 
for it, too? 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has explored the meaning and significance of care in world politics.  A 
wide lens on caregivers reveals the incomplete spread of progressive ideas; the resistance 
of material inequalities to those ideas; the expression of international hierarchy; the 
ascendance of interstate security politics around care; and the tenuousness of expectations 
that humanitarianism will inaugurate a new democratic international community.  A wide 
lens has showed the institutionalization of care has also meant the institutionalization of a 
gendered logic in the international system:  there is an international formation of 
institutions, ideas, and identities around care that is familiar, closely resembling the 
private sphere that has long defined subnational social and political life; another 
international formation more closely resembles the public sphere, the important 
distinction with the national realm being that care is a central and visible constitutive 
element.  These institutionalized conditions shape not only politics but also ethics among 
nations. 
It is time to revise our preconceptions about care.  Scholars of international 
politics risk solipsism when they take the care provided by humanitarian organizations to 
be politically and morally special.  While going to great lengths to distinguish 
humanitarianism from its missionary precursors and commercial peers, they have little to 
say about how humanitarianism differs from the form of care that is its nearest relative—
a relative that not only bears a family resemblance but looks much like an identical twin 
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at the level of practice.414  Feminist theorists often repeat the truism that care is and has 
always been marginal to politics.  While one field of care in international relations 
continues to be marginal, another field is socially recognized and valued positively when 
associated with humanitarians.415  And Americans are too reductive in their imagination 
of the nature of relations between themselves and other peoples.  In supposing themselves 
to be benefactors and not beneficiaries of international assistance they contribute to 
imperious conduct in international relations.  Seeing both faces of care in world politics, 
we will all be able to better resist the conclusion that humanitarianism represents the only 
possibility for caring, compassion, assistance, and meeting needs across borders. 
In this conclusion I address several issues related to theorizing care in 
International Relations.  I return to the division between global public and private spheres 
and re-read it as a “moral boundary” that has limited ethical thought; I then summarize 
this dissertation’s primary contributions; I suggest the applicability of this analysis to 
politics and policy; finally, I propose several possible paths for future work on care in 
world politics. 
 
Tracing New Moral Boundaries 
Joan Tronto argues three intellectual boundaries have limited the depth and range 
of moral understanding.  First, philosophers draw a boundary between morality and 
politics, treating these subjects as distinct and separable domains of inquiry.  Second, 
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philosophers enforce a boundary between objective, purportedly universal moral claims 
and actual, specific moral predicaments, abstracting moral questions from the relevant 
actors and their scenes of action.  Third, philosophers maintain the boundary between the 
public sphere and the private sphere by treating the public sphere as if it comprised the 
entire landscape of moral questions and insight, neglecting the private sphere.416  
Working on one side of all of these boundaries has been detrimental to moral 
understanding.  To clear new thinking space, Tronto proposes embedding morality in 
political context, rethinking moral questions in context, and reevaluating the moral 
weight of practices traditionally associated with women and the private sphere. 
Still other boundaries shape the study of international relations.  For much of its 
history, the most salient moral boundary in the discipline was the one that divided 
interpretive, speculative, normative, and critical political thought from formal theory and 
empirical social science.  Interpretive, speculative, normative and critical political 
theories were marginalized.  In a field organized around making sense of the causes and 
effects of war, as Tronto points out, morality was ruled out of bounds.417  Hostility to 
unconventional methodologies combined with incredulity about the existence of moral 
action in international relations exacerbated the problem. 
The exclusion of moral thought corresponds to still another boundary:  
International Relations was founded on the perceived distinctiveness of the national and 
international realms, and the understanding that morality pertains to only one of these 
domains.  Scholars across the subfields mostly agreed political theory should focus on the 
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domestic realm, and that moral theory and moral practice were impossible in 
international politics.  Writing in the inaugural issue of Foreign Affairs, political theorist 
John Dewey suggested, “The truth seems to be rather that man’s morals are paralyzed 
when it comes to international conduct; that they are swept away and rendered impotent 
by larger forces that go their own way irrespective of the morals that are employed in 
everyday matters.”418  Others argued visions of the good and the just could not 
reasonably pertain to the international realm in the absence of a genuine international 
community to embody them.419 
The discipline is now somewhat less closed to speculation about world politics 
and to normative theory, at least on the old grounds.  Subfield boundaries still exist, and 
modes of inquiry are still narrowly defined and heavily policed, yet there are signs of 
intellectual openness.  Realists from E.H. Carr to Kenneth Waltz to John Mearsheimer 
have long stressed the importance of history, which is not just a substantive area but a 
mode of inquiry that has sometimes tilted the discipline closer to humanists than 
scientists.  Liberal social scientists have begun to refer more frequently to an international 
community, in addition to the possibility and desirability of institutions for democracy 
and justice at the international level.420  Critical theorists have done most to introduce 
interpretive methods traditionally associated with political theorists, and they have 
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addressed questions about the substance and meaning of ethics in world politics, 
including the political dimensions and ramifications of moral projects.421 
An especially telling sign of the times is the new journal International Theory 
dedicated to such pursuits.  The editors of that journal explained in its first issue the time 
was ripe to reexamine theory’s place in International Relations.  They argued that recent 
historical developments “challenge the core empirical claim of [International Theory] 
skeptics, namely that international politics is and will always be a realm of necessity.”422  
Along with the new journal, it is noteworthy the International Studies Association now 
houses a Theory section.  Political theory ought to evolve, too—to include speculation 
about what exists in world politics, and to scrutinize and critique global relations of 
power.  This is one moral boundary now more easily crossed.  It is worth remembering, 
however, that exceptional 20th century political theorists and philosophers took up issues 
of right and wrong in world politics, including Reinhold Neibuhr, W.E.B. Dubois, Frantz 
Fanon, Hannah Arendt, and her teacher Karl Jaspers.  Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that sees speculation about world politics to be a rare event in 20th century 
political theory, international theorizing rated among their primary contributions. 
Thus, I join many others in arguing ethics can and ought to address the 
international domain.  The shortcomings of a lens centered on any particular state are 
clear in light of the movements of people across borders to perform activities loaded with 
moral significance.  Instead of focusing only on the international domain, I have tried to 
bring to the fore relations between several levels and sites of analysis.  Fiona Williams 
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argued for the importance of this move, suggesting we need to know more about the 
linkages between care at the “micro level,” which includes “everyday experiences,” the 
“meso level,” which includes “the national/supranational institutional context,” and “the 
macro level,” which encompasses “the processes of globalization that have fostered a 
global political economy of care.”423  My dissertation helps to represent some of these 
linkages by showing how the organization of care extends between different levels and 
sites of analysis—particularly between the home, the state, and the world—making 
possible a perspective on ethical questions that does not necessarily require privileging 
one realm or another.  Like Williams I think it is crucial to recognize this multiplicity of 
connections, but I also think it is risky to underrate the state or to treat the states system 
as if it were a thing of the past. 
This dissertation has also addressed a moral boundary that scholars in 
International Relations have done much less to conceptualize.  One of the primary 
arguments it has advanced is that politics among states is conditioned by global public 
and private spheres.  If the boundaries of the private sphere once coincided with the 
territorial borders of national states, where the latter would fully contain the actors, 
activities, and conditions we understand to be characteristic of the former, it is difficult to 
make that case today.  The upshot of the scholarly inattention to the separation of the 
global public sphere from the global private sphere is that it remains an unseen yet 
formidable moral boundary.  Our theories about what is moral and what is ethical have 
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been and will continue to be implicitly contoured by the division so long as it remains 
invisible. 
This order shapes care and understandings of it.  To see this more fully we have 
had to pay attention to another group of caregivers, international humanitarians, who are 
more likely to be identified as cosmopolitan citizens, and who are understood to be active 
in creating, reinforcing, and taking advantage of worldwide public institutions.  Different 
gendered ideologies surround humanitarians—ideologies like paternalism, masculinity, 
and perhaps breadwinning—though it is breadwinning only in that they accrue and 
deliver value to their home society.  Embedded in global public and private spheres, two 
forms of care exist in a diffuse relationship of dependence, where the activities in the 
global public sphere depend ideologically and materially on the work performed in the 
private sphere, even while this dependence is obscured. 
This boundary corresponded to the ubiquitous opposition in Western political 
thought between the private sphere—conceived as the domain of women, domesticity, 
family, and care—and, in stark contrast, the public sphere—conceived as the domain of 
men, publicity, community, and citizenship.  The political and intellectual enclosure of 
women in the private sphere impaired ethical thought.  As Joan Tronto explains, “even if 
women could demonstrate that they possess a unique set of moral qualities and 
perspectives, these perspectives could easily be contained by arguing that they have no 
place in a realm of life that extends beyond the private sphere of friends and family.”424  
Among other exclusions, to disregard the private sphere is to rule out the moral 
worthiness of care.  The alternative is not simply to valorize that domain and its moral 
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qualities and perspectives, but to weigh how the latter change how we see life 
everywhere, including in the public sphere. 
Similarly, scholars in International Relations have studied (and sometimes 
celebrated) the moral content of international humanitarianism, while they have largely 
neglected the possibilities for thinking in the same terms about other caregivers who 
cross borders, or, for that matter, all caregivers, regardless of their status.  In International 
Relations, what is most widely recognized as care, whether for approbation or criticism, 
is the image of the voluntary care performed by international humanitarians in the public 
sphere, while the possibility the care performed by those who are paid for it in the private 
sphere might be a moral achievement is inconceivable; in fact, this work is not often (if 
ever) considered by the disciplinary mainstream. 
It is not hard to identify moments of omission or reckon the loss.  Here is an 
example.  When Michael Walzer inquires into the justice of caring for distant others, he 
thinks of caring as a duty as well as a gift, and of international humanitarianism as 
exemplary.425  Whether remunerated care embodies justice, too, is a possibility Walzer 
just does not entertain.  Nor does Walzer think about how caregiving expresses taking 
responsibility for someone other than the immediate recipient of care.  These are real 
circumstances.  When a parent goes abroad to earn wages to support a family, then he or 
she is caring for patients or clients as well as for his or her own children.  Why isn’t this 
labor, which is caring in a double sense, morally substantial?  Would anyone argue that, 
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because they are paid, the activities of doctors, nurses, nannies, and teachers cannot be 
counted as genuine expressions of care? 
At a time when humanitarianism is becoming an integrated field of thought and 
practice, it is all the more important to pay attention to this moral boundary in 
International Relations.  If the title of a recent book by Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell 
is indicative, humanitarianism is increasingly its own “world.”426  We should all attend to 
who is excluded from this world, and with what implications for how care is conceived.  
What questions and conversations are barred from the discipline when we exclude some 
transnational caregivers and practices of care? 
In the context of international life this boundary appears different than in the past.  
The old question was what would it mean if the kinds of activities taken to characterize 
the private sphere had a place in the public sphere.  In international politics, care is 
recognized, but only a particular kind of care.  What do kinds of care that are not 
normative have to offer political thought about the moral content and import of care?  
Again, are there qualities and types of perspectives that are obscured when attention is 
given only to one domain of activity, namely, activity in the public sphere? 
Attending to the global private sphere means seeing that it is possible to care 
simultaneously for multiple, differently situated others.  Remember those who cross 
borders for wages are often caring for themselves and several others at once.  The 
situation of many international nurses exemplifies this point.  They care for others 
immediately in the course of their professional duties, and they care for others at a 
distance, often their children and other family members, by providing financial support.  
                                                
426 Walker and Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World.  This language is in the title. 
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Such arrangements trouble the notion that care means one caring for one other.  More 
than a corrective to descriptions of caregiving in world politics, introducing a third (and 
fourth and fifth) term might help to further destabilize the dualism between the self and 
other, which is the ontological basis of much thinking about caring. 
In addition, there are questions all caregivers and care scholars might address 
about caring in the context of difference.427  These questions include, how is caring best 
practiced in a world characterized by a hierarchical order of power?  How do caring 
attitudes and practices need to adapt to difference?  What type of dialogues and 
negotiations are possible between caregivers and those who receive their care? 
Finally, we can think better about the consequences of the monetization of care 
when we pay attention to the full range of international care.  At the same time some 
argue that for immigrants love is “gold,” in other words, that it is fundamentally a 
commodity, others argue that for humanitarians real care must be animated by 
voluntarism.428  These views underestimate what care is and what paid care might be.  To 
return to Walzer again, I am not sure “the gift” understood as voluntary care should be 
the ultimate standard for goodness or justness in care, because even well compensated 
care can retain some moment, element, or essence that would in some sense be given, and 
hence as morally worthy as a gift.  It seems important to trouble the paid: not paid 
dualism in estimating the moral and ethical value of care. 
                                                
427 On the question of difference in humanitarianism, see Michael N. Barnett, "Humanitarianism as a 
Scholarly Vocation," in Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, ed. Michael N. Barnett and 
Thomas George Weiss (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). Alison Jaggar, "“Saving Amina”: Global 
Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue," Real World Justice  (2005). 
428 On the first argument, see Hochschild, "Love and Gold."   On the second argument, see Barnett and 
Weiss, Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread, 12. 
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The point in introducing the global private sphere and pairing it with the global 
public sphere is not to reinstate a pernicious dualism on a world scale.  I hope these 
points show I wish to contribute to undoing the dualism between public and private by 
addressing how these two terms are related, and also by conflating them and challenging 
their distinctiveness.  Others might do more to situate these terms on a wider continuum. 
 
Reviewing the Contributions 
This dissertation has been concerned with revealing the divergent manifestations 
of care in world politics.  The politics of care cannot be seen, much less explained or 
evaluated with conventional theories of International Relations.  Yet, care relates to 
phenomena widely recognized as important in the discipline, like how hierarchy 
organizes and conditions world politics; how and in what condition states survive; how 
states identify themselves and each other; how nonstate actors contribute to state identity 
dynamics; and how gender organizes world politics.  To explore these issues, I have 
referenced the profession of nursing, which appears in both international 
humanitarianism and international migration. 
I have argued care cannot be well understood attending only to immigration or 
humanitarianism.  World politics entangles them both.  I explained in Chapter 1 my 
interest in the institutions and processes that exert a shaping force on caregivers and that 
generate interstate politics around care. 
Chapter 2 advanced the argument that public and private spheres remain useful 
categories.  I used the concepts of global public and global private spheres to map the 
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conditions and relations under which care is organized on a world scale.  And I drew 
attention to the problems of partial publicity and gendered hierarchy in the organization 
of care on the international level. 
In Chapter 3, I argued if international humanitarians seem special it is because 
over time humanitarians have expelled other caregivers from their moral universe.  I 
illustrated these dynamics of differentiation and exclusion with reference to the history of 
nursing.  The core ideas about voluntary service to humanity that unite and identify some 
transnational caregivers—namely, humanitarians—also divide and differentiate them 
from other caregivers—namely, immigrants.  This differentiation and privileging of one 
sphere over the other is symptomatic of the gendered ordering of public and private 
spheres. 
Chapters 4 and 5 turned to politics.  I argued taking stock of the politics of care 
requires attention to all international caregivers.  This turn matters to appreciate the 
reality that care is not only or primarily involved in world politics on behalf of struggles 
for peace, as Sara Ruddick has suggested.429  Care is entangled in politics in the system.  
Securing care and caregivers is valuable to states, for it helps to maintain their 
populations and ultimately their sovereignty.  Giving care is also valuable to states, for it 
symbolizes their sovereignty.  Getting care and giving care, then, are bound to the search 
for power in ways the discipline has overlooked. 
Chapter 5 discussed the politics and ethics of hospitality that surround migrant 
and humanitarian caregivers.  I argued insistence on hospitality to all caregivers at all 
times is not a viable moral position.  I showed Kant and Derrida make the case that 
                                                
429 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace; with a New Preface. 
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international conditions that lead to the admission or rejection of international visitors 
carry ethical weight.  They also carry political weight, undermining the possibility for 
deliberation on the reception of caregivers.  I pointed out the global public sphere and the 
global private sphere are systems of international conditions that bear on caregivers, and 
ultimately imply that humanitarians and migrant caregivers confront different 
possibilities for relating to those they care for.  Rather than arguing for imposing 
conditions on the visit or removing conditions on the visit, I suggested it is important to 
consider the different ways that these conditions operate. 
These interpretations of care suggest revisions to popular common sense about 
care in the United States, which underplays the politics of care.  Americans, particularly 
young people, tend to understand humanitarian care as “a noncontentious form of 
contemporary activism.”430  In this view, entrenched preconceptions about morality, 
national interest, and politics get in the way of an appreciation for power in care and 
obstruct earnest efforts to know and understand the world.  Americans need to understand 
the very existence of societies around the world has come to depend on care.  No society 
can flourish, or even persist without adequate healthcare and childcare.  But care is 
constantly scarce, and when states are unable to marshal domestic resources to care they 
recruit caregivers from other countries.  Moreover, societies project care abroad and 
bolster their status in the international system.  States seek to get and give care as a matter 
of survival, and so for states care is always more than a morally important or socially 
appropriate policy endeavor. 
 
                                                
430 Finnegan, "Beneath Kony 2012: Americans Aligning with Arms and Aiding Others," 146. 
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Connecting to Politics and Policy 
My analysis suggests prescriptions for politics and policy, some that I alluded to 
already.  Short of revolutionizing the world order that divides public from private 
spheres, governments, humanitarians, and individuals should address the segregation 
between caregivers. 
National governments carry responsibility for action.  Chapter 5 proposed 
hospitality as a site for dismantling institutional mechanisms, norms, and habitual 
practices that uphold global public and private spheres.  In addition, comparison between 
the hospitality states expect for the humanitarians they send, and the inhospitality states 
show to caregivers they might receive could provide leverage in reforming practices of 
reception. 
Humanitarians should continually strive to understand and assimilate not only the 
technical requirements of competent care but also further demands of good and just care, 
which exceed procedural competence.  In particular, reflection and deliberation about 
how to value the principle of equality among caregivers is warranted.  So is grappling 
with how to implement an egalitarian outlook without ignoring power differentials or 
flattening diversity.  A good first step would be to elevate the principle of equality in 
codes of conduct and other such field materials.  And vigilance is due among individual 
international and local humanitarians who are responsible for nurturing egalitarianism in 
their practice in relation to each other. 
Humanitarians should exercise care in how they relate to local and global publics. 
Nongovernmental organizations that hire communications specialists with the express 
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purpose of setting global norms—known as “Thought Leaders” (TLs) and “Deep 
Thought Leaders” (DTL) at Mercy Corps—should look beyond the narrow self interests 
of the organization that employs them.  Media featuring humanitarians heighten the 
appearance of difference between humanitarians and everyone else.  This is particularly 
true of media appeals for funds.  In the United States, such portrayals invite Americans to 
see themselves as potential benefactors and saviors, as good as actual benefactors and 
saviors by mere existence of the possibility. 
National publics who identify with humanitarians (and refuse to identify with 
other caregivers) need to take responsibility, too.  People need to do the political work of 
refashioning popular common sense about care.  They need to value care and caregivers 
of all stripes according to the goodness of care rather than to the class and ethnicity of 
caregivers.  Americans are too assured in relation to others, to begin with, in presuming 
to know the nature of the differences between themselves and others, and then in 
supposing those differences are not so great as to obstruct knowledge of how to care on 
behalf of and for others.  It should be more well known, on the one hand, that efforts to 
care are precarious, and, on the other hand, that the United States is a society dependent 
on international assistance. 
Ordinary people could offer respect for caregivers through media like Twitter and 
Facebook.  People could move to publicize their own dependence.  They should not 
overlook how they themselves are beneficiaries of foreign assistance.  We could all also 
be more thoughtful in connecting local practices to global institutions of care.  If 
individuals judge that it would be best to continue to fund humanitarian operations, they 
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could do so on a more regular basis, so humanitarians could stop conjuring mesmeric 
stories of rescue. 
 
Plotting New Research 
 The analysis of care in world politics is relatively new, so the possibilities for 
description, explanation, idealization, and critique have by no means been exhausted.  
Here are a cluster of theoretical, ethical, and historical questions in need of further 
reflection and research. 
 One question that needs study is the relationship between great powers and 
international caregivers.  When have great power states received humanitarian assistance 
and under what conditions?  Before the creation of federal institutions for disaster 
management in the mid-twentieth century, American cities carried primary responsibility 
for coping with disasters.  In response to the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, for 
example, Japan reportedly sent financial assistance to the city.  There have been more 
recent emergency situations, including the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 
when Americans might have benefited from more extensive international humanitarian 
assistance.  Other countries and international humanitarian organizations have not 
abstained from offering help, and some help has been accepted.  Yet, the United States 
tends to refuse humanitarian personnel, particularly from countries that oppose U.S. 
security interests, like Cuba and Iran.  When exactly did the United States begin refusing 
international care and on what terms?  And what do we learn about the relationship 
between power and care from these offers and from subsequent consent or refusal?  
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These issues become more puzzling when we consider that the United States does receive 
assistance in other forms.  Great powers like the United States seem willing and eager to 
receive assistance from migrants, why not from humanitarians?  Why does the United 
States actively seek one kind of care, and consistently refuse the other kind of care?  My 
dissertation has provided a theoretical account, yet more work is needed to fill in 
historical details. 
In international relations—how should the morality and ethics of care address 
sovereignty?  Should sovereignty defined as national independence be prioritized as an 
ideal and ultimate end for care?  Michael Walzer echoes the conventional thinking when 
he suggests “sovereignty is in fact humanitarianism’s morally necessary end:  a decent 
state, capable of providing security, welfare, economic management, and education for 
all its citizens.”431  The doctrine known as Responsibility to Protect contains a similar 
formulation in which protecting populations treated irresponsibly by their states is 
conceived as a stopgap measure, ending violence with the ultimate aim of restoring the 
full sovereignty of the state.  As noted in the introduction, some care theorists argue that 
the point of care is to promote independence.432  Parenting, for example, usually aims at 
raising self-determining adults.  Yet, other theorists propose instead of independence as 
the endpoint of care, the emphasis should be on the fact that we all need care—and thus 
that vulnerability and dependence should instead be revalued.433  Along these lines, 
presumably because it is so commonplace, Fiona Robinson calls vulnerability in world 
                                                
431 Walzer, "On Humanitarianism: Is Helping Others Charity, or Duty, or Both," 80. 
432 Engster, The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory. 
433 Jenny Morris, "Impairment and Disability: Constructing an Ethics of Care That Promotes Human 
Rights," Hypatia 16, no. 4 (2001). 
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politics “natural.”434  I worry this formulation risks inadvertently minimizing the role of 
power and human agency in producing the security of some and the vulnerability of 
others, a point she raises elsewhere.  But she is right to decenter sovereign independence 
as an ideal, and to join others in probing its place as an organizational principle of world 
politics.  We cannot wish away the sovereign state, of course, and perhaps we would not 
want to do without it, but political theorists could turn to the “hyperbolic” to think where 
sovereign independence fits in ethical practices and moral visions. 
It is necessary as well to better take the measure of the ethical stakes in receiving 
care.  Feminist theory has sketched the moral contours in providing good care.  
Considerably less thinking has been directed to the part of care recipients in the care that 
they receive.  This might be due to a concern that undue burdens would be placed on 
relatively powerless care recipients, or, on the contrary, that undue power would be 
granted to relatively powerful caregivers.  But powerful states and substate actors treat 
doctors and nurses from other countries inhospitably, even while those doctors and nurses 
offer life-saving (and state-preserving) assistance.  Finding some way to respond 
intellectually and politically to their inhospitality and to suggest a way of receiving or, 
indeed, graciously refusing care seems necessary.  In the end, this is an ethical question 
that might be of interest to international and political theorists alike. 
Finally, more needs to be thought and written with respect to strategy.  My point 
in trying to discern a political and scholarly separation between public and private is not 
to hold up either the global public sphere or the global private sphere as somehow natural 
or morally superior.  The point is to analyze it, criticize it, and change it.  Post-WWII 
                                                
434 Robinson, The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security. 
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institutions upholding global public and private spheres have acquired an inertia that will 
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